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Dedication to Dr. Marilyn Fernandez
It is with great collegial affection and gratitude that the Department of Sociology
dedicates this issue of the research annual Silicon Valley Notebook to Professor
Marilyn Fernandez. Dr. Fernandez, who will be retiring at the conclusion of the 20182019 academic year, has been a major contributor to the Department of Sociology
throughout her years and Santa Clara. Among Dr. Fernandez’s many other
contributions, she was singularly responsible for launching Silicon Valley Notebook
and has guided its development ever since. It is therefore quite fitting that the volume of
Silicon Valley Notebook should be dedicated to Dr. Fernandez.
To inspire and edit a research journal devoted to publishing work of students in a
discipline and at a university (which is similar to what Emile Durkheim had intended
when he first established L’Année Sociologue), a person must have many qualities
including commitment to students, excellent command of written language, and facility
in helping people articulate a thesis, marshal and assess evidence, and hone logical
arguments. It also helps to be an outstanding researcher who can serve as a good role
model. Dr. Fernandez is a first rate researcher who has helped shaped current
sociological understanding of a number of important empirical topics, including domestic
violence and social mobility in the 21st century. And as a methodologist, her
collaborative work (along with Dr. Stephen Fugita) yielded what is certainly one of the
most careful longitudinal research studies to explore complex relationships between
behavioral and attitudinal factors over a long course of time. Her other methodological
contributions include (along with Dr. Charles Powers) development of new
methodological approach for quantifying and measuring meso-level features of
organizational structure and culture.
As a teacher, mentor, and editor, as well as in her own research, Dr. Fernandez
has demonstrated extraordinary methodological versatility. She has, furthermore,
consistently stressed the necessity of keeping theoretical premises at the center of the
research design process, the necessity of selecting methodological strategies
appropriate to the topic being studied, and the desirability of employing multi-method
research design (informed by a combination of quantitative, qualitative, and historical
inquiry) whenever it is practical to do so. All these qualities of mind and intellectual
approach have helped to make Dr. Fernandez an excellent role model for Santa Clara
students for almost three decades, with her serving as editor or associate editor of
Silicon Valley Notebook for the majority of those years.
Marilyn Fernandez has been more than a researcher at Santa Clara. She has
also been a deliberative and effective contributor within the department and on campus,
serving three different tours of duty in the demanding job of department chair. Arguably
her most important new initiative in her years as chair, and certainly the initiative which
Professor Fernandez cared about most, was launching Silicon Valley Notebook as a
vehicle of professional socialization, to provide many students with a meaningful
opportunity to benefit from steady guidance while honing their research and writing
skills, and to encourage students to engage in meaningful professional work informing
sociological understanding of important topics.
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Many of us who have worked with Dr. Fernandez feel we are better people as
well as more fully prepared as professionals as a result. We ask that, whether or not
you have worked on a previous issue of Silicon Valley Notebook, you take this
moment to think about Dr. Fernandez, and consider sending her any personal
comments you might wish to share (mfernandez@scu.edu).
Dr. Fernandez remains dear to the hearts of many who have been have been
associated with the department since her arrival at Santa Clara University in 1992. The
department is profoundly grateful for all of her many contributions and is profoundly
lucky to count her as a member and a colleague. And we all know we can look forward
to more informative research and thoughtful analyses in the future, as Dr. Fernandez
turns her attention to studying and writing about the sociological processes which unfold
people make major life-stage transitions.
Dr. Charles Powers
Professor
Department of Sociology
Santa Clara University
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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR OF
Silicon Valley Notebook, Volume 17
Dr. Marilyn Fernandez, Professor of Sociology
The Sociology Department at Santa Clara University is proud to present, in this volume
of Silicon Valley Notebook, four research papers written by students from the class of
2019. As in the past years, the substantive, theoretical, methodological, and applied
content of the Sociology curriculum at SCU are reflected in these papers. Originally
prepared as part of the Research Capstone course (Sociology 121), the student authors
further refined their work during the following quarter for inclusion in this volume.
Taken together, the authors addressed a classic sociological issue, the tensions
between social structure and personal agency in exploring the boundary limits of
environmental issues, community ownership, institutional trust, and socioeconomic
success. Each student used a mixed methods research design integrating survey and
qualitative analyses. They conducted rigorous quantitative analyses of national
secondary survey data to test predictions grounded in sociological theoretical traditions
and reflected on their potential social applications. Narrative interviews with sources
knowledgeable about their respective topics and content analyses of documents were
used to supplement their quantitative findings.
Student authors in the first set, “Class and Race Boundaries of Community Challenges”,
explored the socio-economic boundaries of carbon footprints and community ownership.
Erin Jessica Ronald starts this section with her paper “Creating Low-carbon
Communities: Evaluating the Role of Individual Agency and Systemic Inequality in San
Jose, CA.” The respective roles that human agency and systemic inequalities
(dimensions of Gidden’s Structuration model) played in carbon emissions was the
central theme. Concentrated wealth intensified the propensities of upper class and
dominant race groups to create larger carbon footprints while individual and
demographic agency played minor roles, mainly in less wealthier communities. She
used the 2016 SDG San Jose Dashboard data of city blocks and 2013 ACS survey,
supplemented with interviews with eight climate action-oriented community engagement
professionals in the South Bay, to illustrate the need for customizing interventions to
communities with varied socioeconomic and racial concentration. Elizabeth Namakula
Kamya rounds off the section with her paper titled, “A Community to Call Mine:
Supportive Community Environment and Citizen Actions?” She identified the social
class boundaries of strategies for improving resident attachment using the 2010 Soul of
The Community Survey as well as narrative insights from community development
professionals and community initiatives. Taking ownership of their communities meant
having a supportive social fabric to residents of thriving communities (supporting
Solari’s Affluent Neighborhood Persistence Model) while residents in poorer
communities prioritized political action and a strong social fabric (per D’Maggio and
Powell’s New Institutionalism). Her scholarly contributions to the boundary limiting
conditions of community development also highlighted the need for tailored community
strategies.
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Shifting the focus internationally is Noor Darwish in her paper titled, “The Middle
Eastern Societies: Institutional Trust in Political Turmoil and Stasis’. She documented
the political boundaries of citizen trust surpluses and deficits in institutions in the North
African and Levantine regions in the Middle East. Her analyses of the 2016 Arab
Barometer, supplemented with qualitative insights from two Middle East scholars and
content analyses of journalistic accounts, revealed the trust deficit caused by
governmental dysfunction, balancing out the trust surplus created by government
functionality. Trust deficits were particularly acute in North Africa, a region rife with
political turmoil, in contrast to the Levantine region with its political stasis amidst
economic inequality. Weber’s political legitimacy along with Mosca’s elite theory offered
the theoretical foundation for her analyses of the contested citizen-government
relationships.
Finally, Anna Paris Heider, in her longitudinal examination of the socioeconomic
success of Americans in their youth and in early adulthood, identified some racialized
limits of home and school resources for success theorized by Bourdieu, Coleman,
Lareau, and Massey and Denton. For her analyses of the “Racialized Resource
Models of Socioeconomic Success: A Mixed Methods Analysis of White and African
American High School Students,” she used the 2002-2012 NELS survey data, in
which 16,197 10th graders were followed up over the course of ten years. The
statistical findings, along with narrative commentaries from education professionals
and content analyses of journalistic/documentary evidence, pointed to racialized
resource pathways to success. While resources in the home, and to a lesser extent in
the school, were critical to the early educational success of both blacks and white
youth, black young adults, unlike whites, could rely only on their home socioeconomic
resources for their later socioeconomic success.
As a collection, the student research presented in this volume, continue to exemplify the
evidence based social science curriculum offered by the Department of Sociology at
Santa Clara University. The social issues and their boundary limits explored have
important policy and programmatic implications. These applications resonate with the
University’s mission to prepare students, of competence, conscience, and compassion,
who will help fashion a more just, humane, and sustainable word.
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Class and Race Boundaries of Community Challenges
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Creating Low-carbon Communities
Evaluating the Role of Individual Agency and Systemic Inequality in San Jose, CA
By
Erin Jessica Ronald1

ABSTRACT. Following a scholarly need to test compelling community level
sociodemographic representations of environmental behaviors and outcomes, a
sequential mixed method approach was used to evaluate the connections of
human agency and systemic inequalities with carbon footprints. Statistical
analyses of the 2016 SDG San Jose Dashboard data of city blocks and 2009 2013 ACS survey data were supplemented with interviews with eight climate
action-oriented community engagement professionals in the South Bay.
Boundary limiting socioeconomic conditions for systemic inequalities and human
agency, dimensions of Gidden’s Structuration model, were specified. Partially
supporting structural inequality theories, socioeconomic resources, primarily,
and to a lesser extent dominant race concentration, were associated with larger
carbon footprints, particularly when wealth was concentrated. Both human (time
driven alone) and demographic (senior and mid-aged blocks) agencies were
also in part at play in shrinking or even enlarging carbon footprints, in wealthier
communities. These findings not only contributed to the literature on climate
action, but also highlighted the need for targeted interventions in communities of
different socioeconomic standing.

INTRODUCTION
Mitigating climate change is a profound and complex global challenge that requires
immediate reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Cities produce 70% of these
global emissions, making them critical sites for solving the climate crisis (Churkina
2016). Yet, while cities produce intense emissions, they can also be laboratories for
change. Change can be initiated at the municipal level, with top-down policy solutions
and/or it can manifest through mass behavior change. No matter who the primary
initiator of change is, addressing climate change involves a bottom up approach to
communities changing behaviors and reducing their carbon footprint. However, the
ability of individuals to reduce their carbon footprint is both enhanced and limited by
their own individual agency as well as structural forces, and both must be evaluated
when identifying steps to create low-carbon communities.

1

Acknowledgements: I would like to foremost express appreciation to my professor Dr. Marilyn
Fernandez for guiding me through this project, as well as my capstone cohort and the SCU Sociology
Department for their support and community. I would also like to extend gratitude to the interviewees that
shared with me their stories, and visions for a better future.
10

https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/svn/vol17/iss1/1

10

et al.: Class, Race, and Political BoundaryLimits of Community andPolitic

Carbon footprints include direct emissions created through burning fuel as well as
indirect emissions generated by energy used and created from activities and resources
consumed. However, there is a scholarly gap in understanding how community carbon
footprints are shaped by individual agency and or systemic inequality. Findings from this
study will extend the literature on climate action and provide additional insights into
successful measures for community level change to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Environmental scholars, in their explorations of sustainable choices and behaviors,
have focused, even if separately, on the place of human agency, in its many
dimensions, as well as structural circumstances, to understand the environmental
options available to the individual as well as communities. Their findings can be
categorized into two broad themes: options and actions that stem from human agency
as well as community structures. Human agency environmental scholars examined
preexisting socio-demographic characteristics as they dictated environmentally friendly
choices and the need for targeted interventions to overcome the human barriers.
Another stream in the environmental scholarship embedded individual behaviors in the
broader community, with a focus on the importance of social practices in cultural and
political contexts, the role of community social capital in changing behavior, and the
need to design structural interventions to address barriers.
Human Agency in Sustainable Lifestyles
Human agency for environmental change is foremost rooted in individual’s concerns for
the environment, their corresponding behaviors, and the outcomes that stem from these
behaviors. However, the connection among these three concepts is complex. As noted
in the reviewed literature, there is a disconnect among concerns, behaviors, and
outcomes, which can be partially understood by examining socioeconomic and
demographic features of families and households.
Environmental Concerns, Behaviors, and Outcomes
There is a complex set of connections between orientation that people have towards or
away from sustainable choices and environmental outcomes, which requires that
socioeconomic, demographic, and personal motivational factors be understood. For
example, in Hal and Allen’s (2014) secondary data analysis of surveys of the Scottish
population with 944 males and 933 females, energy use increased with income and
number of children in the household. However, higher education did not necessarily
affect energy consumption behavior, despite the more educated identifying themselves
as environmentalists. The educated environmentalist model was also confirmed by
Patel, Modi, and Paul (2017), in their multivariate analysis of micro-level behaviors
(ascertained using a questionnaire survey) of a “convenience sample of 256
consumers” (p. 192). Married and “mid-age” consumers in the Patel et al. study were
more likely to display pro-environmental behaviors, especially if they were highly
11
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educated. However, engagement in pro-environmental behaviors did not necessarily
effect overall consumption. Relationships of more energy use with more income,
children, and older age groups were documented by Abrahamse and Steg (2011) in
their study of energy consumption in 199 randomly sampled Dutch households. In fact,
they found these socio-demographic variables to be better predictors of energy use than
the established psychological variables of “tradition/security, power/achievement, and
openness to change” (p. 38). In sum, in this stream of scholarship, scholars illustrated
life circumstances that create inconsistent (pro and anti) pre-dispositions towards
environmental behaviors.
Socioeconomic circumstances of households have been useful in reconciling the
disjuncture, noted above, between environmental concerns, behaviors, and carbon
footprint outcomes. Using a multivariate regression analysis of 1203 households in the
Providence of Alberta, Kennedy et al. (2013) offered insights into the “differential
impacts of education and income on attitudes and behaviors” (p. 224). Those who had
higher levels of education typically cared more about the environment and were more
likely to engage in pro-environmental behaviors, while their less educated counterparts
were less aware of environmental issues. Yet, higher education also generated more
income which was associated with a larger carbon footprint. In other words, those who
are “more educated and affluent, and may in some cases actually engage in more PEBs
[pro-environmental behaviors2] also produce larger emissions” (p. 228). The authors
hypothesized that affluent individuals engaged in low-impact pro-environmental
behaviors in order to compensate for the large carbon footprint created by their other
lifestyle choices. In other words, the large negative impact of high SES lifestyle choices
and consumption significantly outweigh any positive impacts created by “private sphere
PEBS in which these well-educated, more affluent households engage” (p. 230).
Regardless, there is still a small, but significant ways in which individual’s proenvironmental knowledge, concerns, and behaviors can reduce overall carbon footprint.
Scholars have further specified the socioeconomic boundaries of the disconnect
between pro-environmental concerns and reduced greenhouse gas emissions
outcomes. For example, Wilson, Tyedmers, and Spinney (2013) analyzed
socioeconomic and well-being status of 1,971 households living in Nova Scotia, Canada
using multivariate analyses and found that indirect greenhouse gas emissions jumped
significantly at higher income levels, while direct greenhouse gas emissions were
decoupled from income. They hypothesized that such income shifts occurred because
there is a limit on the amount that members of households can consume, and once
basic needs have been met, income can then be directed towards “buying the bigger
home, traveling more, or having more electronic gadgets, thus explaining the jump at
higher income levels” (p.888). Younger and married households also had lower carbon
footprints while affluent households produced higher greenhouse gas emissions.
Interestingly, those who were more affluent, and correspondingly produced more
emissions, were not any happier or healthier than their less affluent counterparts. That
household incomes dictate carbon footprints, regardless of environmental concerns, is
2

Elaboration of the acronym added by authors in brackets.
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critical in understanding the complex ways in which individual agency does or does not
influence greenhouse gas emissions.
Engaging the Public in Environmental Practice
The environmental concerns-behavior-outcomes disconnect has critical implications for
how to engage individuals in sustainable practices. Critical to the process of citizen
engagement in creating low-carbon communities is the dual need for improving citizen’s
understanding of climate change as well as their capacity to take action. For example, in
a stratified random sampling of 589 residents from six wards on the south coast of
England, Whitmarsh (2009) found a duality in public understanding of climate change.
While most of these respondents knew climate change was happening, few considered
it a personal risk and understood the impacts of climate change in only a removed,
general sense. Only a small percentage associated climate change with personal
energy use, and most focused on the structural incentives that the government could
provide to encourage pro-environment action, rather than their personal responsibility.
In an article published two years later, Whitmarsh and her colleagues (2011), in their
survey of over 551 citizens in two UK cities on their abilities and motivation to reduce
emissions, continued to observe similar disconnections. UK citizens were very aware of
climate change, but often misunderstood its main causes and the effect they, as
individuals, had on the natural world. Instead they associated climate change with
activities that they could not control and those removed from their personal life,
disregarding critical individual actions such as the reduction of meat consumption,
travel, and shopping. Like other researchers, reviewed above, Whitmarsh and her
colleagues highlighted a serious value-action gap; their UK respondents were quite
knowledgeable about climate change but took few personal actions or responsibility to
address the climate problems. To bridge this gap and to inspire grassroots action, it is
important, they said, to address structural factors, such as enhancing the “availability
and attractiveness” (p. 63) of low-carbon options, as well as highlighting the personal
benefits of actions, and anchoring options within “pre-existing cognitive frameworks” (p.
58). In both sets of the Whitmarsh studies, the general public’s understanding of climate
change was found to be very limited and most inaction came from a lack of personal
connection to environmental problems.
Unlike the prolific human agency-sustainability research in Europe and even emerging
societies, there was not similar US scholarly attention discernible to the author. In a
survey study of 802 respondents in the United States conducted for the Annual
American Climate Perspectives Survey, it was found that there was a, “waning urgency
for climate change solutions” (American Climate Perspectives 2018:2) among women
over 50 years of age compared to previous years. However, within this group, minority
women were the most concerned. Latinx women reported the “highest sense of urgency
for reducing pollution” (p. 2), along with “higher agency in their [personal] ability to
reduce it” (p. 2). This group also discussed climate challenges more frequently with their
social groups, though African American women were most active in contacting voted
officials to make changes, such as increasing the walkability and bikeability of
13
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neighborhoods. While women were more engaged in sustainable actions than men,
Latinx and African American women drove the majority of the engagement as white
women reported the lowest levels of climate engagement out of survey participants. In
other words, engagement in environmental behaviors, along with concern for the
environment, was driven heavily by minority women.
Structural Facilitators and Barriers to Sustainability
Though the majority of scholars reviewed above focused on individual behaviors and
the importance of personal environmental motivation, others have addressed the
structural factors that facilitate or impede, as the case might be, pro-environmental
orientations and actions. Social networks, shared understanding, and community
interventions are some of the structural facilitators of environmental actions that have
been considered. However, even when a community is pro-environment in their
thinking, the absence of effective technological options as well as weak political
leadership and support impede meaningful progress.
Structural Facilitators of Sustainable Lifestyles
The critical role of social structure, particularly social capital, the networks and
connectedness in a community, in understanding environmental behaviors in a
community, was the focus of Sungchul and Hyeongsik’s (2017) research. Using a
“spatially stratified, random sampling telephone survey” (p. 293) of 1,324 individuals
along the Han river in China and multilevel regressions, Sungchul and Hyeongsik
discovered that social capital embedded in networks, through increasing the flow of
“local-specific” (p. 305) information, encouraged pro-environmental actions inside and
outside the home. Others, as Heiskanen et al. (2009), through their in-depth case
studies of four emerging low-carbon communities, elaborated on the structural nexus of
environmental challenges. They concluded that no matter the scale of the community, it
was shared “interests, practices and structures” (p. 7593) that were crucial to the
creation of low-carbon communities. Having a community that is inclusive and had a
shared idea of place, provided the social infrastructure for cooperative community
resource management and sustainable behaviors.
Research by Jiang, Dong, Zhu, Alimujiang, Zhang, and Ma (2018) further support the
need for community and structural interventions to shape environmental choices,
particularly in regard to institutional encouragement and priority setting. In their analysis
of electricity data from a survey of 191 students from Fudan University in China, Jiang
et al. found that both external social conditions and intrinsic motivation shaped behavior
needed for engagement in low carbon communities. In short, community and external
initiatives are needed to support the creation of social capital that can shape individuals’
pro-environmental beliefs and motivations.
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Structural Barriers to Environmental Interventions
No matter the citizens’ dispositions towards environmental behaviors, large barriers can
still exist at the community levels, inhibiting effective transitions to lower carbon
footprints. In a study of over 100 governmental and non-governmental energy-use
intervention programs in Australia, Moloney and her team (2009) found that while
attitudinal resistance can be a barrier to adopting energy efficient technologies, the lack
of energy efficient technology was an even more serious barrier even for those with
strong pro-environmental attitudes. This underscored the need for a context-specific
“socio-technical approach” (p. 7614) that addresses both limited availability of energy
efficient technology and attitudinal barriers for the success of community and
government initiatives. Socio-cultural factors, specifically “structural/operational,
regulatory/ legislative, cultural/behavioral, and contextual factors” (Burch 2009:7584)
can also function as barriers, holding communities back from environmentally conscious
decisions. Burch’s analysis of three cities in the British Columbia, Canada, offered
instructive illustrations of political leadership. Those with a conservative policy hindered
communities in their environmental progress, while strong leadership created ambitious
policy and dictated success. Political leadership must be combined with technological
advances and a large organizational capacity to involve citizens. When innovative
technologies are combined with initiatives to engage citizens, what was once cultural
and contextual barriers can be overcome to aid a community in the transition to a
smaller carbon footprint.
Suggestions for Future Research
Researchers, whose work was reviewed above, emphasized the importance of
considering both human agency and structural factors in understanding as well as
addressing environmental concerns and behaviors, but not outcomes. There were at
least two sets of constraints in these studies. The first was that the recorded selfreported values and behaviors analyzed were explicitly connected to environmental
issues. Scholars suggested that data collected from individuals, not primed for
environmental values, might offer more accurate portrayal of human agency and
structural forces. Second, few researchers have weighed the relative influences of
individual actions and structures on carbon footprint outcomes, a critical component in
creating environmental programs.
In the research presented in this paper, I used a variety of data sources to ascertain
individual actions as well as community characteristics that could have environmental
consequences. For example, in the American Community Survey conducted by the US
Census Bureau (a data source used in this analysis), respondents were not primed to
report questions about “environmental behavior,” thereby minimizing a potential
environment related bias. Using data that was not explicitly collected to measure
environmental impact can improve the accuracy of individual behavior. In this study, I
also focus specifically on a comparative evaluation of structural and human agency
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factors that directly influence carbon emission outputs of communities, a topic that has
received limited attention in previous research.
RESEARCH QUESTION
To expand our understanding of community carbon footprints, I used city blocks in San
Jose, CA as a case study in which to explore the respective influences of human
agency and systemic inequalities on community level carbon footprints. San Jose was
an ideal site because of its participation in the USA Sustainable Cities Initiative. The
initiative supported, “SDG [Sustainable Development Goals] achievement strategies in
three US cities by building on ongoing municipal sustainable development planning
efforts” (SDSN 20173) Collaboration with universities was a critical part of the process in
developing these strategies in cities. A partnership between the City of San Jose,
Stanford University, and San Jose State generated the data on carbon footprints for
block groups in San Jose.
There is agreement in the scholarly circles that carbon footprints are both products of
individual/household choices and/or systemic pressures that limit consumption choices.
A comparison of the respective roles of systemic inequalities and human agency
(individual actions and demographic agency) can provide insight into their respective
influences on high carbon footprints. Results from such an analysis can inform evidence
based approaches intended to target individual as well as community environmental
practices. To investigate how carbon footprints were shaped in San Jose, CA area, the
formal research question was posed as: What are the relative impacts of individual
agency and systemic inequalities on carbon footprints in San Jose blocks,
disaggregated by the communities’ socioeconomic wealth? Carbon footprints
represented the dependent concept while individual agency and systemic inequalities
were independent concepts. The analysis was additionally disaggregated by the
socioeconomic status of communities. Though it is well known that socioeconomic
standing influences carbon footprint, evaluating the human agency-structures dynamics
separately in low income, middle class and upper class4 statuses helps to highlight the
effects of wealth concentration or lack thereof.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The analysis of carbon footprints can be theorized through both structural and
individualistic perspectives. Both systemic inequalities and individual agency (actions
and demographies) influence choices communities are able to make, constraining or
empowering choices that create either sustainable or unsustainable behaviors. Giddens
suggested that both structure and agency are equally important in influencing the action
3

http://unsdsn.org/news/2017/05/02/building-an-sdg-data-dashboard-for-san-jose-california/
Throughout this paper, the terms upper class, middle class, and lower class will be used
interchangeably with terms low SES, middle SES and high SES. The blocks were evenly disaggregated
into thirds representing lower class, middle class and upper class.
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of an individual in his theory of Structuration (Oppong 2014). No doubt, an individual’s
choices are constrained through structural forces. For example, Power’s concept of
market adjustment (Powers 2006) is useful in explaining how unequal access to
resources compel those in poverty to affordable choices, and primes the elite to
increase consumption. However, individuals are still able to have agency for their own
consumption, albeit within the constraints imposed by the greater structural forces.
When they exercise their agency, they are often guided by their core beliefs and values.
Mead’s (1934) Core-Self and Stern and his colleague’s Value-Added Theory (1999),
framed within a symbolic interactionist paradigm, captured well this notion of selfagency in individual behavior.
Structural Inequalities
Powers had posited that even though mainstream economic thinking assumes that the
free market will create “efficient utilization” of resources to meet the needs of the
individual, this is not entirely true. Capitalism is traditionally seen as a tool to combat
inequality, as “the invisible hand” is expected to serve the common good. However,
forces, such as protectionist policies and the lack of discretionary income for the poor,
prevents the capitalist market from creating “socially rational” (Powers 2006) outcomes.
In fact, as the level of inequality in a society increases, the market typically adjusts in
favor of the few, taking resources away from many (poor) and instead providing luxuries
for a few. In other words, relative poverty pushes people to the most affordable options,
while wealthier people are able to make extravagant choices, engaging in excessive
consumption, and resulting carbon footprints since it is within their means.
Moreover, societies are stratified by more than just class inequalities. Racial and class
inequalities are often intertwined, even though both operate independently to promote
and limit the life options people have and choices they can make. On the one hand,
racial inequality operates like the caste system, a “ritualized, body of customs,
endogamous and hereditary, which circumscribed contacts and mobility by race”
(Conyers, 2002:252). But scholars have also seen racial inequality as capitalistic
relations, creating a split labor market where, for example, black and white workers
work against each other, lowering the cost of goods. In this colonial model of classracial inequality, black or minority groups are the oppressed nation(s), represented by
the “black ghetto” (p.253), controlled by a white ruling class that continues the
oppression by using the colony as a form of cheap labor. “Political oppression, selfdetermination, and liberation” (p. 253) are key elements of a class based racialized
society. These histories of oppression have been theorized to manifest in the ways that
minority groups choose to consume, in ways that distinguish themselves from the
dominant groups. If consuming and living a high carbon lifestyle is symbolic of dominant
power, then minority groups, because of their potential awareness of their history of
oppression, may choose to avoid dominant choices. Their history of oppression may
also make minority groups more aware and empathetic of environmental justice issues
because they are disproportionately affected by environmental degradation.
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Drawing from the structural class and racial inequality perspectives, it was expected that
systemic inequalities in San Jose blocks will have stronger net impacts in creating larger
carbon footprints than individual actions or demographic agency (Hypothesis #1). And in
a class based racialized society, class inequalities were predicted to have a stronger
impact, than race inequalities, in increasing emissions (Hypothesis #1A).
Human Agency, Core Self Concept, and Value-Belief-Norm Theory
However, as Giddens postulated, even within the constraints posed by societal
systems, individuals are still able to exercise their own agency. In his concept of coreself, Mead (1934) and other sociologists in the Iowa school of self-concept, also saw
individual actions as an outcome of their core belief and values. These beliefs are
deeply engrained within the individual and are continually inserted into their interactions
with others. In the Iowa school model, one’s core-concept, or idea of self, shapes
interaction in a stable and predictable direction. Stern elaborated on Mead’s theory as
he applied the values, beliefs and norms inherent in self-concept to environmentalism.
Value-Belief-Norm Theory (VBN) (Stern et al. 1999) framed individuals as consciously
having the ability to regulate their impact on the world. In the VBN framework, proenvironmental behaviors are created by the, “acceptance of particular personal
values…and from beliefs that actions initiated by the individual can help alleviate the
threat and restore the values” (Wynveen et al. 2015: 86). Like Core Self-Concept
theorists, VBN proponents claimed that individual values are stable and applied
throughout an individual’s life, shaping their, “environmental worldview” (EWV) (p. 86).
On balance, individuals, informed by a core sense of self, values and norms, are able to
have and exercise agency to control and mitigate their environmental footprints.
Following these understandings, it was predicted that agency, both individual actions
and demography, will have a stronger net impact in reducing high carbon footprints than
systemic inequality (Hypothesis #2).
Boundary Limiting Conditions
In order to specify further the contexts in which human agency and structural
inequalities might operate in impacting carbon footprints, boundary limits (Powers 2012:
76) of their impacts were also considered. Since socioeconomic status has been known
to have significant influence on consumption, thereby increasing carbon footprints, the
wealth status of communities was considered. In addition to focusing on the entire San
Jose area, the effects of agency and structure were re-tested separately, in low
socioeconomic status (SES), medium socioeconomic status, and high socioeconomic
status communities, to assess whether concentration of wealth in blocks pointed to a
major boundary limit.
METHODOLOGY
A mixed methods approach was used to test the comparative relevance of individual
agency and systemic forces to climate footprints in San Jose. Quantitative secondary
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data on carbon footprints per census block were drawn from the SDG San Jose
Dashboard (Ouyang 2016). Additional quantitative secondary data from the 2009-2013
American Community Survey (ACS) were relied on to measure community-level forces
that might influence carbon emissions (Department of Commerce 2013). Qualitative
primary interviews with experts in the field of sustainability and climate change
mitigation conducted provided examples, context and possible solutions, grounding the
statistical results.
Secondary Data Source
The San Jose Dashboard (SDG) served as the primary source of estimates of carbon
emissions for 524 census block groups in San Jose. The emissions were categorized by
energy, goods, food and transportation. In the SDG Dashboard, data on expenditures
and resources consumed were gathered from available geospatial and census datasets.
These pieces of information were totaled to represent carbon emissions per block.
To supplement the carbon emission data, other relevant block level community
information was gathered by the author from the 2009-2013 ACS. ACS data are
collected on a yearly basis, principally by the United States Department of Commerce
and the Census Bureau from a 1% sample of the U.S population. For this paper,
information on socio-demographic and sustainable choice behaviors came from the
2009-13 ACS. The SDG and ACS datasets were merged to investigate the research
question and corresponding hypothesis.5
Primary Qualitative Interviews
The statistical analysis of the combined ACS and SDG San Jose Dashboard was
elaborated on with qualitative interviews with eight professionals knowledgeable about
climate mitigation and environmental community action. These eight interviewees, who
were found through LinkedIn search engine and snowball sampling methods, were
interviewed over the phone for approximately 25-45 minutes each. They were asked
questions about on ways to overcome the challenge of engaging community members
in environmental action. The interviewee consent form and protocol are available in
Appendix A.
Interviewee #1 is a Program Director of a local environmental non-profit organization
that focuses specifically on energy and climate, leading programs on green energy in
the home, electric vehicles, and recognizing businesses that go above and beyond to
implement sustainability. Additional insights were added from the Co-founder
(Interviewee #2, Co-founder) of an initiative at a Global Business Consulting Firm and
Incubator, supporting cities and local governments to adopt the UN Sustainable
Development Goals and accelerate actions to help meet the Paris Climate Agreement.
5

The original collector of the data, San Jose SDG Dashboard, and U.S. Census Bureau or the relevant
funding agencies bear no responsibility for use of the data or for the interpretations or inferences based
on such uses.
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In this position, the Co-founder worked with both the city of San Jose and Stanford
University to help grow community engagement in the city’s climate action plan (titled
“Climate Smart San Jose”). They also helped to created playbooks for residents and
building owners, assisting the city in community engagement strategic planning, and
helping to mobilize resources for these initiatives. The third Interviewee is the Executive
Director of a Community Climate Neutrality Initiative (Interviewee #3, Executive
Director), a nonprofit that aims to help its city reach carbon neutrality in 10 years. The
Climate Director at the City of San Jose, a fourth interviewee (Interviewee #4, Climate
Director for San Jose), provided a municipal perspective. This interviewee discussed
their work in implementing the Climate Smart San Jose Plan, providing strategic
guidance, and obtaining funding from partners in order to create initiatives for residents.
Other professional interviewees included environmental leaders in the community. A
longtime volunteer and leader for a grassroots initiative (Leadership Team for
Grassroots Initiative) was the fifth interviewee. This interviewee created this
organization over ten years ago, aiming to inspire action to increase community
sustainability. The Leadership Team member now leads advocacy campaigns and
initiatives to engage residents. An ex-Executive Director of an environmental non-profit
(Interviewee #6), who now serves as a consultant to the organization (Special Project
Consultant), was also able to provide insights, specifically on the topic of energy
conservation. This interviewee helps to engage residents in behavior change, and has
decades of experiences in energy conservation, and engagement of businesses and
community members. The seventh professional interviewee (Interviewee #7) is an
engineer, architect, and professor, who works on creating sustainable buildings and
sites (Urban Systems Analyst and Scholar). He has helped to start an urban systems
graduate program, leading community-based partnerships with cities to meet
environmental challenges, and specifically connect them to the UN’s Sustainable
Development Goals. Finally, the current committee chair (Interviewee #8) for a large
environmental conservation non-profit focusing on land use (Land-use Expert) shared
his long experiences working in biking and pedestrian non-profits and advocacy groups.
DATA ANALYSES: SURVEY and QUALITATIVE INSIGHTS
To analyze the quantitative data and answer the posed research question, three levels
of data analysis were used, first for the entire city of San Jose, and then for three
groups of blocks separated by their aggregate SES. Descriptive analysis provided a
baseline environmental story of San Jose’s blocks. Initial relationships between
systemic inequality, individual agency and high carbon footprints were then explored
using bivariate correlational analysis. These relationships were then retested in the
multivariate analysis to estimate the net influences of systemic inequalities versus
individual agency on high carbon footprints and to specify the socioeconomic conditions
in which these environmental dynamics operate.
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Operationalization and Descriptive Analyses
Individual agency and systemic inequalities each are expected to uniquely influence
levels of carbon footprints. Individual agency was defined as the choices that individuals
and households make, consciously or unconsciously, to lower the emissions they
produce. Demography is an additional force in human decisions, and is treated as a part
of individual agency. However, systemic inequalities within which humans are confined,
also determine the choices they make, and consequently the emissions they produce.
Several patterns were noted in the descriptive analysis of San Jose’s blocks. Overall,
there were fairly high levels of emissions produced in blocks (Table 1.A). There were
also moderate levels of systemic inequality in blocks, in terms of socioeconomic
resources and dominant race composition (Table 1.B). Besides, households in San
Jose blocks registered low levels of sustainable choices (low proportion of solar use and
sustainable commute modes to work) and moderate levels of unsustainable choices
(lengthy times driven alone to work Table 1.C). Finally, while there was an equal
distribution of males and females in the blocks; they also had a more youthful than older
population (Table 1.D).
As noted earlier, the city blocks were evenly disaggregated into thirds representing
lower class, middle class and upper class. It is noteworthy that systemic wealth and
dominant race concentration were the most pronounced in the wealthiest communities.
Differences in human agency, be it individual or demographic, by SES standing of
blocks were mixed, in expected and paradoxical ways.
High Carbon Footprint
To represent total carbon emissions, or carbon footprint, Scope Two and Three
emissions were used. Scope Two includes emissions purchased and controlled by an
outside organization, namely electricity emissions. Scope Three emissions are other
indirect emissions which includes food emissions, transportation emissions and the
emissions created by the consumption of goods (US EPA 2017). Scope Two and Three
emissions were presented in Table 1.A. Together, Scope Two and Scope Three
emissions, represent the total amount of CO2 emissions produced for each block. The
average SJ city block had a moderate carbon footprint of 8,226.75 pounds of CO2 on
average (with a range from a minimum of 1406.50 pounds of CO2 to a high of 15,425
pounds of CO2) (See Table 1.A).
More specifically, there was a moderate amount of electricity emissions produced
annually in San Jose, an average of 6,031.04 pounds of CO2 (emissions ranging from
1,134-11,634 pounds of CO2 annually). Transportation emissions were also fairly
moderate, with an average of 14,625.64 pounds of CO2 annually out of all sectors,
(ranging from 2,406 pounds of CO2 to 28,622 pounds of CO2). It is interesting to note
that the Transportation emission sector produced the most emissions out of all sources.
The Land-use Expert (Interviewee #8) corroborated this fact, describing the large
contribution that car congestion makes to carbon emissions. This is particularly bad in
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San Jose due to the large urban sprawl in and outside the city. The Urban Systems
Analyst and Scholar (Interviewee #7) additionally emphasized this point, describing the
extended commutes that most Silicon Valley professionals have to engage in getting to
work, driving from homes in the suburbs to company city headquarters. There were also
moderate amounts of goods emissions, with an average of 5,249.26 pounds of CO2
produced annually (these emissions ranged from 834-11,664 pounds of CO2) but, were
the lowest of all sources. Food emissions were also reasonably moderate, an average
of 7,001.09 pounds of CO2 produced annually (with a range of 1,252 pounds of CO2 to
12,892 pounds of CO2).]

Concept

High
Carbon
Footprint

Dimensions

Scope 2

Scope 3

TABLE 1.A. High Carbon Footprint
SDG Dashboard for San Jose, 2016 (n=523)
Indicators
Values
Statistics
Total
Low SES
Medium
SES
Electricity
Mean
6031.04
4621.39
6222.79
Emissions (SD)
(1552.11
(993.07)
(1190.64)
(lbs of
Min113411343689-9752
CO2)
Max
11634
8135

7253.89***
(1152.19)
457311634

Transport
ation
Emissions
(lbs of
CO2)

Mean
(SD)
MinMax

14625.64
(3870.84)
240628622

10564.6
(2103.45)
240618080

14931.02
(2001.61)
8585-20603

18391.44***
(2419.98)
1434328622

Goods
Emissions
(lbs of
CO2)

Mean
(SD)
MinMax

5249.26
(1504.016)
834-11664

3690.50
(802.529)
834-5927

5333.19
(688.61)
2760-7058

6727.13***
(1031.28)
503811664

Food
Emissions
(lbs of
CO2)

Mean
(SD)
MinMax

7001.09
(1635.89)
125212892

5448.22
(1043.99)
12529349

7210.38
(1175.426)
4564-10464

8348.85***
(1145.49)
561112892

Mean
(SD)
MinMax

8226.75
(2080.38)
1406.5015425.75

8226.75
(2080.38)
1406.5015425.75

8424.35
(1193.61)
5022.5011902.50

10180.33***
(1311.42)
7558.5015425.75

Index of
High Carbon
Footprints1
1

High SES

Index of High Carbon Footprints = Electricity Emissions + Transportation Emissions + Goods Emissions + Food
Emissions. Possible range: 1406.50-15425.75. Correlations among these indicators ranged from .797** to .993** at
the .000 significance level.

Many South Bay climate professionals, including the Leadership Team for Grassroots
Initiative, Urban Systems Analyst/Scholar, and the Land-use Expert verified the large
carbon footprint of San Jose. The often-repeated reason for these high emission levels
was the large levels of wealth present in the city, which drives a society of consumption;
wealth permits citizens to own large homes in the suburbs far away from amenities to
which they have to drive to access (Interviewee #5, #7, #8).
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A disaggregation of each carbon emission indicator by lower class, middle class, and
upper class communities revealed a linear relationship between carbon footprints and
their socioeconomic standing. The wealthiest blocks were responsible for the highest
amount of carbon emissions for both Scope 2 and Scope 3 dimensions. The poorest
blocks had the lowest and the middle group fell in between.
Systemic Inequalities
Systemic inequalities were hypothesized to influence block group’s carbon behavior.
This concept was represented on a community/block by the per capita income, high
educational attainment, and percentage of white households to non-white households
(dominant racial concentration). Overall, San Jose city blocks had fairly low levels of
socioeconomic status (𝑥=1,456,282.68) compared to the overall range (0-8,265,753.47)
on the Socioeconomic Status Index (See Table 1.B). The dominant racial composition
was also moderate, suggesting that blocks are reasonably racially diversified
(𝑥=48.49%, range of 0%-97.87%).

Concept

Systemic
Inequality

Dimensions

SocioEconomic
Status

Dominant
Racial
Compositi
-on3

TABLE 1.B. Systemic Inequality
American Community Survey, 2009-2013
Indicators
Values
Statistics
Total
Low SES Medium
SES
Per Capita
Mean
$34178.2
18647.9
32121.87
Income(SD)
(16469.7)
(5348.9)
(6022.8)
Past Twelve
Min6253625313167Months
Max
131809
55673
49860
Percent
High
Education
Attainment
per capita1
Index of
Socioeconomic
Status1
Percent of
White
Households
to Non-White
Households

High SES
51796***
13958
32227131809

Mean
(SD)
MinMax

35.29%
(19.02)
090.2

170.96
(114.75)
655394.16

394.115
(186.68)
741090

678.6***
(422.63)
1923489

Mean
(SD)
MinMax
Mean
(SD)
MinMax

1,456,283
(1315238)
08,265,753
48.49%
(20.52)
097.87

140653.7
(780783)
0293385
39.72
(14.889)
080.63

561457
(156760)
297021.9
-847487
48.7188
(20.664)
6.5786.68

1483919***
(569644)
848059.44132876.7
57.2055***
(21.549)
4.2397.87

1

High Educational Attainment was categorized as percent Bachelor Degrees, Masters Degrees, Professional
Degrees, and Doctoral degrees.
2
Index of Socioeconomic Status = Percentage High Education * Estimate per capita income in the past
twelve months in 2013 infla. Possible range: 0 - 8,265,753.47 Correlations among these
indicators were .799** at a .00 significance level.
3
Dominant Racial Composition is the ratio of white households to non-white households = number of white
households per block divided by non-white households.
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The low socioeconomic status in San Jose’s blocks was mainly due to the fairly low
average income of $34,178.20 (ranging from $6,253 to $131,809) per block (Table
1.B.). However, though the average income was low, residents in the average San Jose
block had a moderate level of educational attainment; percentage above a college
degree was 35.29% ranging from 0-90.17%. Together, these two variables represented
the moderate Socioeconomic Standing of blocks and are a significant part of systemic
inequalities that might influence household decisions. Yet, the wide gap between very
high and very low economic well-being in San Jose were underscored by some of the
professional interviewees. The Urban Systems Analyst and Scholar elaborated on the
class tension stating that the incredible poverty in San Jose is often “masked by how
wealthy other people are” (Interviewee #7), and depending on the measure of wellbeing, this inequality can be easily ignored. Predictably, socioeconomic status, in
education and income, was concentrated in the wealthy (𝑥 = 51796; range of 32227131809) and less so in the poor communities (𝑥 = 18647.9; range of 6253-55673). All
the professional interviewees concurred, naming wealth driven consumption as the
major reason for large carbon footprints.
The predominance of whites over other non-white groups is an additional systemic
inequality; while the individual resident typically does not have much control over, it
systemically influences people’s consumption and carbon footprints. The dominant
racial composition linearly varied by the wealth of blocks. That is, the wealthier blocks
had higher concentration of whites/non-whites (𝑥 = 57.2%; range = 4.23% - 97.87%)
than the poorer blocks (𝑥 = 39.72; range = 0 - 80.63).
Individual Actions as Agency
It is theoretically axiomatic that even when subjected to systemic inequalities,
individuals and households have agency to make choices that can lower their carbon
footprint. This is can be seen through actions taken by individuals or households and
their demographics. The three measures chosen to represent the extent of sustainable,
or unsustainable, choices made by households were: the proportion of households in a
block that used solar energy (of all energy sources available), the percent of sustainable
modes of transportation to work, and the amount of time to work by those who drive
cars in single occupancy. Environmentally relevant demographies considered in this
analysis were the age and gender composition of blocks.
Sustainable Household Choices. The proportion of households that heated their homes
with solar energy in the average San Jose block was low (𝑥 = 0.17 with a range from 0.93); that is, households were less likely to choose solar energy or had the ability to
make the solar choice of all the energy choices they had (Table 1.C.). The percent of
sustainable transportation to work, another sustainable choice, was also low in San
Jose. The percentage of households that used sustainable modes of transit for their
commute was fairly low (𝑥 = 34.01, with a range from 0-147.62). Most used high carbon
emission methods such as driving a car alone. These findings were also reinforced in
the professional interviews. In the words of the Executive Director of a Community
Climate Neutrality Initiative (Interviewee #3), for most regular people, making
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environmental choices, even when it is to save money, is a “research project.” Even if
people “lean green”, said this environmental leader, there is frequently a lack of time
and awareness to make sustainable choices.
A third, and more pointed, indicator used to measure the prevalence of unsustainable
choices in transportation to work was single occupancy drivers (as a proportion of all
drivers) driving for longer periods. The opposite of carpooling for shorter times which
were designated as sustainable choices. The average San Jose Block had households
with more sustainable commutes than not; the mean time driven to work alone was
600.22 on a range of 0-2285.88. And even though taking sustainable modes of
transportation to work was not widespread, block residents who had high levels of
sustainable commutes to work were less likely to drive to work alone for a significant
amount of time (r=-.175***).
TABLE 1.C. Individual Actions: Sustainable Choices
American Community Survey, 2009-2013 (n=518-523)
Concept Dimensions Indicators
Values
Statistics
Total
Low SES Medium SES
Individual Sustainable
Proportion
Mean
.0006
.0004
.0002
Actions
Choices
of Solar
(SD)
(.0044)
(.003)
(.002)
Energy
Min0-.06
0-.03
0-.01
Use1
Max

Unsustainable
Choices

High SES
.0012
(.00693)
0-.06

Percent
Sustainabl
e Transport
to Work2

Mean
(SD)
MinMax

34.01
(15.81)
0-147.62

39.517
(18.409)
5.3-147.6

32.6466
(13.7)
0-76.8

30.244***
(13.714)
0-78.32

Time
Driven
Alone3

Mean
(SD)
MinMax

600.21
(308.6)
0-2286

575.886
(286.8)
0-1570.9

601.086
(285.7)
108-1968.7

623.975
(350.106)
154-2286

1

Proportion of Solar Use = Solar Energy/Total Energy.
Percent Sustainable Transportation to Work= ((Estimate Carpooled in a car truck or van + Estimate 2 person
carpool in a car truck or van + Estimate 3 person carpool in a car truck or van + Estimate 4 person carpool in a car
truck or van Estimate 5-6 person carpool in a car truck or van + Estimate 7 person carpool in a car truck or van +
Estimate public transportation excluding taxicab + Estimate bicycle + Estimate walked + Estimate other means +
Estimate worked at home)/Total Transportation).
3
Time Driven Alone = Single Occupancy and Distance of Drive to Work measured as (Estimate drove alone in a car
truck or van / Estimate Total Transportation) * Estimate Total Travel Time.
2

There was a mixed picture that emerged when differences in sustainable choices by
community wealth were examined. Wealthier communities were more likely to use solar
(𝑥 = .0012 versus 𝑥 = .0004 in the poorest blocks) but less likely to use sustainable
transportation to work (wealthy 𝑥 = 30.244 versus 𝑥 = 39.517 in the poorest blocks) and
drive long distances to work alone (wealthy 𝑥 = 623.975 versus poor blocks 𝑥 =
575.886), though the community difference were not always statistically significant. The
Executive Director of a Community Climate Neutrality Initiative and the Climate Director
for San Jose illustrated this paradox; “there are progressive green people with lots of
money who can afford to buy Tesla and solar, they can help drive the [environmental]
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movement” (Interviewee #3). Low income households, on the other hand, often live in
energy inefficient houses with high energy and utility bills (Interviewee #3) as they don’t
have the resources to make the needed change (Interviewee #4) to sustainable
choices. Limited resources also prevent members of low-income households from
driving, and make them more likely to use public transportation to work, a sustainable
transportation choice.
Demography as Agency. In addition to sustainable choices that people can adopt,
demography can also be a source of agency in reducing or increasing carbon footprints.
Specifically, women (Hal and Allen 2014) and consumers aged 35-50 (Patel et al. 2017)
have been known to make more environmentally friendly decisions than men. In San
Jose, the blocks had primarily young residents, below the age of 35 (47.81% young, 36%
middle age and 16.08 senior). Besides, blocks with older residents had more
socioeconomic resources than the more youthful blocks. However, there were no
noticeable differences in block wealth status by gender composition of blocks, which was
roughly equal.
Concept
Age

Female
Gender
Compos
-ition

TABLE 1.D. Demographic Profile of San Jose Blocks
American Community Survey, 2009-2013 (n=518-523)
Dimensions Indicators
Values
Statistics
Total
Low SES Medium SES
Young
Percent
Mean
. 47.81
53.794
47.5984
Blocks
aged 0(SD)
(10.48)
(9.319)
(9.47)
341
Min-Max 17.56-93.3
28.4-93.3 17.8-74.7

High SES
42.05***
(9.3)
17.6-72.8

Mid-age
blocks

Percent
Ages 35592

Mean
(SD)
Min-Max

36.1
(6.92)
5.6-55.9

33.0479
(6.956)
5.6-55.3

35.5717
(6.307)
14-49.47

39.7***
(5.863)
20.66-5.09

Senior
Blocks

Percent
Aged 60+3

Mean
(SD)
Min-Max

16.08
(7.37)
0-51.9

3.1582
(6.107)
0-39.2

16.8299
(7.533)
2.9-51.9

18.3***
(7.5)
1.7-44.7

Percent
Female

Mean
(SD)
Min-Max

49.8%
(5.08)
25-65

49.48%
(5.1)
25-61

49.87%
(5.4)
26-64

50.17%
(4.8)
36-65

1

Percent aged 0-34 (Young Blocks) = ((Estimate Male Under 5 years + Estimate Male 5 to 9 years + Estimate Male
10 to 14 years + Estimate Male 15 to 17 years + Estimate Male 18 and 19 years + Estimate Male 20 years +
Estimate Male 21 years + Estimate Male 22 to 24 years + Estimate Male 25 to 29 years + Estimate Male 30 to 34
years + Estimate Female Under 5 years + Estimate Female 5 to 9 years + Estimate Female 10 to 14 years +
Estimate Female 15 to 17 years + Estimate Female 18 and 19 years + Estimate Female 20 years + Estimate
Female 21 years + Estimate Female 22 to 24 years + Estimate Female 25 to 29 years + Estimate Female 30 to 34
years) / Total Population).
2
Percent Ages 35-59 = ((Estimate Male 35 to 39 years + Estimate Male 40 to 44 years + Estimate Male 45 to 49
years + Estimate Male 50 to 54 years + Estimate Male 55 to 59 years + Estimate Female 35 to 39 years + Estimate
Female 40 to 44 years + Estimate Female 45 to 49 years + Estimate Female 50 to 54 years + Estimate Female 55
to 59 years) / Total Population).
3
Percentage Senior = ((Estimate Male 60 and 61 years + Estimate Male 62 to 64 years + Estimate Male 65 and 66
years + Estimate Male 67 to 69 years + Estimate Male 70 to 74 years + Estimate Male 75 to 79 years + Estimate
Male 80 to 84 years + Estimate Male 85 years and over + Estimate Female 60 and 61 years + Estimate Female 62
to 64 years + Estimate Female 65 and 66 years + Estimate Female 67 to 69 years + Estimate Female 70 to 74
years + Estimate Female 75 to 79 years + Estimate Female 80 to 84 years + Estimate Female 85 years and over) /
Total Population).
4
Female Gender Composition = Estimate Female / Total Population.
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Bivariate Analysis
In order to test the preliminary empirical relationships between Systemic Inequalities,
Individual Agency and High Carbon Footprints, bivariate analyses were conducted. As
noted below, not only were there multiple connections that structural and human agency
had with carbon footprints, but these connections varied across the communities divided
by wealth (Table 2 in Appendix B).
Overall, the wealthier (r=.790***) and more white dominated (r=.417***) a block in San
Jose was, the more carbon emissions they produced. Driving alone on a longer
commute also contributed to the high emission levels (r=.106***), even if to a lesser
extent than structural sources. On the other hand, the more sustainable commute
choices to work made (r=-.238***), the fewer emissions blocks produced. Finally, the
more mid age (r=.379***), senior (r=.313***), or female (r=.088*) a block was, the higher
the carbon footprint. That is, in blocks that had more mid age individuals, seniors, and
women there were more unsustainable choices made.
Other relationships among the structural and individual agency indicators worth noting
were as follows. The higher socioeconomic status of a block, the more likely they were
to be white (r=.345***) and to use solar (r=.109**), but less likely to use sustainable forms
of transportation (r=-.213***). Blocks that were predominately white were less likely to
use unsustainable forms of transportation (r=-.112**) but less likely to drive long
distances to work alone (r=-.178***). Understandably, those who drove longer periods of
time alone to work were less likely to commute using sustainable methods (r= -.175***).
And mid age (r=-.234***) and senior aged block groups (r=-.186***) were also least likely
to use sustainable modes of transportation to work.
More poignant were the differences in racial composition and demographies by wealth
standing of blocks. The more wealth was concentrated in blocks, the more carbon was
emitted. For example, the SES-carbon footprints connection was the strongest in high
SES blocks (r=.544***), followed by mid-SES (r=.481***) and low SES (r=457***) blocks.
Additionally, there were parallels, even if not linear, in the wealth and dominant race
composition in blocks. The medium SES blocks had the highest white concentration
(=.457***) followed by the high SES blocks (r=.199**). But, race and SES were not
connected in the poorest blocks. Interestingly, demography had the potential for agency
in carbon footprints only in the medium and low SES communities. The more senior
aged residents there were in medium SES blocks (r=.198**) and low SES blocks
(r=.235**), the larger the block’s carbon footprint. Additionally, concentration of mid-aged
individuals in low SES blocks (r=.244***), the higher the carbon emissions.
In sum, these bivariate findings indicated that systemic inequalities might have a greater
impact on high carbon footprints than individual agency. And that the wealthier the
communities, the bigger the carbon impacts of structural inequalities. On the other
hand, demographic agency might be more relevant to carbon emissions in the poorer
communities. The robustness of these potential relationships with carbon footprints
were tested using multivariate analysis and are presented in the next section.
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Multivariate Analyses
To isolate the unique effects of structural inequalities and individual agency on carbon
footprints, two sets of one-step multivariate analyses were conducted. In the first set,
the net comparative effects of systemic inequalities and individual agency on carbon
footprints were assessed for the entire sample. In the second set, the net effects on
carbon footprints were disaggregated by the SES concentrations in blocks to pinpoint
the boundary limits of the wealth concentration and carbon footprint relationship,
As seen in Table 3, systemic inequalities were the strongest predictors of high carbon
footprints. For example, the wealthier and educated residents of a block were, the larger
was their carbon footprint (β=.651*** in Total Sample). Similarly, even if to a lesser
extent, concentrations of whites in blocks were associated with larger carbon footprints
(β=.180***), apart from the wealth of their residents.
As for individual agency factors, whether measured in actions or demography, their net
effects in enlarging, or shrinking, as the case may be, carbon footprints were smaller
than the structural impediments and inconsistent at best. Longer commute times to
work, and that too, in single occupancy vehicles, had the net effect of enlarging carbon
footprints (β=.145***) but home solar use or commutes using sustainable modes of
transportation did not register an impact. And, of the demographic agencies, age
composition of blocks was the only factor that was relevant. For example, mid-aged
blocks (β=.096***) and senior-aged blocks (β=.114***) had net higher carbon footprints
than youthful blocks. In other words, blocks with younger residents, on balance, made
more environmentally friendly choices than older resident blocks.
It is widely known, in both the practice and scholarly communities, that socioeconomic
standing is the prime driver of large carbon footprints. A fine grained boundary analyses
of the wealth limits of structural inequalities and individual agency on carbon footprints,
separately in the lower class, middle class, and upper class blocks, revealed several
interesting patterns. While socioeconomic status remained a strong predictor of high
carbon footprints, irrespective of the socioeconomic foundation of blocks, the impacts of
money and education in raising carbon footprints was most concentrated in the upper
class blocks (Beta =.550***) and fairly equal between middle class (Beta =.324***) and
lower class (Beta = .366***). Interestingly, dominant racial concentration was the most
influential predictor of bigger carbon footprints (surpassing wealth concentration) in
middle class blocks (Beta= .477***) but was not the case in the poorest blocks. Upper
class blocks, in addition to their wealth, added to their carbon footprints with their
dominant race concentration (Beta .228***).
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TABLE 3. Regression Analysis of the Relative Impacts of Systemic Inequality and Individual
Agency on High Carbon Footprints; Beta (β) Coefficients1
SDG Dashboard for San Jose and American Community Survey 2009 - 2013
Beta Coefficients
Total sample
Low SES
Medium SES
High SES
Systemic Inequality:
Socioeconomic Status
.651***
.366***
.324***
.550***
***
***
White to Non-White
.180
-.025
.477
.228***
Concentration
Individual Actions as
Agency:
Proportion of Solar
Use
Percent Sustainable
Transit to Work
Time Driven Alone
Demography as
Agency:
Mid aged blocks
Senior aged blocks
Female blocks
Model Statistics:
Constant
Adjusted R2
DF 1 & 2

-.032

-.026

.033

-.003

-.006

.094

.106

-.025

.144***

.139

.194**

.129

.095***
.113***
.034

.179*
.162*
.100

.089
.205***
.074

-.124
-.098
.019

3076.627***
0.673***

2224.190*
.239**

2941.338***
.447***

87222.690***
.342***

8 & 514

8 & 164

8 & 165

8 & 165

***p≤.001; **p≤.01; *p≤.05
1
Index of High Carbon Footprints = Electricity Emissions + Transportation Emissions + Goods Emissions +
Food Emissions. Possible range: 1406.50-15425.75.;
Index of Socioeconomic Status = Percentage High Education * Estimate Per capita income in the past twelve
months in 2013 infla. Possible range: 0-8,265,753.47;
Percent White to Nonwhite = White households per block/non-white households. Possible range: 0 - 97.87;
Proportion of Solar Use = Solar Energy/Total Energy. Possible range: 0-.06;
Single Occupancy and Distance of Drive to Work= (Estimate Car truck or van Drove alone / Estimate Total
Transportation) * Estimate Total Travel Time Possible range: 0-2286;
Percent Mid Aged Blocks = Men and women aged 35-59;
Percent Senior Aged Blocks = Men and women aged 60 and above;
Female Blocks= Proportion of self-identifying females.

As for human agency, whether individual actions or demography, it was not only less
relevant (than wealth) in its net contribution to bigger carbon footprints, its potency was
evident only when wealth was not too concentrated (particularly not in the wealthiest
blocks). For example, when blocks had medium wealth, solo driving time to work (Beta=
.194**) and concentration of senior aged residents (Beta = .205***) raised emission rates.
The poorest blocks also created more emissions when their residents were senior-aged
(Beta= .162*) or middle-aged (Beta=. 164*).
It was also possible to identify additional conditions of wealth concentration (or lack
thereof) under which the structure versus human agency dynamics in carbon emissions
played out (Table 3). For one, when wealth was the most concentrated, in high SES
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blocks, it was the only predictor of carbon emissions; human agency did not factor in at
all. On the other hand, when wealth was the least concentrated (as in low SES blocks),
socioeconomic standing, followed by older age compositions were the main emission
contributors. However, there was a different combination of structural and human
agency contributors to high carbon emissions when there was a medium amount of
wealth concentration in blocks. For example, not only did Mid-SES blocks produce
more emissions when they had dominant race concentration (even more than wealth)
but time driven alone to work and presence of seniors in their midst added some to
their carbon footprints.
The professionals interviewed for this paper offered valuable ground-level insights into
the wealth-high emissions paradox outlined in the statistical findings reported above.
Many spoke to contradictions between lifestyles enabled by wealth and environmental
motivations for reducing emissions. Speaking about how wealthier and predominantly
white communities might create high carbon footprints, the Program Director of an
environmental nonprofit (Interviewee #1) noted that in the outreach programs she
conducted, people who came to engage with and learn about sustainable and costsaving behaviors were typically either already low energy users, or seniors with fixed
incomes, “who were watching their bill” (Program Director). In contrast, engaging and
maintaining the attention of a majority of other groups, particularly high-income
individuals, in sustainable behaviors was difficult, as wealthier individuals can afford
more utilities and higher levels of consumption. Since finances are not pressing for
wealthier households they do not regularly think about possible savings, and some may
not be aware of personal consumption levels, particularly with energy. Besides, for
consumers without cost concerns, a desire to maintain a certain lifestyle often
outweighs environmental impacts.
The idea that consumption, is the “biggest problem” when it comes to carbon footprints
was underscored by one of the professional interviewees who is a Leadership Team
Member for Grassroots Initiative (Interviewee #5). That is, even if people are
environmentally motivated, life styles made possible by wealth can stand in the way.
Some of the other environmental professional interviewees offered specific illustrations
of wealthy life styles creating high carbon emissions while triumphing pro-environmental
motivations. In the experience of the Urban Systems Analyst and Scholar (Interviewee
#7), consumption stems from wealth and associated privileges of education and time,
and with this, comes the ability to do a lot more. One can be more selective with where
they live, they can afford to buy a car and expand the boundaries of where they go. If
wealth gives residents the freedom to travel, they “will get on the freeway to drive home
to the suburbs away from the city, investing in a single-family size home and filling that
home with lots of stuff”. But, even if high income individuals are “interested in
environmental issues” and can even afford to make changes, said Interviewee #6, an
Energy Conservation Special Project Consultant, it is difficult to engage these
households in sustainable behaviors. As the Leadership Team Member for Grassroots
Initiative noted, much of the high value placed on environmental issues “is just talk”
(Interviewee #5). The Co-founder of a Global Business Incubator (GBI, Interviewee #2)
also underscored the wealth-carbon footprints contradictions while speaking about the
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difficulties in engaging high-income households in sustainable behaviors. A unique
approach that includes incentives, restrictions, and a new emission mentality must be
used to address these barriers (See the Lessons in Environmental Practice section
below for more details).
A contrasting scenario about carbon emissions in low-income communities was painted
by many in the interview community. Low income households, they noted, were
significantly more motivated to reduce costs. In fact, “households in East Palo Alto [a
lower income community] spend 20% of their income on utilities, compared to 7% in
Palo Alto” (Program Director, Interviewee #1), and are much more likely to feel the
negative effects of environmental degradation. These stressors render lower income
communities to be more motivated to cut costs and protect the environment, thereby
reducing their carbon footprints. Low income communities are also more likely to be
communities of color, they noted, supporting the regression findings about the
connections between minority race composition and lower emissions.
Yet, even though low-income communities might be more motivated to reduce carbon
footprints by their limited disposable income and a corresponding desire to save money,
the interviewees emphasized the difficulties of reaching low income areas in their
environmental practice. Poor communities do not have resources to implement
sustainable alternatives (per the Co-founder, Interviewee #2), and are less likely to trust
programs originating from people outside their community (Program Director,
Interviewee #1). In the final analyses, even with fewer resources to implement ecoefficient changes, low income communities have smaller carbon footprints, both opined,
compared to wealthier communities which either are unaware of, or disconnected from,
environmental issues.
CONCLUSIONS
In this concluding section, empirical and theoretical findings were synthesized and
suggestions for environmental practice were recommended based on the study findings.
Further, suggestions for future research were proposed to advance the field of climate
science and action.
Empirical Summary
Analysis of data from the 2009-13 ACS and 2016 SDG San Jose Dashboard and
narrative commentaries provided critical insights into the unique effects of individual
agency and systemic inequality on high carbon footprints in San Jose, CA. As
expected, socioeconomic wealth of blocks, specifically measured by income and
education, had the greatest impact on their high carbon footprints. The wealth-high
emission connection was the most pronounced when wealth was concentrated as in
the high SES blocks. To a lesser extent, concentration of dominant (white contrasted
with nonwhite) households in blocks were also associated with high emissions,
particularly when there was medium to high wealth concentration. While human agency
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was overall less relevant (than class or racial structures) in creating large carbon
footprints, they were particularly important when wealth was not concentrated. For
example, driving longer distances to work in single-occupancy cars led to bigger carbon
footprints only in medium SES blocks. Similarly, older blocks (with more seniors or
middle-aged residents) produced more carbon emissions in low and medium SES
blocks. Qualitative commentaries from eight professional interviewees corroborated
these findings; high income, thereby usually whiter, communities have higher carbon
footprints. However, they also emphasized the challenges faced by low income
communities to engage in sustainable practices, even though their carbon footprint was
typically lower than in wealthier areas.
Theoretical Implications
Theoretically speaking, wealth concentration was an important moderator of the
respective roles that structure and human agency played in carbon footprints (Figure
1). There was empirical support for the structural inequality perspective (Hypothesis #1)
as seen in the strong connections between socioeconomic wealth and high carbon
footprints, followed by dominant racial composition, particularly when wealth was
concentrated. Following systemic inequality predictions, Hypothesis #1A was also
supported, as class inequalities had a stronger impact than race inequalities in
enlarging carbon footprints. However, there was not much direct support for Mead’s
Theory of Core Self-Concept or Stern’s Value-Based Norm Theory (Hypothesis #2), as
sustainable choices were not significant predictors of carbon footprints. The limited role
played by individual agency in carbon emissions did not fully support Gidden’s theory of
structuration as the influence of individual agency, albeit modest, was second to that of
systemic inequalities.
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Figure 1. Empirical Model of the Impacts of Systemic Inequality and Individual Agency on High
Carbon Footprints; Beta (β) Coefficients1
SDG Dashboard for San Jose (2016) and American Community Survey (2009 - 2013)

Systemic Inequality:
Powers + Conyers
Socioeconomic
Status

Low SES
Medium SES
High SES
Total Sample

Dominant
Racial
Composition

Individual Agency: Mead +
Stern
Proportion of
Solar Use
Percent
Sustainable
Transportation

Total β=.651***
Low SES β=.366***
Medium SES β=324***
High SES β=.550***
Total β=

Total β=.180***
Medium SES β=.477***
High SES β= .228***

Total β=.144***
Medium SES β=.194**

Time Driven
Alone

High
Carbon
Footprints

Total β=.095***
Low SES β=.179*
Total β=.113***
Low SES β=.162*
Medium SES β=.205***

Demography:
Mid aged
Blocks
Senior aged
Blocks
Female Blocks
1.

Refer to Table 3 for index coding.

Lessons in Environmental Practice
The privilege-high carbon emissions connections documented in this research
underscored the need to create targeted solutions to reduce carbon footprints. As such,
the privilege disparities in emissions, at the structural and agency levels, could be
valuable to organizations that work to create solutions on both the macro and micro
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levels. The programmatic discussion, of challenges and solutions, below relied on the
valuable experiences of practitioners interviewed for this project.
Macro Level Challenges and Solutions
Similar to the statistical findings, the professional interviewees were almost unanimous
in their educated opinion that a significant portion of challenges in reducing
consumption and carbon footprints stem from the macro level. Drawing from their
experiences on the ground, they discussed macro policy issues and challenges, be they
setting and enforcing environmental policies or reducing inequalities.
Policy Solutions. Before any sustainable changes can be introduced, said the Urban
Systems Analyst (Interviewee #7, there must be a “democratic [governance] structure
where [macro] stakeholders hold themselves accountable to hitting targets, and
milestones to meet goals”. Beyond the governance structure, politicians must be ready
to set targets specifically for carbon reduction, something sorely lacking in America’s
current political system. However, with targets in place, mandatory policy changes and
pressures will be needed if we are to reduce the collective carbon footprint. Foremost,
carbon and consumption taxes can be implemented to create pressure on individuals
and corporations to reduce consumption and mandate reductions (Interviewees #5, #7,
#8). These taxes can be used to pressure industries to change their production patterns
and create more sustainable options (Interviewee #4). These prescriptions to reduce
unsustainable behaviors must be coupled with incentives, said the Co-founder
(Interviewee #2); incentives could be tax breaks for residents engaging in environmental
behaviors, such as driving electric vehicles and upgrading to energy efficient appliances
and machines (Interviewee #2). Broader structural changes are also needed to allow
sustainable options to be the easiest choice that residents can make. The Executive
Director of Community Climate Neutrality Initiative (Interviewee #3) underscored the
need for cities to “step up and change zoning, as well as power procurement.” Both the
Executive Director and the Urban Systems scholar added that cities must also change
their building policies, retrofit affordable housing, invest in public transportation and
electric vehicles, (Interviewee #3), to “solve regional issues” (Interviewee #7).
Macro Level Inequality Challenges and Solutions. Inequality, be it socioeconomic and
racial, was a running theme in this research on carbon footprints. Low income
households are trapped without the resources to make environmental changes, nor do
they have the privilege of time to think about environmental choices. While limited in
their ability to exercise agency, it is these groups that are impacted most by climate
change. In juxtaposition, high income households and corporations drive climate
change through excessive consumption, whether that be of land or natural resources.
This growing gap between the rich and poor only continues to escalate, as does the
United States carbon footprint. Several professional interviewees also identified social
and racial inequality as part of the problem. In fact, the Co-founder and Climate Director
for San Jose, both who work on Climate Smart San Jose, the climate action plan to
help the city of San Jose reach carbon neutrality, stated that plans to change cities
“must address inequality in regard to race and income” (Interviewee #4, Director of
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Climate Change). However, addressing inequality is not part of the environmental
solutions currently being considered. The Director stated that the city currently does not
“dive into income and racial inequality” when working on climate solutions. Climate
Smart San Jose, “is not designed to explicitly address the issue of equity in San Jose”
(Climate Smart San Jose 2018 p. 105). Instead, it is left to be covered in San Jose’s
General Plan, a plan for overall city development, removed from climate action
solutions.
To their credit, officials within the environmental department focus more on “meeting
people where they are at through outreach” (Interviewee #4). This means directing
individuals with high socioeconomic status towards more eco-efficient options provided
by technology (Interviewee #4) but not necessarily changing consumption patterns.
Micro Level Challenges and Solutions
On the individual level too, interviewees emphasized the challenges in creating more
sustainable changes. In many communities there is limited environmental progress,
whether it is because people are often too busy to make sustainable changes or that
residents do not always think collectively, nor can they easily see a collective impact on
environmental progress (Special Project Consultant, Interviewee #6). However, macro
structures will not change, unless “consumers demand it,” said the Climate Director for
San Jose (Interviewee #5). To this Director, who works to create a policy link between
communities and cities, policies for change will not work unless they have support from
constituents. In other words, stakeholder engagement is key, specifically that of
community grassroots organizations.
On balance, the leaders of the environmental community interviewed for this paper, be
they the Program Director (Interviewee #1, Co-founder (Interviewee #2), Climate
Director for San Jose (Interviewee #4), Leadership Team Member for Grassroots
Initiative (Interviewee #5, or Urban Systems Analyst and Scholar (Interviewee #7), all
emphasized the importance of programs that focus on community engagement,
collective choices and neighborhoods associations. Enhancing social capital through
friendly competitions, community-based decision-making, and peer-to-peer information
exchange, they felt, could facilitate pro-environment behavior-change programs such as
driving electric vehicles, upgrading to energy efficient appliances and machines,
switching to solar, and overall reducing energy consumption.
However, based on the boundary setting limits of wealth identified in this analysis,
engaging low income communities will require a significantly different approach than
engaging high income communities. In order to inform and equip low income
communities with resources that initiate change, community leaders must lead the
process, and initiate peer-to-peer information exchange, said the Program Director at a
local environmental non-profit (Interviewee #1). This Director has seen this method be
particularly successful in the context of community house parties hosted dually by a
community leader with an environmental program leader.
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Yet, the professionals were quick to point out that initiatives intended to reduce
consumption in a capitalistic society, which is “based around consumption” (Climate
Change Director, Interviewee #4) pose a significant challenge. The Director, along with
others, emphasized the importance of connecting environmental values with human
values, showing how the two are inextricably intertwined. In San Jose’s climate action
plan (“Climate Smart San Jose”) this mindset is emphasized through the promotion of
the “Good Life.” In this document, a connection is made between happiness and
sustainability, helping people to understand and accept the benefits sustainable actions
can have on their whole life. Some benefits include urban walkability, multi-use
development, apartment living, being close to work, adopting a healthy, and plantbased diet. Making this connection helps individuals to “identify with what they want
their life to look like” (Interviewee #4) and in doing so reduces their environmental
impact.
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
Despite these valuable empirical, theoretical, and practical findings, like most research,
this study did not offer a complete analysis on factors that influence high carbon
footprints in San Jose, CA. The study had a narrow scope, and did not evaluate other
factors, such as airplane travel, access to transit nodes, waste generated, etc. that
could influence carbon footprints. Most significantly, the data used to measure carbon
emission output per block group were extrapolated from available geospatial data. No
doubt, it is also almost impossible to perfectly track all carbon emissions created by
block group activities.
In this analysis, 67% (Adjusted R2=0.673***) of high carbon footprints (and much less in
the poorest communities (Adjusted R2 = .239**) was explained by structural and human
agency factors. Future research could be more comprehensive by evaluating factors
that directly measure environmental choices and emissions. For example, the
Leadership Team Member for Grassroots Initiative stated that cities do not take into
account total consumption when measuring carbon footprint. Often, analysis is limited to
energy use, waste, transportation, and water, not on high-carbon activities, “such as
meat, purchasing clothing or flying” (Interviewee #5). This evaluation leads to a “skewed
perception of carbon footprints” (Interviewee #5). The importance of establishing a good
baseline measurement was also emphasized by the Urban Systems Analyst and
Scholar, stating that is necessary to use these “key environmental metrics” (Interviewee
#5) in order to reliably predict carbon emission outcomes (Interviewee #7). Measuring
these factors is difficult, but critical for future researchers to look at to secure a complete
and accurate measurement of carbon footprints. Additional research should also
continue to explore systemic inequality. Evaluating the current availability of
infrastructure in communities, such as recycling or composting services as well as
distance to transit nodes (Interviewee #2), will be critical. Such evaluative assessment
will be critical for the discussions of effective structural changes in land-use policy that
has to be built on a more accurate portrayal of resident ability to make sustainable
choices. The be more effective, these structural changes will also have to take into
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consideration the links of wealth and racial inequality with carbon footprint; that is,
systemic environmental changes will have to enhance equality and environmental
sustainability.

APPENDICES
Appendix A: Interview Protocol and Consent Forms
Consent Letter
Dear____:
I am a Sociology Senior working on my Research Capstone Paper under the direction of Professor Marilyn
Fernandez in the Department of Sociology at Santa Clara University. I am conducting my research on
community carbon footprints in San Jose.
You were selected for this interview, because of your knowledge of and experience working in the area of
sustainable development, and environmental community action.
I am requesting your participation, which will involve responding to questions about factors that influence
community environmental actions. The interview will last about 20 minutes. Your participation in this study is
voluntary. You have the right to choose to not participate or to withdraw from the interview at any time. The
results of the research study may be presented at SCU’s Annual Anthropology/Sociology Undergraduate
Research Conference and published (in a Sociology department publication). Pseudonyms will be used in
lieu of your name and the name of your organization in the written paper. You will also not be asked (nor
recorded) questions about your specific characteristics, such as age, race, sex, religion.
If you have any questions concerning the research study, please email me at erinjronald@gmail,com or Dr.
Fernandez at mfernandez@scu.edu
Sincerely,
Erin Ronald
Please send an electronic message denoting consent, or electronically sign below. By signing below or
providing an email, you are giving consent to participate in the above study.
______________________
____________________
____________
Signature
Printed Name
Date
If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have
been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Committee, through Office of
Research Compliance and Integrity at (408) 554-5591.
Guideline Interview Questions
Supplemental Qualitative Interviews for Thesis Sociology 195, Fall 2018 and Winter 2019
Interview Date and Time:
Respondent ID#:
1.
What is the TYPE Agency/Organization/Association/Institution where you learned about (and/or
worked) with this issue?
2.
Can you tell me about your position?
3.
How long have you been in this position and in this organization?
4.
Based on what you know of climate mitigation, how do you get people to adopt pro environmental
behavior that actually reduces their carbon footprint?
5.
In your opinion what are some factors that contribute to high carbon footprints in San Jose?
6.
I found that carbon footprints are higher in areas where there are concentrations of high
socioeconomic status and white communities. Has this been true in your experience?
37
Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

37

Silicon Valley Notebook, Vol. 17 [2019], Art. 1

7.

Is there anything else about this issue/topic I should know more about?

Thank you very much for your time. If you wish to see a copy of my final paper, I would be glad to share it
with you at the end of the winter quarter. If you have any further questions or comments for me, I can be
contacted at eronald@scu.edu Or if you wish to speak to my faculty advisor, Dr. Marilyn Fernandez, she
can be reached at mfernandez@scu.edu.

Appendix B
TABLE 2A. Bivariate Analyses: All Blocks and High SES Blocks
Correlation Matrix: Indices of High Carbon Footprint, Socioeconomic Status, White to Non-white
Concentration, Proportion of Solar Use, Percent Sustainable Transit to Work, Time Driven Alone, Mid-age
Blocks, Senior-Aged, and Female Blocks
SDG Dashboard for San Jose and 2009 - 2013 American Community Survey (n=517-523)1, 2
A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

1.0

.54***

.2**

.04

-.15

.09

-.001

.03

-.001

B. Socio-economic Status

.79***

1.0

.12

.09

-.06

-.04

.14

.17*

-.002

C. White to Non-white
concentration

.42***

.35***

1.0

.14

-.1

-.38***

.2***

.34***

.14

.06

.11**

.08

1.0

.11

-.09

.09

.07

.06

E. Percent Sustainable
Transit to Work

-.24***

-.21***

-.11**

.05

1.0

.02

-.24***

-.01

-.08

F. Time Driven Alone

.11***

.05

-.18***

-.03

-.18***

1.0

-.28***

-.42*** -.16*

G. Mid-age Blocks

.38***

.39***

.17***

-.08

-.23***

-.09

1.0

-.78*** -.25***

H. Senior-aged Blocks

.31***

.29***

.20***

.03

-.19***

-.260**

-.75***

1.0

.16***

I. Female Blocks

.09*

.05

.04

.04

-.10*

-.07

-.16***

.06

.16***

A. Index of High Carbon

D. Proportion of Solar Use

***p≤.001; **p≤.01; *p≤.05
1
Index of High Carbon Footprints = Electricity Emissions + Transportation Emissions + Goods Emissions + Food
Emissions; Possible range: 1406.50-15425.75;
Index of Socioeconomic Status = Percentage High Education * Estimate Per capita income in the past twelve months
in 2013 infla; Possible range: 0-8,265,753.47;
Percent White to Nonwhite = White households per block/non-white households. Possible range: 0 - 97.87;
Proportion of Solar Use = Solar Energy/Total Energy; Possible range: 0-.06;
Single Occupancy and Distance of Drive to Work= (Estimate Car truck or van Drove alone / Estimate Total
Transportation) * Estimate Total Travel Time Possible; Possible range: 0-2286;
Percent Mid Aged Blocks = Men and women aged 35-59/total population in a block;
Percent Senior Aged Blocks = Men and women aged 60 and above/total population in a block;
Female Blocks= Proportion of self-identifying females/total population.
2
Correlations above the diagonal of 1.0 refer to High SES blocks ; Below 1.0 refer to All blocks.
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TABLE 2B. Bivariate Analyses: Medium (below the diagonal) and Low (above the diagonal) SES
Correlation Matrix: Indices of High Carbon Footprint, Socioeconomic Status, White to Non-white
Concentration, Proportion of Solar Use, Percent Sustainable Transit to Work, Time Driven Alone, Mid-age
Blocks, Senior-Aged Blocks and Female
SDG Dashboard for San Jose and 2009 - 2013 American Community Survey (n=517-523)1, 2
A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

1.0

.46***

-.06

-.04

-.07

.14

.24***

.24**

.10

B. Socio-economic Status

.48***

1.0

.02

-.04

-.16*

.20**

.26***

.21**

-.02

C. White to Non-white concentration

.53*** .24***

1.0

-.13

.004

.03

-.09

-.16*

-.15

A. Index of High Carbon

D. Proportion of Solar Use

.04

.009

-.05

1.0

.05

.95

.54

.10

.66

E. Percent Sustainable Transit to
Work

.04

-.16*

-.02

.02

1.0

-.36***

-.12

-.21**

.02

F. Time Driven Alone

.05

.03

-.18*

.17*

-.14

1.0

-.09

-.1

-.06

G. Mid-age Blocks

.13

.19*

-.005

.02

-.16*

.03

1.0

.01

-.08

H. Senior-aged Blocks

.2**

.15*

.04

-.03

-.16*

-.30***

-.07

1.0

.19*

I. Female

.12

.08

.02

-.04

.24**

.01

.08

.1

1.0

***p≤.001; **p≤.01; *p≤.05
1
See Index names and coding in Table 2A.
2
Correlations above the diagonal of 1.0 refer to Low SES ; Below 1.0 refer to Medium SES.
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A Community to Call Mine
Supportive Community Environment and Citizen Actions?
By
Elizabeth Namakula Kamya1

ABSTRACT. To what extent are supportive Community Environments and Citizen
Actions needed to strengthen community attachment? The answers were
explored among three distinctive communities across America (Thriving,
Struggling, and Suffering) using a mixed methods design; analyses of secondary
survey data from the 2010 Soul of The Community Survey were supplemented
with qualitative insights from four community development professionals as well
content analysis of select community development and affluent neighborhood
initiatives. As predicted using Solari’s Affluent Neighborhood Persistence Model,
members of thriving communities were more likely to take ownership when there
was a supportive social environment. But, citizen action, particularly through
political activism, was most useful for community development mainly in suffering
communities, partially supporting Powell and DiMaggio’s New Institutionalism.
These findings, corroborated with the narrative commentaries, contributed to the
literature in the Sociology of communities as well community development and
highlighted the need for tailoring tools for communities of different levels of
affluence. Future research is warranted to identify and prioritize community
initiatives around social fabric and political activism in community development
practice.

INTRODUCTION
At the heart of communities are the residents who call an area home. Community
ownership is best encapsulated by an African proverb, “I am because we are.”
Collectively, individuals indeed make a community rich in beauty, character, and
diversity. In the words of a Community Psychologist (Interviewee #4), with the idea of
common goals and purpose, neighborhoods create cohesiveness to work together,
thrive together, weep together, and celebrate together. The goal for every community
should be to improve and prosper in the interests of their residents. However, figuring
out how to build sustainable growth remains a puzzling challenge for many public
officials, community organizers, and social workers.
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Currently there is not one set of best practices available to improve and transform
communities into more prosperous environments. Besides, neighborhoods are uniquely
varied and change is slow occurring over decades. The homology or cohesion between
people, the built environment, and community symbols are an evolving set of
processes. For example, changes, as in gentrification of communities, that seem
apparent, emerge through multiple, uneven steps (Deener, 2012). Communities have
diverse structures and are dense with opportunities, even if untapped, for fostering
identity and attachment. Persistently affluent neighborhoods work to protect, maintain
and renovate their structures to sustain their economic and social resources. In contrast
poor neighborhoods are at a disadvantage and their capital is very much pulled apart
through trying to make ends meet. As a result, understanding the complexity of
communities, in which no two are exactly the same, is challenging.
In this research, an attempt was made to learn more about factors that foster residents’
community attachment amongst communities of varied levels of affluence. Specifically,
the comparative relevance of strength of community social fabric and citizen actions in
nurturing attachment in thriving, struggling, and suffering communities were assessed.
While members and activists in suffering communities are typically interested in
community development those in more affluent communities focus on maintaining the
status quo. These wealth disaggregated research findings will be of interest not only to
academics of community development, but also to local government leaders,
community organizing agencies, and others working in the field to engage communities.
Because of the diversity of communities, there is need for context specific evidence on
which to generate new methods and/or strategies tailored to building stronger
communities.
LITERATURE REVIEW
A community is a sociological construct in which shared meaning and cultural
understanding are cultivated through interactions and attachment among its members.
And communities grow, change, or persist by their own sets of principles. Resident
participation in the community can be expected to be based on mutual expectation,
values, beliefs, and shared perceptions within a community. Because of the resulting
multidimensional complexity of communities, it is not easy to predict specifically how
each community will respond to challenges they encounter. However, scholars have
identified some common themes and related strategies in the lives of communities. Be
they a strong social fabric or citizen participation in community life, the goal has been to
unpack and understand the multidimensional glue that can hold a community together.
Community Attachment
Community attachment has been an important area of study in which scholars have
attempted to understand why individuals choose to live in a certain community, choose
to stay, or sometimes move. The word attachment has become synonymous in its
definition with satisfaction, sentiment, and bond to the community, and as such has
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been used interchangeably. Irrespective of the diverse terminology, community
attachment is viewed as the emotional and personal bond that ties a person to the
collective. The satisfaction residents have with their neighborhood encompasses
feelings of kinship, a sense of sodality, and measures community embeddedness
(Boulianne and Brailey, 2014).
In an effort to conceptualize community attachment, Cross (2013) examined how a few
dozen residents, in Nevada county, California, described their sentiments about the
community in which they live. Four aspects stood out as distinguishing features of
attachment: resources that make for an ideal community, experiencing a sense of
belonging, identifying with a place or region, and plans for the future. Cross concluded
that community attachment can be more than having an emotional connection to a
place; identifying with the place was also key. Of course, not all residents are attached
to, or identify with, the same dimensions, say social and/or physical, of a community.
Besides, community attachment is multidimensional; residents, in Hidalgo and
Hernandez’s (2001) study of 177 people in communities in Spain, were attached to both
the social and physical dimensions of places as well as their ability to develop different
degrees of dependence, cognitive preference, satisfaction, and identification with their
neighborhoods.
But community attachment is not only an outcome but also a process. Jaques (2008),
who studied citizens in rural communities of Colorado, concluded that binding to a
community is a basic social process of how people engage and fuse into an
environment. From the collective experiences of citizens varying in ages 26-82,
retrieved by Jaques from Glaser & Strauss, 1967, five stages of the social process were
documented. Two particularly important stages were: first the processes by which
people became involved and integrated into a community and second, the process by
which people continued interaction through practicing community norms and rituals.
In short, any substantive exploration of communities should account for subjective and
objective measures of community attachment. Subjective attachment was described by
Garland (in a 2013 study of 400 adults) as an individual’s sense of belonging in their
community, which could be influenced by the individual’s length of residence,
involvement in their community, and the connections they have with other community
members. Objective attachment refers to the more physical or tangible items in a
community, as in police presence or an abundance of parks and areas for outdoor
activity.
Keys to Community Attachment:
Social Fabric and Citizen Engagement
Although sociologists have tended to describe communities in terms of the strength of
resident satisfaction or attachment, they have, in their more recent research, expanded
their analyses to include the social environment of communities as a key to unlocking
community attachment. The social fabric includes social ties with family, friends, and the
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degree of integration into other social networks, and a resulting sense of safety that
support attachment. “The struggle over the direction of the country is not just about
economics or politics. It is a spiritual struggle over who we are and how we are
connected” noted a Community Organizer interviewed for this research by the author
(Interviewee #2). Researchers have also studied the active community residents, be it in
their engagement in the political and/or civic life of their communities to strengthen and
reinforce community life.
Strength of Community Social Fabric
There is a fair amount of agreement in the scholarly and activist circles that satisfaction
with one’s neighborhood is a result of both attitudinal and behavioral connections to the
area. For example, strong social cohesion within a community has been found to have
both direct and indirect positive effects on neighborhood attachment. Dassopoulos and
Monnat (2011), in their analyses of the Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey,
suggested that perceptions of cohesion within one’s neighborhood was important
because solidarity can become a tool to effect positive change through both formal and
informal community organizing and problem-solving. These researchers, however, did
not explore the mediating roles of social support and social control in the relationship
between community participatory action and satisfaction. It would be advantageous to
explore the type of events, places, and opportunities that allow individuals to socialize
with one another and deepen their bonds.
Sense of Safety. Community satisfaction is also described as the product of feeling safe
in the social location where one feels at home (Cross, 2013). For example,
Dassopoulos and Monnat (2011) captured the link between security and satisfaction as
follows: Los Angeles residents who reported that they feel safe in their neighborhood
had 4.5 times the odds of being in a higher community satisfaction category (exp1.540 =
4.66) than those who reported not feeling safe in their area. In other words, perceptions
of safety significantly and substantially increased satisfaction with their community.
Collective levels of satisfaction were also lowest in communities characterized by
residential mobility, urbanization, a density of youth, a high victimization rate, and most
importantly high levels of fear and distrust about local safety (Sampson, 1988). Fear of
crime, among the 10,905 residents from England and Wales that Sampson studied,
appeared to have negative consequences for collective community attachment and
social participation. One socially adverse effect of perceived danger was that those who
perceived crime to be high reduced their active leisure activities.
Citizen Actions: Civic Engagement Versus Political Activism
Even if the social fabric and other structural elements of communities are vibrant, the
many social, environmental, cultural, and safety challenges that communities face
require the active attention and involvement of residents and their allies. Through citizen
actions, as in collaborating with others, and getting engaged politically, residents can
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seek to address challenges, create sustainable communities, and subsequently uplift
their sense of community ownership.
Of course, not all community members can be expected to be equally engaged in all
matters of their communities. For example, in a literature review of civic engagement
and citizen participation in local governance, those with more socio-economic resources
and personal as well as social capital were more politically active or civically engaged
(Olimid, 2014). In the same vein of variability in citizen actions, the goals of citizen
action can also vary. For example, in a study of 577 individuals who sought volunteering
and community roles, Nix (2011) was able to relate the motivational desires of idealism
and social status to members’ desire to engage in a community to reaffirm and
strengthen community values. Similarly, using data from 28 countries in four continents,
a positive relationship between political activism and self-transcendence values with
and openness to change were found (Vecchione et al., 2015).
There is also a case to be made for distinguishing between subjective (satisfaction) and
objective (actions) measures of citizen actions as they contribute to community
attachment. In a study of community attachment and citizen actions, in a random
sample of 2000 students enrolled in a Canadian University, objective measures of
community attachment were found to increase the possibility of voting but not of
volunteering (Boulianne and Brailey, 2014). But when these researchers used
subjective measures (agree or disagree responses) of community attachment, along
with objective criteria, there was a positive relation between resident satisfaction and
volunteering as well as voting (political actions). They made a case for more
measurement accuracy by looking at both subjective and objective measures of
community attachment. In the final analyses, the different mechanisms of resident
involvement indicated that civic engagement and political activism must be treated as
separate concepts rather than one unitary concept. As such, distinct initiatives are
required to combat low rates of civic engagement and political activism.
Civic Engagement. Civic engagement can take many forms, with the two most common
being volunteering (active engagement) and other passive involvement such as
monetary donations (Olimid, 2014). Volunteering or doing service around one's
community is a demanding form of civic engagement (Uslaner, 2002). It asks more of
the individual than just donating money or being a shirker in an organization. Instead,
volunteering requires sacrifice of time and dedication to the cause (Garland, 2013).
Although many people associate their community engagement and work with
organizations with their religion, researchers, like Uslaner (2002), explain that the most
critical predictor of volunteering is the perception of a common bond or attachment with
other people. But, even when accounting for perceptions of social cohesion and
support, participating in a local business or civic organization was not associated with
neighborhood satisfaction among 1,912 respondents in the Los Angeles County
(Dassopoulos & Monnat, 2011).
Active involvement in the local community also provides residents with a sense of
control (Dassopoulos and Monnat, 2011); individuals in Wales and England who were
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socially integrated into their communities were more likely to trust other individuals. And
involvement in community groups and organizations, as well as having a social network
and attachment to one's community, improved community satisfaction (Wasserman,
1982).
Political Activism. Political activism, another form of citizen action, takes citizen actions
to a different level, both in its locus as well outcomes. When political activism is
collective, this form of activism in communities puts pressure on the local government to
improve the quality of life for all residing in the area, including the less advantaged.
Political activism can also strengthen collective efficacy, by activating or converting
social bonds among community members in order to accomplish common goals.
Communities with a higher average of collective efficacy usually share more of
consensus about issues and challenges in the local area (Brunton-Smith, Sturgis, and
Leckie, 2018). As with civic engagement, motivations for political activism also vary. In a
study of the motivation for political activism in sample of 125 social work students,
depending on whether they were liberals and conservatives, belonging to a community
of activist and maintaining activist identities were crucial to different modes of activism.
However, subjective measures of collective efficacy only influenced activism for
electoral campaigns in a select sample of students (Swank, 2012).
With a political mind frame, people can be active participants and change agents for
their constituencies on the issue for their wellbeing, noted a Community Based
Psychologist who was interviewed for this paper (Interviewee #4). Community concerns
in a global economy demand solutions, like, among others, political activism and
collective efficacy, to bring about change (Glaser, Yeager, and Parker, 2006). Their
comparisons, of responses of 5,970 registered community voters favoring
Neighborhood-Based organizations with others in favor of Government based solutions,
suggested that political activism amongst community members was a strong powerful
way to create change instead of latently waiting on their local leaders to enact it.
Community members’ actions can work either in line with the government or in
opposition to government. In any event, because political actions can drastically shift
the lives of those less fortunate, it is just as important as civic engagement.
Summary and Suggestions for Future Research
In conclusion, scholars have argued that creating a vibrant social fabric, political
activism and civic engagement are effective strategies for communities to address the
growing stressors they face and strengthen them (Henkin and Zapf, 2006-2007). But
there was little research found in which citizen actions (political activism and civic
engagement) were simultaneously evaluated with community social fabric for their
unique impacts on fostering belongingness, attachment, and satisfaction with
community. Besides, because of varied socioeconomic contexts of communities, there
is a need to investigate the differential roles of citizen action and community social
fabric in improving member satisfaction in communities with varying levels of economic
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growth. Further, political activism, that very often get categorized as civic engagement,
need to be treated as a distinct form of citizen action. To this effect, the relative net
effects of community social fabric, social networks and social cohesion, on community
satisfaction of residents will be assessed among thriving, struggling, and suffering
communities.
RESEARCH QUESTION
In this research, I investigated the differential impacts that social fabric, civic
engagement and political activism have on an individual’s community attachment in
three distinctive sub groups of communities. These insights will add to previous
research that showed a positive relationship of residents’ civic engagement (helping
others, volunteering, etc.) and political activism (voting and exhibiting local leadership)
with community attachment (as in Boulianne and Brailey, 2014). I want to expand on
this extant research by investigating how civic engagement, and political actions might
differentially affect community attachment of residents living under different wealth
constraints or access as the case might be. In addition, the role of community social
fabric in shaping or altering this attachment will be explored, an issue that has not
received full attention.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The analyses, presented in this research, of strategies and resources for differential
community attachment in thriving, struggling and suffering communities was framed
within Giddens’ Social Structuration (as outlined in Tagarirofa and David, 2013),
neighborhood persistence, and the new institutionalist (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:150;
Powell and DiMaggio, 2012: Chapter1) community development paradigms. Community
environment, in its dimensions of social fabric and sense of security, as well as citizen
action, as they might color a resident’s level of community satisfaction, are best
understood within Giddens’ social structuration framework. Giddens posited that the
bases of structure and agents in social systems are neither absolute nor abiding and
that social structures limit the actions of individual agents. That is, structure and action
evolve in a manner that are mutually constraining. However, context specific variations
in the importance of protecting the social environment and citizen actions to enact
changes in the community are best addressed using Solari’s Affluent neighborhood
persistence (2012) and DiMaggio and Powell’s New Institutional (1983:150) models for
community development.
As per the Affluent Neighborhood Persistence model tested by Solari (2012), thriving
communities protect and strengthen their affluence through a complex infrastructure of
resources, protection, and social networks. These structural benefits create a supportive
community environment that promotes a process of cumulative advantage. As affluent
residents collectively build their community environment, they protect access to social
spaces, strengthen neighborhood safety, and improve residents’ overall wellbeing. The
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resulting supportive community environment in the affluent communities work to elevate
residents’ feeling ownership of their community.
Ironically, persistent affluence in some neighborhoods comes at the expense of
economic segregation, growing inequality, and persistent poverty in others at the other
end of the economic spectrum. In the face of entrenched systemic poverty in
communities, community development theorists have advocated for social action and
community participation as potent tools to promote development that ensures more
inclusive access to and equitable distribution of economic resources and power.
However, citizens involvement in their local communities has to go beyond an interest in
local involvement and also require actions that seek to confront, impede, promote or
raise awareness about an issue or set of issues at different (external to the community)
levels. DiMaggio and Powell (1983), in their theory of New Institutionalism (elaborated
from Max Weber’s conceptualization of the iron cage), came to understand that for civic
actions to be effective they should be founded on an acknowledgement of community
organizational structures and bureaucratic institutions in the government and state.
Effective institutional change has to stem from both formal and informal pressures
exerted on organizations by organizations that also fit the cultural expectations in
society. To overcome the iron cage like constraints that communities face, organizations
and communities can find attractive solutions to the problems they face through means
of collective community effort and even sheer force. That is, coordinated citizen actions
might be an effective tool available to enact community change and development. The
resultant improvements in the social, environmental, economic and cultural
infrastructures within their communities can ignite community members’ passion and
loyalty toward their place of residency.
Drawing from these theoretical paradigms, two sets of boundary-specifying hypotheses
were postulated. In Hypothesis #1, a supportive community environment, more than
citizen action, would be more relevant, on balance, to community attachment in thriving
communities (Affluence Persistence). On the other hand, following New Institutionalist
expectations, Hypothesis #2 would be that citizen actions (more than supportive
community environment) would be the unique key to community attachment in the
suffering communities. Both hypotheses were evaluated net of community member’s
socioeconomic status, age, sex, and length of residence.
METHODOLOGY
A sequential mixed method design, of secondary quantitative data drawn from a
secondary data source combined with primary qualitative narratives, were used. These
mixed methods findings will provide a more comprehensive understanding of the
research question posed in this paper. Supplemental qualitative information was
gathered through interviews with professionals knowledgeable about citizen actions and
a supportive community environment, as well as experiential infield experience working
to strengthen community attachment.
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Secondary Data
The secondary quantitative data set I used to answer my research question was called
the Soul of the Community; this data came from a 2010 study conducted by Gallup, Inc.
of the 26 Knight Foundation communities across the United States. It was a purposeful
survey to identify the factors that connect residents to their communities and the role of
community attachment in an area's economic growth and well-being. Researchers used
Random Digit Dialing (RDD) to reach a representative selection of private household
telephone numbers in each of the defined areas; the adult interviewee (aged 18 or over)
in each sampled household was also randomly selected. A random sample of at least
400 residents, aged 18 years and old in each of the eight resident communities in
Akron, OH; Charlotte, NC; Detroit, MI; Macon, GA; Miami, FL; Philadelphia, PA; San
Jose, CA; and St. Paul, MN. The total number of respondents for 2010 was 20,2712.
Community groups were categorized by Soul of the Community into Thriving,
Struggling, and Suffering depending on the residents’ rating of their life at the time of the
survey and in the future. A person was considered to be living in a Thriving community if
she/he rated both their life at present time and future to be positive. On the other hand,
if individuals rated both their life at the present time and the future to be very low, they
were classified as living in a Suffering community. In between were respondents who
lived in Struggling communities3.
By design, the three communities varied substantially in the socioeconomic standing of
their members (Appendix A). Residents of Thriving communities were the most
educated and had the highest incomes. Half of individuals in the thriving communities’
group had graduated college, or were pursuing post graduate work, and/or had
achieved a post graduate degree. In contrast, a 1/3 in the suffering communities listed
their highest educational achievement as completing high school.
In Thriving communities, over 40% of the respondents had an annual income of
$75,000 - $99,999 or higher; with 2/3rds of them reporting six figures or more. On the
other hand, in Suffering communities, almost 37.5% reported annual income below
$25,000. According to the United States Census Bureau, the 2010 poverty income
threshold for a family of 4 with no children under 18 years of age was $22,541, while for
a family of 4 with 2 children under 18 it was $22,162. A sizeable portion of respondents
2

The original collector of the data, NADAC, or ICPSR, or the relevant funding agencies bear no
responsibility for use of the data or the interpretations or inferences based on such uses.
3
A respondent lived in a Thriving community if the ranked response to QN1A (Rating of life at present
time: Please imagine a ladder with steps numbered from zero at the bottom to ten at the top. Suppose
we say that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder
represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel
you stand at this time, assuming that the higher the step the better you feel about your life, and the lower
the step the worse you feel about it? Which step comes closest to the way you feel? Is 7 or higher and
the response to Q1B (Rating of Future Life: Just your best guess, on which step do you think you will
stand in the future, say about five years from now?) is 8 or higher. A respondent is considered to be
Suffering if the response to both QN1 and QN1B is 4 or lower. A respondent is considered to be
Struggling if they have not been classified as thriving or suffering based on the stated criteria (NADAC
2010). The response rates were not available for this survey.
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in suffering communities lived in poverty. Struggling community residents fell in
between; a plurality (39.5%) of residents in Struggling Communities had incomes in the
range of 25,000 - 54,999 that matched their education; 53% had completed high school
or some college. Aside from the deep socioeconomic disparities, the three communities
did not differ much in their demographic composition. Men and women were equally
represented in all three communities. The residents of the community tended to be
older; about 2/3 was 55 and older.
Qualitative Data
I conducted four semi structured interviews over the phone with professionals who had
expertise in the area of community development. The interviews were around 20
minutes long and as seen in Appendix B, voluntary participation and confidentially were
assured. The first interviewee (Interviewee #), found through personal connections at an
East Coast university, is a Social Work Professor who has been teaching the macro
level of social work for over 20 years. Prior to becoming a professor, she was engaged
in communities in her work at a public works organization in Boston. It is through this
organization that she began to grapple with and help with the challenges facing different
local neighborhoods. The second interviewee is the Director of an international
community organizing nonprofit and started his career doing faith-based action in
Oakland. I became acquainted with this Community Organizer through working in this
nonprofit. As with Sociologist Interviewee #3, they have a vast knowledge in immigrant
communities and how to create for a healthy environment. The last interviewee #4 was
a psychologist based in Boston. This psychologist teaches at a local university and is
specialized in peace and conflict mediation in communities across the globe.
It was important to include content analysis of case studies of different communities,
personal experiences, and annual reports that were gathered. One case study centered
in Los Angeles and mapped out the diverse framework of the Venice neighborhood in
the County (Deener 2012). The author’s personal experiences from time spent in LA
(Kamya 2017) were another source, although the location was Boyle Heights. The
annual report reviewed for this paper highlighted a suffering community in Michigan that
is working to be a thriving neighborhood (UNI 2017). These sources of real and current
community work helped to strengthen the methodology and theoretical framework in an
effort to illustrate the impact of community attachment.
DATA ANALYSES: SURVEY and QUALITATIVE INSIGHTS
Three levels of analyses, univariate, bivariate and multivariate were utilized to answer
the research question posed above. In keeping with the research design, I
disaggregated the analyses by the three types of communities, Thriving, Struggling, and
Suffering communities, in which residents lived.
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Operationalization and Descriptive Analyses
A sense of community is important for determining a good and healthy lifestyle, opined
the Sociologist interviewed for this research (Interviewee #3). Levels of resident
community attachment, supportive social environment and citizen actions, varied, by the
type of community in which they lived. Residents in thriving groups were most attached
to their communities, reported the most supportive social fabric and highest levels of
participatory activities, be they political action or civic engagement. Suffering
communities were at the opposite end; not only were residents less attached than the
more affluent residents, they did not have as supportive of a social fabric nor were as
engaged in the civic political life of their communities. The descriptive findings pointed to
clear boundary limiting conditions amongst thriving, struggling, and suffering groups,
underscoring the need for accounting for conditional limitations of attachment in each
community.
Community Attachment
Community attachment can be defined as the thoughts and feelings of ownership an
individual has towards the place in which they reside. The psychology professor
(Interviewee #4) described it in simpler terms: “Attachment is like glue. When
communities lack this glue, or their glue is spread too thin, a detachment from a
common goal that would bring people together is created.” Recommending their
community to others and one’s pride in their community all indicate satisfaction and
creates the “glue” leading people to feel attached to their communities.
As see in Table 1.A, American's living in thriving communities, compared to suffering
communities, were more attached to their community; The thriving communities group
had the highest index of community attachment with a mean of 16.18 (sd=28.01) on a
range of 4 – 100, followed by those that resided in struggling communities. The
Suffering group had the lowest mean attachment index score of 37.01 (sd=31.99). For
example, almost half the respondents living in thriving communities strongly felt proud to
live in their community (48.5%), more than double the proportion that reported pride in
suffering communities (22.4%). Also, more than 2/3s of people in both thriving and
struggling communities reported high levels of satisfaction living in their communities;
the corresponding proportion in suffering communities was only 1/3 (36.3%). In short,
the descriptive data shed light on the disparities among the three communities. A
plurality (40%) respondents in suffering communities reported extreme dissatisfaction
and would not at all recommend their community to others (39.1%).
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Concept

Community
Satisfaction/
Belonging

Table 1.A. Community Attachment/belonging
NADAC, 2010– Soul of The Community
Dimensions Indicators
Responses
Thriving
(n=9458)
Community
Loyalty

Community
Passion

Suffering
(n= 379)
19.3%***
19.3
25.1
19.6
16.7

QCE1
recode:
Community
as a place
to live: How
Satisfied?

1. Not at all
2
3
4
5. Extremely
(n)

3.2%
4.8
20.1
39.5
32.5

5.7%
8.2
25.1
34.4
26.6
(10314)

QCE2
recode:
Recommend
community
to others

1. Not likely at all
2
3
4
5. Extremely likely

6.9%
6.3
17.4
29.7
39.7

15.1%
11.6
22.3
26.2
24.8

39.1%***
11.9
16.4
15.6
17.2

Q3A
recode:
Proud to live
in this
community

1.Strongly disagree
2
3
4
5.Strongly agree

4.3%
4.4
15.3
27.4
48.5

8.7%
10.2
24.0
25.9
31.2

29.8%***
15.0
19.3
13.5
22.4

Q3B:
Community
is perfect for
me

1.Strongly disagree
2
3
4
5.Strongly agree
Mean (𝑥)
Std. deviation (s)
Min-Max

6.1%
7.3
17.5
30.0
39.1
66.18
28.01
4 - 100

13.3
14.5
23.5
25.4
23.2
52.09
29.42
4 – 100

35.1%***
16.5
17.6
12.0
18.9
37.01***
31.99
4 - 100

Index of
Community
Attachment1
1

Statistics
Struggling
(n= 5513)

Index of Community Attachment = (QCE1+QCE2)*(Q3A+Q3B). The correlations among these indicators were:
suffering communities between .858*** and .735***; in the struggling communities between .799*** and .668***; in the
thriving communities between .802*** and .682***; *** p <=.001.

Community Environment
One potential explanation for stronger attachment in some communities and less so in
others considered in this analysis was the social environment. A supportive community
environment is important for residents to feel satisfied with their local communities. An
important principle to distinguish in community development work is creating a social
fabric that fosters self-reliance. For example, an environment that fosters a caring and
safe group context where residents can come together to exchange knowledge, skills,
and life experiences allow people to reach their own personal goals is an essential
building block for attachment. In this supportive environment, community members can
build connections and not feel isolated.
For example, a community that uplifts community members, regardless of their
background or varying ability, will address individual and local needs through informal
interactions. By finding a place where people can actually meet, even if it is just once a
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week, residents are offered a forum for engagement and is a market place for ideas. A
community that emphasizes inclusion will address safety issues by acknowledging that
men and women may feel differently walking home alone. Identifying members’ different
needs to feel secure is instrumental in informing the planning and development of
activities and programs.
Social Fabric, the first component of community environment considered here, involves
formal and informal methods of networking. To develop connections within their local
communities, residents align, collaborate, and work with individuals, groups and other
agencies. In addition, the strength of the social fabric can also be distinguished by
access and equity. A strong community will have centers that are accessible and
welcoming; accessibility to particular social spaces and social events promotes equity
and improves the social, environmental and cultural infrastructures within their
communities. The social fabric of a community can be assessed using these
distinguishing characteristics and by community participation.
As seen in Table 1.B, availability of events and spaces that allowed for social cohesion
were of varying rates of quality in the three communities. Some examples are noted to
identify these community differences. For example, a plurality of residents in the thriving
communities rated the frequency of social community events offered to the community
as very good (37.2%). On the other hand, more than half (54.8%) in suffering
communities thought the availability of social community events to be average or worse.
About ¼ (25.6%) in struggling communities expressed that the availability was okay.
Another example of the social fabric is the social settings in which people meet one
another. Almost 2/3rds (63.7%) of residents in thriving community reported that their
community had an above average vibrant night life and more than 2/3rds (68.3) said their
community is a good place to meet people and make new friends. Corresponding
ratings in suffering communities was only 39% (above average night life) and 36.5%
(good place to meet people) respectively; for struggling communities it was 53% and
51.8% respectively. On balance, the social fabric was rated by residents to be the
strongest in Thriving communities (𝑥 on the social fabric index score was 27.79***
on a range of 6.0 - 60.0 while weakest in Suffering communities (𝑥 = 26.39***)
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Concept

Social
Fabric

Table 1.B. Social Fabric
NADAC, 2010– Soul of The Community
Indicators
Responses
Statistics
Thriving
Struggling
(n=8852)
(n=5153)
Q7P:Availability
1. Very bad
2.0%
4.7%
of social
2
5.4
10.0
community
3
19.5
25.6
events
4
35.9
33.4
5. Very good
37.2
26.3
4.2
Q7A: Availability 1. Very bad
2.0%
8.7%
of parks and
2
5.4
20.8
playgrounds
3
15.1
32.7
4
32.8
33.6
5. Very good
44.6
Q7O: Availability
of arts and
cultural
opportunities

1. Very bad
2
3
4
5. Very good

3.5%
7.8
20.7
33.2
34.9

6.6%
11.4
23.2
32.4
26.4

14.2%***
14.2
27.9
20.9
22.8

Q7I: Good place
to meet people
and make
friends

1. Very bad
2
3
4
5. Very good
1. Very bad
2
3
4
5. Very good

3.0%
6.8
21.9
37.4
30.9
4.3%
8.7
23.4
33.1
30.6

6.7%
12.0
29.5
31.7
20.1
7.3%
11.9
27.7
29.8
23.2

21.2%***
14.5
27.7
22.3
14.2
17.7%***
16.6
26.2
20.4
19.1

1. Very bad
2
3
4
5. Very good
1.Yes
2. No

4.8%
9.9
32.2
36.5
16.7
78.2%
21.8

9.5%
16.7
35.7
27.2
10.9
68.1%
31.9

20.6%***
22.0
28.5
19.5
9.5
56.8%***
43.2

Mean (𝑥)
Std. deviation (s)
Min-Max

27.79
10.61
6.0 - 60.0

27.48
11.36
6.0 - 60.0

26.39***
12.05
6.0 - 60.0

Q7H: Vibrant
nightlife restaurants,
clubs, bars, etc.
Q7M: People
care about each
other

Q22F: Attended
a local event

1

Suffering
(n=345)
9.3%***
17.3
28.2
26.3
18.9
10.2
12.4%***
23.9
28.0
25.5

Index of Social Fabric= Q7O + Q7P + Q7A + Q7H + Q7I + Q7M + DummyQ22F. The correlations among these
indicators were: suffering communities between .586*** and .281***; in the struggling communities between .510***and
.045***; in the thriving communities between .522*** and .037***; *** p<=.001

Sense of Safety, is the second component of community environment considered in this
analyses (Table 1.C). In Thriving communities over a 1/3 of respondents reported
feeling completely safe walking alone at night near their house (34.2%). But, about a 1/3
of respondents in suffering communities reported the opposite and shared that they did
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not feel safe at all (29.3%). While the level of crime in the community generated little
variance in the responses across the three groups, those in struggling and suffering
reported a slightly higher level of crime. Other safety characteristics that helped
distinguish these three groups was the change in local crime rates in the past year.
While the majority of respondents in each community group said crime rates stayed the
same, over 1/3 of respondents in both the struggling and suffering groups noticed an
increase in crime (32.8% and 44.5% respectively). Besides, residents of suffering
community reported that the effectiveness of the police was very bad (17.6%) which
was 5 times more than reported in the thriving group (3.3%) and more than two times
those in the struggling group (6.8%). On balance, the Sense of Safety was rated by
residents to be the strongest in Thriving communities (𝑥 on the social fabric index score
was 12.98*** on a range of 4.0 -18.0 while weakest in Suffering communities (𝑥 =10.57***)

Concept

Sense of
Safety

Dimensions

1. Not safe at all
2
3
4
5. Completely
safe

Statistics

Thriving
(n=9242)
9.2%
8.7
17.0
30.9
34.2

Struggling
(n=5392)
16.0%
13.4
20.2
27.5
22.9

Suffering
(n=365)
29.3%
13.9
17.6
19.7
19.5

Feeling safe

Q18: Feel
safe walking
alone at night
near your
home

Crime
Activity

Q19: Level of
Crime in your
Community

1. extremely high
2
3
4
5 Extremely low

7.2%
12.2
27.1
30.2
23.4

8.9%
15.9
33.4
26.7
15.1

15.1%
17.5
30.8
21.5
15.1

Q20: Change
in local crime
level in past
year
Q7N:
Effectiveness
of Local
Police

1. Increased
2. Stayed the
3. Decreased

23.6%
65.7
10.7

32.8%
58.1
9.1

44.5%
48.2
7.3

1. Very bad
2
3
4
5. Very good
Mean (𝑥)
Std. deviation
Min-Max

3.3%
5.9
20.2
40.1
30.5
12.98
2.64
4.0 -18.0

6.8%
10.0
25.3
35.5
22.4
11.83
2.78
4.0 -18.0

17.6%
16.0
24.1
25.7
16.6
10.57***
3.23
4.0 - 18.0

Law
Enforcement

1

Table 1.C. Sense of Safety
NADAC, 2010– Soul of The Community
Indicators
Responses

Index of Sense of Security = Q7N+Q18+Q19+Q20. The correlations among these indicators were: suffering
communities between .391*** and .196***; in the struggling communities between .327*** and .131***; in the thriving
communities between .335*** and .156***; *** p<=.001.

Citizen Actions
Human beings are political animals and as such they participate in various forms of civic
engagement (Interviewee #4). The term citizen action was used to capture civic
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engagement and political activism; they both involve and require an individual to
voluntarily participate and collaborate in a social system to create some form of change.
A person can be involved politically and partake in actions to ignite community growth
and a person can also be involved civically and use voluntary actions to help others
around them. With both types of engagement, residents enact their civic duty and are
called to action, but the type of actions being executed and the types of outcomes will
be quite different.
Civic Engagement, is an important component of Community Attachment because it is
through service and dedication that residents can enact changes and make community
member feel better about and become more connected to their neighborhood. Civic
engagement is important for any healthy community because it can also strengthen and
sustain the areas that need attention. For instance, volunteering and working with local
organizations can be a form of engagement that individual partakes in to help others
around them (Table 1.D). As might be expected, the thriving communities group had the
highest levels of civic engagement with an engagement mean of 7.72 (on a range of 415) followed by the struggling communities. Suffering communities showed the lowest
mean of civic engagement with a mean of 7.39 (sd= 1.38).

Concept

Civic
Engagement

1

Table 1.D. Citizen Action: Civic Engagement
NADAC, 2010– Soul of The Community
Indicators
Values and
Statistics
Responses
Thriving
Struggling
(n=9400)
(n=5488)
Q22A:
1.Yes
58.7%
49.2%
Performed
2.No
41.3%
50.8
local volunteer
Work
Q22D:
1.Yes
44.3%
37.9%
Worked with
2. No
55.7
62.1
others to
change
community
DummyQ22G: 1.Yes
17.9%
26.8%
Donated
2. No
82.1
73.2
money to help
a local
organization
Q22_A:
1. No impact at all
2.5%
6.2%
Residents'
2. A small impact
18.9
29.4
impact on
3. Moderate impact 43.9
42.7
improving
4. A big impact
34.6
21.6
community
Index of Civic
Mean (𝑥)
7.72
7.60
Engagement1
1.20
1.21
Std. deviation (s)
4.0 - 15.0
4.0 - 15.0
Min-Max

Suffering
(n=373)
37.3%***
62.7%
36.8%***
63.2

35.8%***
64.2

17.0%***
39.0
28.4
15.6
7.39***
1.38
4.0 - 14.0

Index of Civic Engagement = Q22A + Q22D + Q22_A + DummyQ22G. The correlations among these indicators
were: suffering communities between .409*** and .130*; in the struggling communities between .344*** and .156***; in
the thriving communities between .339*** and .143***; *** p<=.001; * p<=.05.
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Some specifics on civic engagement activities in the three communities: In Suffering
communities, residents (37.3%) were far less likely to engage in local volunteer work as
opposed to those who lived in thriving communities (58.7%). However, in all three
communities more than half did not attend local public meetings (62.7%, 66.1%, and
68%). When asked how often they worked with others to enact change in communities,
more than half indicated infrequently. However, those in Thriving communities were the
most evenly split, with a little less than half working with others to change the
communities (yes=44.3% vs. no=55.7%). Besides, more than half the residents in the
suffering group felt they can make a little to no impact in improving their communities
(56%).
Political Activism, the second dimension of Citizen Actions, is also human empowered
and offers people a voice against dominant political and societal structures. Citizen's
participation and involvement in local government are essential for community
attachment because it places responsibility both on the individual and on the collective.
In the process of political activism, people come together, hold each other accountable,
understand the complexity of problems, and find innovative strategies. Individuals’
feelings about their local government and leaders paint a potential picture of past and
present experiences living in the community. Political activities are ones that get people
to think about their civic duties and change the dynamics and make-up of the
community. The type of political activity in which individuals engage may vary
depending on the individuals’ level of trust and whether or not they have local leaders
representing their interests. Voting and being registered to vote is one form of activism
that has the potential to bring about developmental change within communities.
As seen in Table 1.E, political activism, that ultimately shapes the fate of a community,
varied by whether the community was thriving, suffering or struggling. The thriving
communities had the highest index of Political Activism at 19.33, on a range of 6 – 68,
followed by the struggling community group. At the other end was the group of suffering
communities which had the lowest index of political activism with a mean of 14.59 (sd =
8.31). But, all three communities had high proportions who had registered to vote (close
to or over 90%). Additionally, all three groups had a high turnout rates in their local
election. Those in Thriving communities had the highest turnout rate (80.3%) followed
by the struggling community group (76.9) and then the suffering group (73.6%). Despite
the uniformity in voting patterns, perceptions of local government and leaders conjured
varied openness across communities. The majority of those residing in Suffering
communities hardly ever had trust (44.8) in the local government, almost 3 times more
than those in thriving communities who felt the same (14.7%). Also, two thirds in
suffering communities admitted that local leadership was bad or very bad and a plurality
strongly felt that their leaders failed to represent their interests (41.2%).
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Concept

Political
Activism

Dimensions

Assessment

Actions

1

Table 1.E. Citizen Action; Political Activism
NADAC, 2010 – Soul of The Community
Indicators Values and
Statistics
Responses
Thriving Struggling
(n=9302) (n=5411)
Q7L: Local 1.Very bad
10.8%
19.7
leadership
2
15.7
20.0
of elected
3
33.7
31.9
officials
4
28.5
20.6
5. Very good
11.3
7.8
Q10A:
1. Hardly ever
14.7%
23.9%
Level of
2. Only some of the 41.3
47.4
trust in
time
local
3. Most of the time
37.7
25.8
govern4. Just about
6.4
3.0
ment
always

Suffering
(n=370)
40.9%***
19.5
19.2
14.9
5.4
44.8%***
39.8
12.2
3.2

Q15AB:
Local
leaders
represent
my
interests

1.Strongly disagree
2
3
4
5. Strongly Agree

10.4%
17.1
37.2
26.0
9.2

10.4%
17.1
37.2
26.0
9.2

41.2%***
25.0
19.9
8.2
5.6

Q21Regist
ered to
vote

1. Yes
2. No

92.6%
7.4

90.4%
9.6

87.9%***
12.1

Q22C:
Voted in
the local
election

1. Yes
2. No

80.3%
19.7

76.9%
23.1

73.6%***
26.4

Q22B:
Attended a
local public
meeting
Index of
Political
Activism1

1.Yes
2.No

37.3%
62.7

33.9%
66.1

32.0%***
68.0

Mean (𝑥)
Std. deviation (s)
Min-Max

19.33
7.77
6.0 68.00

17.29
7.84
6.0 - 56.0

14.59***
8.31
6.0 - 44.0

Index of Political Activism = Q7L + Q15AB + Q10A + DuummyQ22C + DummyQ21 + DummyQ22B. The
correlations among these indicators were: suffering communities between .691*** and .197***; in the struggling
communities between .580*** and .030*; in the thriving communities between .667*** and -.047***;
***
p<=.001; * p<=.05.

Bivariate Analyses
In the second analytical step in the process of answering the empirical and theoretical
questions raised in this paper, the empirical relationships of community attachment with
supportive community environment and citizen actions were evaluated (Table 2 in
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Appendix C). Based on these preliminary results, community social fabric had the
strongest likelihood of strengthening residents’ ownership of their communities,
irrespective of whether they lived in struggling (r=.61***), thriving (r=.61***) or suffering
communities (r=.61***). Sense of security was possibly a second, even if weaker than
social fabric, predictor in all three communities; but, security was more important to
community ownership in suffering communities (r=.45***), followed by residents in
struggling communities (r=.39***), and least in thriving communities(r=.37***).
Of the two types of citizen actions considered, political activism appeared to have a
stronger potential for strengthening community attachment than civic engagement. For
example, political activism was most important to residents’ attachment in suffering
communities (r=.58***); thriving community residents (.49***) followed by struggling
communities (r=.52***) seem to have used political activism to strengthen attachment to
their communities. Civic engagement was also an important tool, even if less so than
political activism, to strengthen community ownership first in suffering communities
(r=.17***), followed by struggling (r=.15***) and last in thriving (r= .12***).
But, which of these mechanisms are the most effective in engendering community
ownership? The unique roles that each of these tools played in strengthening
community ownership were tested using multivariate analyses and are laid out in the
next section. In keeping with the research design, the analyses were disaggregated by
whether residents lived in Thriving, Struggling, or Suffering communities.
Multivariate Linear Regression Analyses and Qualitative Insights
A series of one-step multivariate analyses were used, separately for the three
community subgroups, to test the robustness of the correlational analyses and the
research hypotheses; see Table 3 below. Overall, a supportive social environment was
the strongest predictor of how satisfied their residents were in all three communities.
However, not all environments were equal nor were they equally effective in different
communities. A vibrant social fabric took precedence over members’ sense of security.
For example, the more supportive the social fabric was the more attached their
members of the communities were (β=.45*** in Thriving, β=.41*** in Struggling, and
β=.34*** in Suffering communities respectively). As per the Psychologist interviewee
(Interviewee #4), when community members have a supportive environment, full of
inclusion and security, they feel recognized, have a sense of purpose, and feel that their
contributions to the community are actually elevated and noticed. These feelings, are a
buy-in, and has a valuable impact on the communities as it creates a sense of
commitment. Without a supportive environment, resident don't feel a buy-in and when
their contributions are dismissed, they feel alienated. Such disjointedness ends up
hurting the very people that live there.
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Table 3. Regression Analysis of Community Attachment1
NADAC, 2010 – Soul of The Community. β Coefficients
Community Attachment
Thriving

Struggling

Suffering

.45***

.41***

.34***

Sense of Security

.11***

.13***

.14**

Citizen Actions:
Political Activism

.19***

.23***

.32***

.03**

.03*

.07

.09***

.09***

.04

.04***

.03*

-.05

SES

-.01

-.04***

-.05

Length of residency

-.01

-.01

-.03

Constant

2.36***

2.87***

10.68***

Adjusted R2

.43***

.45***

.46***

8 & 7534

8 & 4347

8 & 281

Community Environment:
Social Fabric

Civic Engagement
Demographics:
Age
Gender

Model Statistics:

DF 1 & 2

***p≤.001;**p≤.01;*p≤.05
1
Index of Community Attachment = Community as a place to live + Recommend community to others + Proud to live
in this community + This community is perfect for me. Possible Ranges: 4 -100 for all groups;
Index of Social Fabric = Availability of social community events + Availability of parks and playgrounds + Availability
of arts and cultural opportunities + Good place to meet people and make friends + Vibrant nightlife - restaurants,
clubs, bars, etc. + People care about each other + Attended a local event; 6 - 60 for all groups;
Index of Sense of Security = Feel safe walking alone at night near your home + Level of Crime in your Community +
Change in local crime level in past year + Effectiveness of Local Police; Possible Ranges: 4-18 for all groups;
Index of Political Activism = Registered to vote + Voted in the local election + Leadership of elected officials + Local
leaders represent my interests + Level of trust in local government + Attended a public meeting; Possible Ranges: 6
- 68 for thriving groups, 6 - 56 for struggling groups, 6 - 44 for suffering groups;
Index of Civic Engagement = Performed local volunteer work + Worked with others to change community + Donated
money to a local organization + Residents' impact on improving community. Possible Ranges: 4 -15 for struggling
and thriving groups, 4 - 14 for suffering groups:
Female (1) versus Male (0);
Age: 1 = 18-24, 2 = 25-34, 3 = 35-44, 4 = 45-54, 5 = 55-64, 6 = 65 and older;
Index of Socio-economic Status = Income Range * Highest level of education completed; Range: 1- 48 for all groups;
Length of Residency = 1-97 years.

Similarly, even though to a lesser extent, the more secure residents felt in their
communities, the more satisfied they were with their communities (Suffering β=.145**,
Struggling β=.13*** and Thriving β =.11***). That is, residents felt more ownership in
62
https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/svn/vol17/iss1/1

62

et al.: Class, Race, and Political BoundaryLimits of Community andPolitic

communities that were secure (supported by Interviewee #4). However, community
context, whether thriving or not, also mattered. Of the different mechanisms considered
here, a strong social fabric was the most important for residents of thriving
communities4. And security was more relevant to member attachment in the Suffering
(β=.145**) and Struggling (β=.13***) communities than in Thriving communities
(β=.11***).
In addition to a supportive community environment, citizen actions were also a
necessary set of options for strengthening community attachment. Civic Actions,
particularly political activism but not civic engagement, was a critical element in
member’s satisfaction, most in Suffering communities5 (β = .32***). Political activism was
less relevant in the Struggling (β= .23***) and Thriving (β= .19***) in that order.
Two other noteworthy patterns were evident in the comparisons among the three
communities. For one, of the three tools for building community attachment,
strengthening the social fabric was by far the most important to members of Thriving
(β=.45***) and Struggling (β=.41***) communities. On the other hand, members of the
Suffering communities equally valued a strong social fabric (β=.34***) and political
activism (β=.32***). Second, members of all three groups equally valued sense of
security in their commitment to their communities (Thriving β=.11***, Struggling β=.13***,
and Suffering β=.14**). But priorities in suffering communities were strong fabric and
political activism.
While having a supportive social fabric is important for community attachment,
significant differences across the three communities indicated that an affluent, lack
thereof, social context matters. While affluent community conditions are prime for more
social interactions (as in the Thriving Communities), others, as the Suffering group,
have limited resources and opportunities to engage in social events. No doubt,
residents in the Suffering communities, that have a large percentage living below the
poverty line, also desire to cultivate in social connections. Nevertheless, their priorities
to work and provide for their families might be more pressing. Advocating for their
material needs and making sure their voices are heard is equally as important as the
social fabric in their community, whereas in thriving communities there is less of a need
for political activism perhaps because they are already being listened to. And while
sense of security is important in all of the communities it is not a primary concern when
looking at community satisfaction as compared to political activism and social fabric.
Political activism is critical because it is one of the most important ways individuals in a
community can feel a sense of belonging and knowledge of how to access political
leadership. It is important for any healthy community to discuss, critic their situation, and
do some problem solving. In the process of having these conversations, a person is
able to understand that some of the challenges they face can be addressed with some
4

Z Scores of the differences in unstandardized regression coefficients among all 3 groups were
statistically significant at the .05 level.
5
Z Scores of the differences in unstandardized regression coefficients among all 3 groups were
statistically significant at the .05 level.
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activism. “If you feel you are not alone and have some power to exercise your rights and
access political influence you will feel better about you self and better about your
neighborhood when it comes to change (Social Worker, Interviewee #1).” Feeling better
about your community through political activism is confirmed from the multivariate
findings. It’s strong positive influence on community attachment comes from the
demands that political activism places on individuals to collaborate and interact.
The opportunities to interact is present a bit in civic engagement as well, but only in
thriving (β=.03**) and struggling (β=.03**) communities. Civic engagement was not a
viable option to strengthening community attachment in the suffering group; there was
no empirical relationship to support civic engagement. Inquiring into why civic
engagement might not be an appropriate strategy for strengthening community
attachment in suffering communities, the Community Organizer (Interviewee #1) had
this to say: with a sense alienation in some communities, there is less connection, and
fewer opportunities, and consequently community attachment stays stagnant. This does
not necessarily mean that they are avoiding a collective bond; it just indicates that it is
not a priority amidst the financial stress and challenges of providing for their families.
Civic engagement strengthened community attachment in thriving and struggling
communities, but their economic conditions were less dire in these communities.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the concluding sections, a synthesis of the study findings with theoretical premises
and practical applications were explored. Some suggestions for future research,
specifying additional conditional boundary limits of communities, were also outlined.
Empirical and Applied Implications
There were clear boundary limiting conditions in what made residents of thriving,
struggling, and suffering communities felt attached to and took ownership of their
communities. In thriving communities, a supportive social fabric was the most important
predictor of community attachment; political activism and sense of security were a
distant second. In contrast, politically active residents along with a supportive social
environment were the keys to strong sense of belonging for residents of suffering
communities. Notable differences were also observed in the respective ranking of the
three critical priorities in community attachment. In suffering communities, a resident’s
sense of security can come only after a supportive social environment is established
and citizens become politically engaged. On the other hand, in both thriving and
struggling communities’ sense of security is less as priority than a strong social fabric.
The sociologist (Interviewee #3) interviewed for this research placed these boundary
limits in perspective thusly: If a community is very tight-knit, in the sense of offering
ample opportunities for socialization, their residents can “socialize and thrive by
introducing good lighting on the streets, creating open areas or spaces where people
talk, and making sidewalks large enough for conversations to occur amidst the foot
traffic. The way we design cities creates socialization and a deep sense of pride, but
additionally can control for deviance”. He went on to explain that with a bustling social
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fabric, it inadvertently reduces crime because criminals are not naïve; they are
cognizant that if they are visibly seen or can’t assure a quick escape then they will be
caught. Therefore, security is less of a priority in these thriving communities considering
that their social fabric mostly insulates residents from crime.
These findings about boundaries of community attachment could be useful to interested
stakeholders, such as local government officials, social workers, and community
organizing nonprofits/organizations, in developing tailored strategies for boosting
community attachment amongst their citizens. Community attachment is conditional;
one first must identify whether the community is thriving, struggling or suffering because
the community building strategies or approaches to address any particular issue would
and should be prioritized differently in each community. In all three groups, but
particularly in suffering groups, political activism is a tool that stakeholders, including
community residents, can use. No doubt, encouraging civic engagement by residents in
struggling and thriving groups is important but until their socioeconomic conditions
improve, especially in struggling communities, developing attachment through civic
engagement will be a challenge. For example, in Suffering Communities, where a
considerable percentage of their population live in poverty, unless their economic
poverty situations are addressed, attempts at impactful changes will be of limited
effectiveness.
One community organization that has already been taking efforts to strengthening the
social fabric of their neighborhood is Michigan’s Urban Neighborhood Initiative (UNI
Annual Report, 2017). This non-profit’s mission is to work with communities to develop
safe and thriving environments, in the hopes that everyone will feel attached to the
place where they work live and play. By taking on various projects in the town of Spring
Wells and Detroit, Michigan citizens have seen their neighborhoods transform before
their eyes. In their annual report they address targeting issues of youth development,
land use economic development, and education. “By collaborating with the resident they
reveal their attachment to the community and each other. Spring Wells and Detroit
vacant lots, streets, and sidewalks were filled with memories of joy and love, and by
tapping these residents on the street knowledge, these places are filled with hope and
promise! (UNI Annual Report, 2017)” Testimonials like these provide a glance of the
power that communities have when addressing major impactors of community
attachment.
Theoretical implications
From a theoretical point of view (Figure 1), the affluent persistence model was
conditionally supported in this analysis; a supportive community environment was the
most critical tool for attachment in the more affluent communities but not so strong in
the less affluent neighborhoods. The wealth in a neighborhood shapes the
opportunities, security, and social networks of the residents, which, in turn, improves
their quality of life and overall wellbeing (Solari 2012). It is this overall satisfaction,
independent of personal and family status, that generate and sustain strong ties
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towards their collective community. Indicators of affluence are expressed not only in the
high economic status of the neighborhood but also its unattainability for those on the
outside. One of the clearest visual cues of social exclusion are gates and walls
bordering wealthy communities. Affluent communities maintain their exclusive position
and status of their neighborhood through social exclusion (Deener, 2010). In contrast,
persistently poor neighborhoods, are not primarily concerned with the maintenance and
renovation of their community. It is to be expected that their residents’ attention is, first
and foremost, to their families. While deteriorating buildings, increased crime, and
disinvestment persist in suffering communities, so does the need for members to
provide for their children. As a result, living in chronically distressed areas creates
disadvantages that makes it increasingly difficult not only to exit poverty but also to build
community attachment.
Figure 1. Empirical and Theoretical Model of Community Attachment:
Impacts on Civic Engagement and Political Activism
NADAC, 2010– Soul of The Community1,2,3
Social Fabric

Supportive Community
Environment
(Solari’s Affluent
neighborhood persistence
model):

(β = .45***)

(β = .41***)

(β = .34***)

(β = .11***)

Sense of Security
(β = .13***)

›

(β = .14**)

Citizen Actions
(Powell and DiMaggio’s New
Institutionalism Theory)

Community
Attachment

(β = .23***)

(β = .19***)

(β = .32***)

Political Activism

1

Key: Thriving =
Struggling =
Suffering =
See Table 3 for index coding.
3
Controls and Civic Engagement were not modeled because they did not have significant effect
on community attachment.
2
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Additionally, there was conditional support for the New Institutionalist theory in the most
disadvantaged communities. Even if citizens in persistently poor neighborhoods might
lack political power, they may find a collective identity and attachment through engaging
in political activism. The Boyle Height Los Angeles community offers an excellent
example (Kamya, 2017). In a community that suffers from a heavy presence and
concentration of gang violence, the mothers came together as a community to address
the issue of their children’s safety on the streets. In a community forum, one mother
recounted her story of spending the night lying on the street with the rest of the
community. They laid on the ground where a child had previously been shot in a drive
by and engaged in this protest to demand that the city of Los Angeles paves a speed
bump on the road (a request that was multiply denied prior). Eventually the demand was
met, demonstrating that when people connect to a mission, their community attachment
and sense of ownership can be fostered and deepened.
However, while politically active citizenry was one of two most instrumental in creating
community attachment in suffering communities (as per the Institutionalists), it might not
be sufficient. There is also the need for a supportive social environment to foster
community ownership. Even though residents in suffering communities might be
interested in volunteering and contributing to the public good, their primary focus is on
maintaining taking care of their families (e.g., paying the bill, mortgage, and providing
for family). It is these competing priorities in suffering communities that might explain
why civic engagement was not a relevant factor to community attachment.
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
While the theoretical and empirical models of supportive environments and community
actions considered in this analysis offered a coherent explanation (Adjusted R2 = over
0.40) of community ownership in communities, irrespective of their affluence or lack
thereof, there is still much to be learned. Theoretically and programmatically, community
engagement and ownership are also built on shared beliefs and traditions, both spiritual
and ethnic. The Social Worker (Interviewee #1), interviewed for this research, noted the
potential for local churches, neighborhood rituals/practices, and shared traditions to
strengthen community attachment. More research is called for on how belonging to an
ethnic niche, rich in traditions or to a community with similar (and divergent) religious
beliefs and practices can encourage political activism, strengthen social fabric, and in
the long run, build community attachment. Additionally, professional interviewees also
pointed to race and immigration in communities; how do individuals of color and
immigrants connect to their communities and how can those connections be
strengthened?
Theoretically, further elucidation of the functional and power dynamics involved in
creating and sustaining conditional boundaries of community ownership can offer
advances in the field of sociology of communities. If societies and social systems are
not equally functional or resilient in facing challenges and dealing with conflict (Powers
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2004), it is a theoretical and programmatic imperative of scholars to clarify the internal
(to the community) and external dynamics that facilitate or hamper healthy communities.

APPENDICES
Appendix A. Demographic and Socioeconomic Controls

1

Demographics: Sex and Age (Controls)
NADAC, 2010– Soul of The Community
Values OR Responses

Concepts

Indicators

Statistics

Demographics

SEX of Respondent

0. Male
1 Female

Thriving
42.5%
57.5

Struggling
44.6%
55.4

Suffering
48.9%***
51.1

Age Range of
Respondent

1. 18-24
2. 25-34
3. 35-44
4. 45-54
5. 55-64
6. 65 and older

7.4%
9.0
12.6
17.3
21.3
30.9

2.9%
5.1
12.2
20.0
23.2
34.5

3.7%***
5.0
7.4
20.5
27.1
33.2

Educational
Achievement

1. Grade school or less.
2. Some High school
3. High School
4. Some College or
Technical School
5. College Graduate
6. Post Graduate work or
degree

0.8%
3.4
16.4
28.1

1.5%
4.2
21.1
31.8

3.2%***
8.0
24.1
32.6

26.3
25.0

23.7
17.8

18.7
13.4

Annual Income

1. under 15,000
2. 15,000 to 24,999
3. 25,000 to 34,999
4. 35,000 to 44,999
5. 45,000 to 54,999
6. 55,000 to 74,999
7. 75,000 to 99,999
8. 100,000 or over

5.2%
6.9
9.7
9.8
11.1
16.2
13.9
27.1

9.6%
11.9
14.7
13.0
11.8
14.9
10.6
13.5

19.2%***
18.3
15.5
11.9
7.9
11.3
6.7
9.1

Index of SocioEconomic Status1

Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum - Maximum

26.36
13.74
1-48

20.52
12.98
1-48

15.98***
12.51
1-48

Length of Residency

Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum - Maximum

32.93
24.01
1- All my
Life

35.18
24.53
1- All my
Life

38.28***
24.80
1- All my
Life

Index of Socio-Economic Status = (QD9 * QD7). Among These indicators correlational values are between .45*** to
.48*** (***p <= .001).
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Appendix B. Interview Protocol and Consent Forms
Letter of Consent
Dear _______________:
I am a Sociology Senior working on my Research Capstone Paper under the direction of Professor
Marilyn Fernandez in the Department of Sociology at Santa Clara University. I am conducting my
research on the differential impacts of community attachment in thriving, struggling and suffering
communities.
You were selected for this interview, because of your knowledge of and experience working in the area of
community development.
I am requesting your participation, which will involve responding to questions about civic engagement,
political activism, and community attachment. The interview will last about 20 minutes. Your participation
in this study is voluntary. You have the right to choose to not participate or to withdraw from the interview
at any time. The results of the research study may be presented at SCU’s Annual Anthropology/Sociology
Undergraduate Research Conference and published (in a Sociology department publication).
Pseudonyms will be used in lieu of your name and the name of your organization in the written paper.
You will also not be asked (nor recorded) questions about your specific characteristics, such as age, race,
sex, religion.
If you have any questions concerning the research study, please call/email me at ___ or Dr. Fernandez
at mfernandez@scu.edu
Sincerely,
Elizabeth Kamya
By signing below, you are giving consent to participate in the above study. (If the interviewee was
contacted by email or phone, request an electronic message denoting consent).
______________________
____________________
____________
Signature
Printed Name
Date
If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you
have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Committee, through Office of
Research Compliance and Integrity at (408) 554-5591.
Interview Schedule for Supplemental Qualitative Interviews
Interview Date and Time: ____________
Respondent ID#: __
1. What is the TYPE Agency/Organization/Association/Institution (NO NAME, please) where you
learned about (and/or worked) with this issue: Establishing community attachment in thriving,
struggling, and suffering communities?
2. What is your position in this organization? ___________________________
3. How long have you been in this position and in this organization?
____________________________
4. Based on what you know of community development, how crucial is attachment of community
members? That is, typically, how attached are members to their communities?
5. Based on your experience what are some reasons why some community members are very
attached while others are not? Could you expand a bit more?
6. How important are citizens actions to improve community attachment?
7. Could engagement improve resident’s attachment to their communities? How so?
8. How important is a supportive community environment in regard to improving attachment?
9. In your opinion what makes for a supportive community environment?
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10. In your opinion, what are some reasons that contribute to this problem (issue or concern)?
(PROBE with: Could you expand a bit more?).
11. [If the respondent does not bring up your independent concepts as potential causes), PROBE:
a. How about Social Fabric
b. How about Sense of Security
c. How about Political Activism
d. How about Civic Engagement
12. Is there anything else about this issue/topic I should know more about?
Thank you very much for your time. If you wish to see a copy of my final paper, I would be glad to share it
with you at the end of the winter quarter. If you have any further questions or comments for me, I can be
contacted at ekamya@scu.edu. Or if you wish to speak to my faculty advisor, Dr. Marilyn Fernandez, she
can be reached at mfernandez@scu.edu.
Appendix C Table 2. Correlation Matrix (r)
Table 2A.
Correlational Matrix of Thriving and Suffering communities: Indices of Community Attachment,
Supportive Community Environment, Citizens Actions, Gender, Age, and Socio-economic Status,
Length of Residency1,2
Index of
Community
Attachment
Index of
Community
Attachment

1.00

Index
of
Social
Fabric
.61***

Index of Social
Fabric

.61***

1.00

.44***

.55***

.21***

-.01

.07

.12*

.09

Index of Sense
of Security

.37***

.40***

1.00

.43***

.17***

-.20***

.04

.100

.06

Index of
Political
Activism

.49***

.52***

.39***

1.00

.20***

.12*

.15**

.01

.04

Index of Civic
Engagement

.12***

.13***

.12***

.13***

1.00

.03

.04

.07

-.01

Female vs.
Male
Age

.08***

.07***

-.12***

.09***

.041***

1.00

.10

-.11*

.02

.17***

.12***

.02

.17***

.015

.06***

1.00

-.02

.13**

**

Index of
sense of
security

Index of
Civic
Engagemen
t
.22***

Sex

Age

Index
SES

Length of
residency

.45***

Index of
Civic
Political
Activism
.58***

-.02

.13**

.01

.04

***

***

***

Index of SES
-.02
-.03
.13
0.0
.02
-.13
-.07
1.00
-.12*
Length of
.03**
.04***
-.04***
.05***
.00
.06***
.30***
-.18***
1.00
Residency
***p≤.001;**p≤.01;*p≤.05
1
Index of Community Attachment = Community as a place to live + Recommend community to others + Proud to live in this community
+ This community is perfect for me. Possible Ranges: 4.0-36.0;
Index of Social Fabric = Availability of social community events + Availability of parks and playgrounds + Availability of arts and cultural
opportunities + Good place to meet people and make friends + Vibrant nightlife - restaurants, clubs, bars, etc. + People care about
each other + Attended a local event. Possible Ranges: 6.0 - 60.0;
Index of Sense of Security = Feel safe walking alone at night near your home + Level of Crime in your Community + Change in local
crime level in past year + Effectiveness of Local Police; Possible Ranges: 4.0 -18.0;
Index of Political Activism = Level of trust in local government + Local leaders represent my interests + Registered to vote + Voted in
the local election. Possible Ranges: 6.0 - 68.00;
Index of Civic Engagement = Performed local volunteer work + Donated money to a local organization+ Worked with others to change
community + Residents' impact on improving community. Possible Ranges: 4.0-12.0;
Sex: Male = 0, Female = 1;
Age: 1 = 18-24, 2 = 25-34, 3 = 35-44, 4 = 45-54, 5 = 55-64, 6 = 65 and older;
Index of Socio-economic Status = Income Range + Highest level of education completed; 1- 48 for all groups;
Length of Residency = 1= 1-5, 2= 6-10, 3= 11-20, 4= 21-30, 5= 31-40, 6=41-50, 7=51-60, 8=61-75, 9= 76 or more;
2
Correlations above the value of 1 refer to suffering communities and correlations below the value of 1 refer to suffering groups.
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Table 2A.
Correlational Matrix for Struggling communities: Indices of Community Attachment, Supportive
Community Environment, Citizens Actions, Gender, Age, and Socio-economic Status, Length of
Residency1,2
Index of
Community
Attachment

Index
of
Social
Fabric

Index of
sense of
security

Index of
Civic
Political
Activism

Index of Civic
Engagement

Sex

Age

Index
SES

Index of
Community
Attachment

1.00

Index of Social
Fabric

.61***

1.00

Index of Sense
of Security

.39***

.43**

1.00

.

Index of
Political
Activism

.52***

.54***

.38***

1.00

.

Index of Civic
Engagement

.15**

.15***

.11***

.15***

1.00

Female vs.
Male

.06***

.06***

-.13***

.10***

.03*

1.00

.21***

.14***

.05***

.21***

.05**

.03**

1.00

-.04**

-.01

.12***

-.00

.02

-.14***

-.00

1.00

Length of
.05***
.03**
Residency
***p≤.001;**p≤.01;*p≤.05
1
Refer to table 2.A for Index Coding

-.03*

.08***

.00

.03**

.29***

-.12***

Length of
residency

.

-

Age
Index of SES

1.00
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The Middle Eastern Societies
Institutional Trust in Political Turmoil and Stasis
By
Noor Darwish1
ABSTRACT. There is a general lack of citizen trust in governmental
institutions in the Middle East, especially because of changing of
governments and resulting turmoil. Sequential Mixed Methodology was
used, in which data from the 2016 Arab Barometer were supplemented
with qualitative insights from two professionals knowledgeable about the
political climate in the Middle East and content analyses of relevant
journalistic accounts. A comparison of North Africa (characterized by
political turmoil) and the Levant (political stasis) countries in how
government functionality (efficacy, stability, and corruption), as
perceived by their citizens, differentially colored trust in governmental
institutions was used to illustrate the citizen-government dynamics that
resulted in citizens questioning the legitimacy of government authority.
Predictions, based on Max Weber’s theory of Political Legitimacy and
Gaetano Mosca’s Elite Theory, that, on balance, functional governments
will garner more citizen’s trust in the Levant than in North Africa, while
corruption will have a more corrosive effect were supported. A trust
surplus occurred as a result of governmental functionality, balancing out
the trust deficit created by government dysfunctionality. These findings
contributed to existing theoretical and empirical literature on the
contested relationship between citizens and their governments.
Additional research on sectarian and ethnic conflicts and types of
government (monarchy, authoritarian, democratic) in the region as they
have shaped citizen trust is warranted.

INTRODUCTION

The Middle East is a hard region to define, primarily due to the wide range of countries,
the many languages or dialects, cultures, and traditions, it encompasses. Even though
the region has no standardized definition, it can generally be split into three groups. The
first group is comprised of the Gulf countries (Gulf Cooperation Council) which include
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar. The second group, referred to as the
“Levant”, is comprised of, but not limited to, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan. The
third is the “North Africa” group which includes Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.
The latter two is the focus in this research paper.
The Gulf countries have enjoyed economic success in the last few decades and are
considered powerful Middle Eastern countries on a global scale. But, over the last
couple of decades, many countries in the North African and Levantine regions of the
1
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Middle East have experienced turmoil as a result of multiple wars, including civil wars
and revolutions. Others look more static, even if in their extreme class inequality. For
example, among the Northern African countries, Egypt has gone through a revolution
and a political coup. Even though Algeria and Morocco have not recently been through
governmental turmoil, they are characterized by poverty and instability. In the Levant
camp, Syria is currently fighting a civil war and dealing with a huge refugee crisis,
Palestine is under military occupation of the Israeli army, and Jordan is in political stasis
but characterized by class inequality.
The Middle East is a region that is always featured in the news, often under the section
involving war, disaster and terrorism. Yet there is very little coverage and research
regarding the effects of the turmoil and dramatic change in governments and war on
citizens’ lives. Such lacunae are especially acute in the United States whose foreign
policy in the Middle East has greatly affected the political dynamics of its current
landscape. Consequently, the level of trust Middle East citizens have in their
governmental bodies have decreased over the last couple of decades.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There is much scholarly literature on the politico-historical events that have occurred
over the last few decades in the Middle East, specifically in the Levant and North
African regions. Another stream in the Middle East scholarship has been about the
economics-citizen trust equation, and the relationship between corruption and trust.
The New Arab Order and Political Trust
The 2011 uprisings that occurred across the Middle East created a “New Arab Order.”
But soon after, the hopes of new democratic reform to replace autocratic regimes
vanished. The uprisings were a result of citizen frustration with their countries stagnant
economy and lack of political freedom (Lynch 2018:120). In the end, regimes were
either overthrown as the byproduct of popular uprisings, or remained standing, as a
result of the failure of popular uprising, or did not experience any popular uprisings. In
either event, a shift was created in which traditionally strong powers such as Egypt2
have collapsed and are now “barely functional states” (Lynch 2018:116). On the other
hand, Gulf countries, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for
historical and unique global economic reasons, have been able to maintain a strong
political and economic presence in both the Middle East and worldwide; these Gulf
countries were not part of the Arab Barometer survey, and are not included in this
research.
On the world stage, the Middle East has become a playground for both Western major
powers and other powers such as Russia, to achieve their own political and economic
goals. Power in the Middle East operates through “influence peddling and proxy
2

Which were included in the 2016 Arab Barometer Survey, the source of survey data for this paper.
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warfare” (Lynch 2018:116). As a result, there is great sense of insecurity among the
citizenry of the Middle East; for example, citizens are unsure of the likelihood of another
uprising or civil war. In this volatile political climate, academics, politicians and others
have posed important questions about the impacts of failed states, unresolved crises of
governance, unrest and the resulting turmoil on the political attitudes of citizens.
For one, the protests that swept through the North African and Levantine regions of the
Middle East changed “two key civic attitudes, trust and tolerance”, fundamental to wellfunctioning democracies (Spierings 2017:4). Niels Spierings synchronized over 40 Arab
Barometer and World Values Survey conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan,
Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, and Yemen, from before and after the uprisings.
Using macro-level analysis, Spiering associated a fall in political-institutional trust with
the uprisings in countries that went through democratic reform or regime change.
Politics became less trustworthy to citizens as a result of “misbehaving” politicians and
unsuccessful social reform policies.
North Africa and the Origins of the Arab Spring
The North African region of the Middle East includes Morocco, Libya, Sudan, Egypt and
Tunisia, and Algeria. Tunisia was the birthplace of the Arab Spring in 2011, when
Mohammed Bouzaizi, a street vendor, set himself on fire as a form of protest. His action
was a catalyst for the wider Arab Spring. Since then, democracy and reform have
become the focal point of pride in a region that needed it (Bremmer 2019). Protesters
demanded that the government tackle rising corruption, reduce income inequality,
create jobs, and increase wages. However, Bremer claimed that even though a
democratic regime replaced the former president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, it has not
been a successful transition. For example, almost ten years later, Tunisia ’s
unemployment rate is 30%, GDP per capita is low, wages are stagnant, and there is
heavy dependence on financial support from the International Monetary Fund. Amidst
such economic chaos, almost 11,000 demonstrations took place in 2018.
Like Tunisia, Egypt, also saw the fall of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011 and in 2012,
Mohamed Morsi, who represented the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected president.
However, the democratic period in Egypt only lasted till 2014, when a military coup,
spearheaded by Abed Fattah el-Sisi, led to the return of an authoritarian regime. The
military coup used disorder of the popular protest to assume power (Ketchley 2018).
Currently, Abdel Fattah el- Sisi's push towards a presidential term extension, by
changing the constitution, is indicative of the corruption and illegitimacy of his reign.
Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Morocco, the third country in the North African region, did not
experience a change in government. However, in 2011, a new constitution was
introduced that aimed to improve democracy and the rule of law (Al Jazeera and
Agencies 2011). In addition, a stronger separation of powers within governmental
branches was created, giving the prime minister and parliament more executive
authority and ultimately reducing the authority of the King Mohammed VI. The
referendum on constitutional reforms, held on July 1st 2011, was approved by 98.49%
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of voters, legitimizing the authoritative governing system in Morocco (No Author[a], BBC
News 2011). Yet, despite the reforms, and increased transparency, corruption remains
a major problem within the country, and elected officials power to change policy is
heavily constrained (No Author[b], Freedom House 2019).
Algeria the fourth country in the North Africa region, suffered through a civil war during
the 1990’s, which resulted in the death of 100,000 Algerians (Algiers, Economist 2012).
On May 10 1992, a general election was held. However, the electoral change was not
deemed as revolutionary, especially considering that the 1992 elections were hijacked
by the army in order to stop the Islamic Salvation Front from winning (Algiers 2012). On
January 12, 2011 26-year-old Mohamed Aouichia set himself on fire in Algeria. The next
day, January 13, 2011, Mohsen Bouterfif also set himself on fire. The two suicides were
followed by many others causing hundreds of protesters to take to the streets. In
response, a National Coordination for Change and Democracy was created with the aim
of seeking systemic change. However, these protests notwithstanding, Algeria remained
unaffected by the Arab Spring, mostly because it was recovering from the civil war and
Algerians were fearful of further instability (Daoud 2015).
The Levant
The Levantine region of the Middle East, the second considered in this paper, includes
Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Israel; the region is sometimes extended to include
Cyprus and Turkey. This region has faced intractable sectarian and ethnocentric
conflicts, including, but not limited to the Palestinian-Israeli crisis, the independence
struggle of the Kurds, and the rise of ISIS. The Levant is a volatile region that is deeply
affected by broader Middle Eastern conflicts. The geopolitical clash between the Iranled and Saudi-led camps, the ideological conflict among the Muslim Brotherhood
groups, and other religious conflicts has led to the internal fragmentation of the Levant
(Dalacoura 2018:32). Global actors, such as the United States and Russia, have also
contributed to the prolonged instability and vulnerable state of the region.
Lebanon, with its fairly longstanding constitutional system, was not affected by the Arab
Spring, much like its Levantine neighbors (Di Peri 2014). Yet, Lebanon experienced its
own “spring” in 2005, following the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Al
Hariri. His death was a catalyst of political change, which ultimately led to the end of
Syrian military occupation of Lebanon and the withdrawal of Syrian troops. Lebanon,
typified by confessionalism3, faces continued conflict in its civil society primarily because
of the power imbalance among the various religious, ethnic, and associated political
communities. But, even though the opportunity to change its political structure of
3

Confessionalism is a consciational system of government that proportionally allocates political
power among a country's communities according to their percentage of the population (Harb
2006). Per consciationalist governing principles: there is a proportional (numerical
representation) allocation of political posts among communities with a grand coalition between
community leaders on common policies that serve all. But there is communal autonomy and
freedom for each community to determine its own affairs (as in personal status laws and mutual
veto power on any decisions deemed detrimental by any community.
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consciationalism, presented itself during the Arab Spring, it was lost because of
deepening sectarian divide and politics.
The legitimacy of the rule of Jordan’s monarchy was based on its rentier system
(Muasher 2018:114). A social contract, imposed from the top down, through public
spending rather than political participation, secured support for governmental and elite
rule. “In return for their patronage, states expected citizens to leave governing to a small
elite, which, over time, became more and more isolated from the general population”
(p.115). Unlike Lebanon and other Levantine countries, the instability in Jordan is more
economic than political. For example, the 2011 protests in Jordan began as a fight
against unemployment, inflation and corruption. A real constitutional monarchy and
electoral reforms were demanded by the people. In response, economic reforms were
introduced to address the holes in the social contract. But with no political changes, the
economic reforms, of privatization of state-run industries and liberalizing trading
systems, only ended up benefiting the elite as opposed to the general population. In the
end, the economic reforms were associated with the self-enrichment of elites (p. 11618). In the last decade, Jordan’s patronage system has been threatened as a result of
the declining financial support from oil-producing countries and the United States. While
Jordan has taken steps to pacify the protestors, such as firing three prime ministers and
reforming a third of the constitution after the 2011 protests, these measures have not
led to more power sharing between the monarchy and the judicial and legislative
branches of the government (Muasher 2018:121). In the long run, by buying the support
of its elite class, the monarchical government is able to operate, even if inefficiently, and
maintain is legitimacy.
The Palestine, another Levantine country, has been strife with economic and political
instability, primarily because of external political actors and internal strife. The
Palestine-Israeli conflict can arguably be said to be one of the main reasons for regional
distress in the Middle East. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 has been
the source instability both in Palestine and in the broader Middle East. The West Bank
is currently under military occupation; Gaza remains under military siege, and there
have been numerous bombings in the last decade. Yet, there has been no political
change, nor was the area directly affected by the Arab Spring in 2011. The Hamas
government has been the de-facto governmental institution in Gaza since its election in
2006, with Mohamoud Abbas as the president of the State of Palestine and Palestinian
National Authority. However, instability and resulting dysfunctionality, both as a result of
external forces, mainly Israel, and internal corruption, has become almost permanent.
Elliott Abrams, an American Diplomat, stated that "corruption is an insidious destroyer,
not only of Palestinian public finance but of faith in the entire political system” in his
testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Middle
East and South Asia (Elliot, CFR 2012).
In short, starting in 2011, the Middle East region has seen an uneasy mix of great
political turbulence and stasis. Even though the Levantine countries, such as Lebanon,
Jordan and Palestine, are characterized by political stasis but without major upheavals,
they were still affected by the neighboring uprisings and wider Middle Eastern instability.
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On the other hand, Northern African countries, except for Algeria, have witnessed
immense political turmoil. In either case, whether political stasis or turmoil, citizen trust
in the political institutions in the region has been shaky at best. In fact, according to
Global Corruption Barometer, despite half a decade since the Arab Spring, there is still
“widespread public dissatisfaction with government efforts to curb public sector graft”
(Pring 2016:5). Sixty-one percent of citizens in the region perceive corruption to have
increased in the last year.
Economic Vitality and Trust in Government
Aside from political volatilities and the resulting shattered citizen trust, scholars have
identified economic instability or lack of economic vitality as two other sources of citizen
discontent and distrust. Two distinct dimensions of economic instability, material
instability and perceptions of economic instability, have been noted for their eroding
influences on citizen trust.
Material Economic Instability and Trust Erosion
Economic stability, which has been scarce in the Middle East, particularly since 2011, is
an important element in the trust equation. Economic stability refers to stable, material
conditions in which a country offers its citizens job opportunities, opportunities for civil
and political involvement for its citizens, and flowing economic activity (Hashemi
2017:87). And sustained economic stability is expected to lead to a higher standard of
living for citizens. On the other hand, when there is economic instability in a country, the
socially and economically marginalized, especially its youth, feel frustrated and
powerless. Often, citizens hold the country’s government and/or its corporations
responsible for their economic security. Under these unstable conditions, it is not
surprising that youth participate in insurgency or political militant movements, further
deepening regional instability (p. 83).
Ironically, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region benefited from the wealth
created by the increase in oil prices in the1970s. However, failure to create employment
opportunities for the expanding labor force led to a deterioration in economic conditions.
Non-oil economies in the region rely heavily on “aid, capital flows, and worker
remittances” from the oil- producing Middle Eastern countries (Abed and Davoodi, IMF
2013). “Political fragmentation, recurring conflicts, and authoritarian rule have hampered
the development of democratic institutions and remain major obstacles to economic
reform” (Abed and Davoodi, IMF 2013). High-tariff barriers, imbalanced exchange rate
policies, limited advancement of human capital, and poor provision of basic public
goods and services are few of the many factors that have contributed to material or
objective lack of economic growth within the region (Abed and Davoodi, IMF 2013).
The material or objective strength of the economy is widely accepted to be directly
linked to citizen trust in institutions (Eccles 2015:17). Eccles referenced Nye’s (1997)
research which showed that governments who were unable to reduce unemployment,
increase economic growth and provide social services were unable to gain trust from
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citizens. Increased globalization has provided citizens with access to more information,
allowing them to be more aware of their rights and demand more from their
governments (Eccles 2015:19). Also, over the last few decades, “social modernization”
has led to the transformation of the relationship between citizens of the state and its
governmental body. The growing distrust and skepticism of younger, more educated
citizens has led to a new style of politics in which, as quoted by Eccles, there is “… less
deference to authority, more assertive styles of action, and higher expectations for the
democratic process” (p. 18). For example, Algerians protested against President
Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s decision to delay the April 18 presidential election despite
announcing that he will not continue his presidency of 20 years for a 5th term. However,
Bouteflika’s move to step down did not guarantee that the ruling elite, consisting of his
brother, the army and several industrial bosses, would relinquish their power (Nossiter
2019). Besides, while Algeria has natural gas reserves, the common citizens have seen
very little economic gain, leaving the youth very concerned about the lack of job
opportunities (Adamson and Charlton 2019).
Amidst such economic stagnancy, access to information has allowed citizens to more
accurately assess the income inequality in their country. If governments are responsible
for providing regulations that ensure stability, it follows that citizen trust in the efficiency
of governments will be measured through the type of policies and regulations
implemented as opposed to simply the quantity (Siems and Schnyder 2014). In fact,
these authors argued that since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, there has been a
worldwide call for more government intervention, “ordoliberalism”, to restart the market
economy so that citizens’ benefits, and interests can be furthered. Citizen awareness of
the unfair distribution of wealth within the country was commented on by an Executive
Director who was interviewed for this research (Interviewee #1). There is a pronounced
difference, she said, between the lifestyle of government officials and that of regular
working-class citizens. The government officials and leaders are always of the upper
class while citizens are of the lower or middle class, with notably fewer material
possessions and wealth. Therefore, citizens are demanding fair processes from their
governments. On balance, it is not surprising that over the last few decades, public trust
in government has been declining worldwide, including in the Middle East.
Perceptions of Government (In)Efficacy and Citizen Trust
A second stream in the literature on governments’ responsibility for economic stability
and trust is the public’s perceptions of government efficacy and of their wellbeing.
According to Tom van der Meer and Armen Hakhverdian (2016), while trust is based on
the merit of governmental bodies, it is not based on actual policy performance but on
the “perceptions of performance, accountability, impartiality, corruption” (p. 82). Meer
and Hakhverdian, in their study of 42 countries in Europe (51,255 respondents) also
showed that difference in process (greater accountability and impartiality), as opposed
to macro-economic outcomes, explained variations in political trust, measured by
“satisfaction with democracy” and “confidence in national political institutions” (p. 98).
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Other researchers who studied political trust have documented similar themes.
According to Kong (2013), based on the archival data of 7,182 citizens in the Asia
Barometer survey (2004), trust in government was contingent on government goodwill,
namely their intentions and purposes and the extent to which the governmental systems
operated in the best collective interest of the people. Institutional trust is also
competence-based, which directly links to the performance and the system's ability to
deal with problems. Trust in government is vital in order to have economic development
and progressive public policy (p. 847). Kong found that the more goodwill and
competence-based trust citizens had in their governments, the more satisfied they were
(p.854).
Corruption and Trust
Corruption is an extremely negative version of government efficacy. According to the
authors of the 2016 Arab Barometer (AlKhatib et al. 2018), financial and administrative
corruption was the second (17.2%) most important challenge that citizens felt their
country faced. Experts also posited that authoritarianism and corruption were two of the
three most important challenges facing the region as per the “Arab Voices” survey
conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Forty-eight out of the
one-hundred-and-three experts surveyed stated that corruption is among the most
pressing issue. Corruption takes many forms in the Middle East, including the use of
security and armed forces to quell uprisings, which helps maintain leaders in their
positions, derails the fight against political, minority and gender inequality and allows for
religious and minority oppression and prosecution (Aman 2017:172). Another 2016
Carnegie report titled “Arab Fractures: Citizens, States, and Social Contracts” also
underscored the fact that political and economic control is linked to cronyism and
corruption in the Middle East (Cammack et al. 2016). This linkage, they posited, must
be broken if sustainable private-sector economic growth is to emerge.
Restoring of Trust
Broken trust (interpersonal and political) can be both a cause and consequence of
corruption. Researchers have shown that countries characterized by corruption are
stuck in a circle, where corruption creates a climate of distrust which, in turn, generates
and nurtures more corruption. Restoring trust can be difficult since distrust “fosters a
tolerant or acquiescent attitude toward corruption and, by creating the expectation of
corrupt behavior among others, feeds individual participation in corruption” (Morris and
Klesner 2010:1260). The normalizing and tolerance of official wrongdoing creates the
casual expectation of negative conduct. Corruption erodes regime legitimacy, noted
Morris. According to 2016 Global Corruption Barometer of MENA, nearly one third of
citizens paid a bribe in the last year, approximately 50 million people. One in 3 people
paid a bribe to the courts, while 1 in 4 paid a bribe to the police. Despite this, citizens
feared retaliation if they spoke out about corruption, and 2 in 5 who did report corruption
suffered retaliation. The unfair distribution of services through bribery, which
undermines law and order, creates a negative environment that does not incite change.
Morris went on to argue that the mutual causality between distrust and corruption make
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it difficult to fight corruption; since distrust undermines citizen’s belief in governmental
promises to fight corruption and undermines governmental effort to mobilize society to
fight corruption. As a result, citizens tend to be cynical about politics therefore tend not
to participate in the political process as they believe that their actions will not have an
effect. As he Professor who was interviewed by the author (Interview #2) noted, feeling
of helplessness and the lack of empowerment to fight against government corruption
leads to not only lack of trust, but unwillingness to change the status quo.
No doubt, it is worthwhile, despite the declining levels of citizen trust, for societies and
their citizens, to ask how the broken trust can be restored. Chris Eccles (2015), in a
2005 survey of Canadian Citizens, documented that, in, despite the trend of declining
trust in governmental institutions, trust can be restored when public organizations
provide good leadership and management (50–65% impact), equal and ethical
treatment (10–15% impact), quality services (10–20% impact) and services that meet
citizens’ and community needs (10–25% impact). In other words, the more citizens
believed that governmental institutions benefit them, the more trust they had in the
institutions.
Suggestions for Future Research
Economic Vitality (or lack thereof) and corruption have had tremendous negative
impacts on citizen trust in the Middle East. The Arab Spring of 2011 dramatically
changed the political landscape of many countries. While some countries, such as
Libya, Sudan, Iran and Yemen, were not surveyed in the Arab Barometer, general
political trends can be found within countries in North Africa versus the Levant regions.
Many countries in North Africa experienced a change in regime type while in others
governmental systems remained the same. Further research is needed in order to
understand why certain governmental types, such as monarchies, despite corruption,
were able to retain power and legitimacy using top-down social contracts and access to
natural resources, while other governments and leaders were overthrown. Additionally,
ethno-sectarian tensions exist within many countries, and across border lines in the
region. For example, there has been an on-going religious Sunni and Shiite power
struggle which has divided the populations, challenged political boundaries, and fueled
terrorism and civil war. The polarization of identity groups has gravely affected stability
in the region. These factors need to be examined to assess the extent of which internal
conflict has affected citizen trust in governmental institutions and affected their
perceptions of their government’s ability to ensure the country’s stability and the
personal safety of all identity groups.
RESEARCH QUESTION
In this research, an attempt was made to compare the level of trust that citizens in North
Africa and the Levant region had in their governments’ functionality. Three dimensions
of functionality were measured: perceptions of citizen’s stability, government efficacy,
and corruption. Stability was indicated by feelings of personal safety and economic
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stability. Perceptions of government efficacy covered areas of economy, employment,
security and health. The third factor was corruption, based on perceptions of level
corruption, government efforts to combat it, and cronyism. The following question was
posed: “How does government functionality, as perceived by their citizens, differentially
affect their trust in institutions in North Africa and Levant?” The control variables used in
this research was level of education and gender to neutralize their potential confounding
effects on trust in the government.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In order to theoretically explain why and how perceptions of government efficacy and
stability, in particular personal economic stability and safety, as well as corruption affect
the level of trust citizens have in their governments in the both North Africa and the
Levant, political legitimacy and elite theory will be used. This analysis was theoretically
framed using a synthesis of conceptual ideas offered by Weber (1964) and Dahl’s
(1971) political legitimacy and Gaetano Mosca’s elite theories (1965).
Elite Political Legitimacy and Related Hypotheses
Political legitimacy refers to the right and acceptance of an authority, thereby giving the
authority figure, or institutions as the case might be, the right to exercise power. The
legitimacy of rulers or governments is derived from the population’s belief that the
governing power appropriately uses the country’s laws and the constitution. To quote
Max Weber “the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of
willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority
are lent prestige” (Weber, 1964:382). Robert A. Dahl expanded on Weber and
compared legitimacy to a reservoir, where as long as the water is at a specific level,
political stability is maintained, while if it drops below the specific level, political
legitimacy is endangered (1971:124-88). Therefore, functional institutions, including
perceptions of government efficacy and stability, will legitimize their authority and
cultivate a trust surplus among its citizens.
Gaetano Mosca in his elite theory outlined in his “The Ruling Class” (Meisel 1965),
added more detailed nuances to the political legitimacy of elites. It is a given that
political legitimacy is needed for governing and that there is always those who are rulers
and those who are ruled. But, “the first class, always the less numerous” performs all
political functions, monopolizes power and favour the benefits that accompany such
power. On the other hand, the masses are directed and controlled by the ruling class,
“in a manner that is now more or less legal” (p. 50). But, Mosca argued that power is not
exclusively justified by the de facto possession of it, but states that those in power find a
moral and legal basis for it, further legitimizing and deeming it a “necessary
consequence of doctrines and beliefs” that are already recognized and accepted in
societies (p. 71). However, the isolation of lower classes, and their lack of accessibility
to the ruling class can lead to political upheaval (107). The consequent pressure arising
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from the discontent of the masses, who are swayed by their passions, can influence the
policies of the ruling class (p. 51). In other words, those who rule must garner the
support of the masses in order to maintain their power (p. 51). Such support is gained
through the consideration of the majorities’ beliefs and sentiments. Besides, in order for
the minority to remain in power, they must be organized and efficient so that they can
overcome the unorganized majority. Following Mosca’s elite political legitimacy
arguments, it can be argued that when governments are seen to be functional, they will
garner more citizen’s trust than otherwise. However, corruption can create a trust deficit,
by corroding the trust that governments have garnered through their efficient provision
of providing functional services to their citizens.
Applying these theoretical arguments to the citizen-elite dynamics in the Levant and
North Africa, elites in the Levant could be expected to garner more citizen trust than the
North African elite because Levantine elites have maintained political stasis or stability,
even if not economic progress. On the other hand, North African countries are not only
ridden with economic equalities but also have been in political turmoil, and have
experienced regime change which despite the hopes of many, did not bring about the
expected economic and social change. Against this background, the first hypothesis
tested in this study was: Functional governments will garner more citizen’s trust in the
Levant than in North Africa, net of corruption, level of education and gender”
(Hypothesis #1).
However, when citizens perceive corruption in their government their trust will be
shaken, creating a trust deficit. And given the volatile political histories of the North
African region (because of the numerous changes in types of governments or rulers),
the trust deficit caused by corruption is expected to be higher in North Africa than in the
Levant. The Levant, on the contrary, has been characterized by political stasis, with
stagnant governments and rulers, despite persistent economic inequality. Countries in
North Africa, on the other hand, have experienced leader and government changes as a
result of the Arab Spring yet also are burdened with economic and political turmoil.
Therefore, we can hypothesize that corruption will have a more corrosive effect on
citizen trust in North Africa than in the Levant. The many changes in the government
elite in North Africa and to the extent there continues to dysfunction in each new
government, there will be more net trust deficit, in North Africa than in the Levant
(Hypothesis #2).
METHODOLOGY
Sequential mixed methodology was used, where statistical analyses of survey data
were followed up with narrative accounting by journalists and other professionals to
further interpret the statistical findings. Secondary survey data from the Middle East
were used to measure and test the hypotheses about levels of trust in governmental
institutions in the North African and the Levantine regions of the Middle East. Two
narrative assessments provided by an Executive Director of an NGO in Lebanon and an
international studies professor at an academic institution were supplemented with
journalistic commentaries on the Middle East.
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Secondary Data source
The “Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan,
Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016” was a public survey conducted to
assess citizen attitudes about public affairs, governance, and social policy in their
countries of residence in the Middle East. Questions about the political, social, religious,
and cultural life of respondents were posed throughout the survey. In addition to some
general questions, respondents were asked to evaluate their political institutions and
political attitudes, elections and parliament, the media, democracy, social, religious and
cultural topics, the Arab world and international relations, and current affairs. The Arab
Barometer is vital to understanding key issues in the lives of ordinary citizens in Arab
society so that governmental and nongovernmental bodies can use the information to
base their solutions to the specific problems faced within specific countries and the
region as a whole.
“Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,
Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016” was carried out by eleven principal investigators
(AlKhatib et al. 2018). Interviews were conducted in Arabic in the respondent’s place of
residence to ensure a higher response rate and more truthful answers. The sample was
drawn with the use stratified multi-stage sampling to cover a nationally representative of
non- institutionalized adults aged 18 and above. In most countries the sample size was
1,200 citizens. Furthermore, 300 Syrian nationals living in Jordan and Lebanon were
interviewed. As shown in Appendix A, 49.9 % of the of the respondents were female
and 50.1% were male in all countries except Egypt and Palestine. In Jordan, Lebanon
and Tunisia 30.9% of the respondents had completed a secondary level of education
while in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Palestine 28.9% of the respondents did so.
Narrative Commentaries
Several journalistic accounts in newspaper outlets, that offer commentary on current
and past news in the Middle East, were used to ascertain on-the-ground perspectives
on government functioning and citizen responses. The newspaper outlets included “The
Economist,” “The New York Times” and “Al Jazeera.” In addition, two interviews were
conducted with professionals who have deep knowledge about the functioning (or
dysfunctions) of governmental institutions in North Africa and the Levant. The first
interviewee (Interviewee #1, Professor) is an international studies professor at a
university. Her specific focus is the Middle East. The second interviewee was an
Executive Director (Interviewee #2) at an NGO in Lebanon, and has worked directly with
the ministry of education to make education accessible to all children. She has
volunteered for the NGO for 10 years, and has been the executive director for three
years.
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DATA ANALYSIS
Three types of statistical analyses, disaggregated by North Africa and Levant, were
used in order to explore the validity of the hypotheses. Univariate analysis was, first,
used to describe the sample using trust in institutions, perceptions of government
efficacy, stability and corruption. Second, to explore the primary empirical relationship of
level of trust in governmental institution with perceptions of government efficacy,
stability, and corruption, bivariate correlations were used. Finally, multivariate analysis
was used to assess the net impact of perceptions of government efficacy, stability and
corruption on trust in governmental institutions. Illustrative examples of trust surplus and
deficits in North Africa and the Levant were drawn from the narrative commentaries
offered by journalists and professionals.
Operationalization and Descriptive Analysis
Overall, there was a low level of trust in governmental institutions in both regions. And
as might be expected in low citizen trust environments, the governments in both regions
were also judged to be less functional in their efficacy, their ability in maintaining
stability and had high corruption ratings. However, there were notable differences in the
two regions on trust as well as the functionality and dysfunctionality of their
governments. North Africans perceived their governmental institutions to be more
efficacious, stable, and less corrupt than their Levantine counterparts. More specifically,
citizens in North Africa rated their governments to be more efficient in operating three of
the four sectors considered; the economy, employment and security sector. It was only
the health sector that Levantine nation citizens found to be more efficacious than the
North Africans. An interesting note: even though citizens in the Levant believed that
there was more corruption and cronyism in their respective countries than their
counterparts in North Africa, the latter (North Africans) believed there was less
crackdown on corruption and bribes.
Trust in Institutions
Given the recent turmoil in the Middle East, the low trust in institutions in both regions
was to be expected. According to the Professor (Interviewee #2), economic hardship,
instability, lack of accountability and high level of corruption amongst government
institutions are the main factors that create trust deficits. The Executive Director
(Interviewee #1) added, in order for there to be a surplus of trust, there must be a high
level of ethics, transparency and accountability. However, for historical reasons
discussed at the start of this paper, citizens of North African nations trusted their
institutions a bit more than the Levantine citizens. The lower level of Levantine trust was
captured in the Trust index mean (𝑥) of 9.01 on a scale of 6-14, in contrast to the mean
(𝑥) of 10.16 in North Africa.
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Table 1.A. Trust in Institutions
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016
Concept
Dimensions Indicators
Responses
Statistics
North Africa
(n=4277)
Trust in
Institutions

Legislative
System

Q2011. Trust
in government
(council of
ministers)?

Judicial
Branch

Q2012. Trust
in the courts
and legal
system?

Executive
Branch

Q2013. Trust
in the elected
council of
representative
s (the
parliament)?
Q2016. Trust
do you have in
the armed
forces (the
army)?
Index of Trust
in Institutions1

Army

1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
3.
4.

No trust at all
Not very much trust
Quite a lot of trust
A great deal of trust
No trust at all
Not very much trust
Quite a lot of trust
A great deal of trust

27.8%
27.7
29.3
15.3

Levant
(n=3405
)
47.1%***
21.3
22.2
9.4

23.9%
27.9
29.5
18.7

32.9%***
23.9
28.2
15.0

1.
2.
3.
4.

No trust at all
Not very much trust
Quite a lot of trust
A great deal of trust

41.7%
29.0
20.2
9.1

55.1%***
23.0
16.1
5.8

1.
2.
3.
4.

No trust at all
Not very much trust
Quite a lot of trust
A great deal of trust

3.9%
9.2
22.2
64.8

12.6%***
12.1
21.7
53.6

10.16
(3.01)
4-16

9.01***
(3.05)
4-16

Mean (𝑥)
(sd)
Min-Max

1

Index of Trust in Government: ReversedQ2011 + ReversedQ2012 + ReversedQ2013 + ReversedQ2016;
correlations among the indicators for North Africa ranged from 0.62*** to 0.18***; Levant 0.64*** to 0.11***;
*** p<=.001.

Some examples of the specific points of regional divergence in trust and mistrust are
worth noting. Citizens of both regions registered “a great deal of trust” in armed forces;
64.8% citizens in North Africa even if only 53.6% of Levant citizens. But there was more
distrust than trust in all the other sectors considered here, particularly in the Levant
nations. For example, in the Levant, 41.7% had “no trust at all” in the councils of
ministers as opposed to only 27.8% in North Africa. Citizens in the Levant also
distrusting of their courts and legal system; 32.9% of the citizens stated they had “no
trust at all” compared to the 23.9% in North Africa. A similar pattern of low Levantine
institutional trust (55.1% “no trust at all”) continued to the level of council of
representatives (in contrast to the 41.7% of North African citizens).
Functional Governments
Trust in governmental institutions was hypothesized to be a product of the
government’s functionality and dysfunctionality as evaluated by their citizens.
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Governments were considered to be functional based on how efficacious they were
perceived to be and how stable the citizens felt their lives were. On the other hand,
corruption was used to identify dysfunction within governmental institutions. According
to the Professor (Interviewee #2) there are negative perceptions of government
efficacy. Limited efficacy is a result of the lack of accountability leaders and
governmental institutions. In a sense, they are above the law. Whether leaders and
governmental institutions carry out their responsibilities efficiently or not, they will
almost never be punished or voted out of office.
Perceptions of Government Efficacy. Perceptions of Government Efficacy was
measured by how effective the citizens thought their governments were in managing
their respective countries. Citizen’s evaluated the performance of their own
government’s ability to effectively grow the economy, creating employment
opportunities, providing security, and offering health services. As illustrated in Table
1.B governments were perceived to be less efficacious, than not, in both regions; the
mean (𝑥) efficacious index score in North Africa was only 10.7 (on a scale from 5-20)
and 10.2 (𝑥) in the Levant region. With the exception of providing security, both sets of
governments were rated negatively (bad or very bad) than positively, and more so in
the Levant. It is only in providing health services that the Levant governments were
rated to be more effective than the North African governments.
The case of Lebanon is illustrative. In Lebanon, 34.5% of citizens believed that
government was not effective at managing the economy. Even though “Banque du
Libyan,” the government run central bank in Lebanon, has strived to preserve the twodecade old currency peg, the economy remained stagnant. The high interest rates have
increased the risk within the financial system and is “strangling an already depressed
economy” (Barrington 2018). Lebanon is currently the world’s third most indebted state
but needs urgent fiscal reform to help the economy. According to Barrington, regular
citizens are feeling the effects of the weak economy as annual growth rates has
decreased to 1-2%, lending is down, business activity is falling, and prices are falling in
the real estate sector, the pillar of the Lebanese economy.
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Table 1.B. Perception of Government Efficacy
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016
Concept
Dimensions Indicators
Responses
Statistics

Perception
of
Government
Efficacy

Economy

Security

Health

How would you evaluate:
Q2041. The current
government's
performance on managing
the economy?
Q2043. The current
government's
performance on narrowing
the gap between rich and
poor?
Q2042. The current
government's
performance on creating
employment
opportunities?
Q20421. The current
government's
performance on providing
security in the country?
Q2044. The current
government's
performance on improving
basic health services?
Index of Perceptions of
Government Efficacy 1

1. Very Bad
2. Bad
3. Good
4. Very
Good
1. Very Bad
2. Bad
3. Good
4. Very Good
1. Very Bad
2. Bad
3. Good
4. Very
Good
1. Very Bad
2. Bad
3. Good
4. Very
Good
1. Very Bad
2. Bad
3. Good
4. Very
Good
Mean (𝑥)
(sd)
Min -Max

North
Africa
(n=2076)
25.5%
37.7
33.6
3.2

Levant
(n=3350
)
34.5%***
35.5
27.0
3.0

44.1%
37.4
16.3
2.2

45.7%*
37.8
15.1
1.4

42.0%
37.5
18.4
2.1

50.1*%**
35.5
13.3
1.0

7.6%
12.6
54.6
25.2

23.6%***
20.0
33.4
23.0

28.4%
34.4
33.7
3.5

26.5%***
30.9
38.0
4.6

10.73
(2.97)
5-20

10.25***
(3.32)
5-20

1

Index of Perceptions of Government Efficacy: ReversedQ2041 + ReversedQ2042 + ReversedQ20421 +
ReversedQ2011 + ReversedQ2043; correlations among the indicators for North Africa ranged from 0.49** to
0.25***; Levant 0.56** to 0.36***
***
p<=.001.

Stability. Governments in both regions fared a bit better (but not by much) in offering
their citizens stability (Table 1.C). But, as with trust and efficacy, North African citizens
felt more stable in their lives; on a summative index scale that ranged from 6-25, the
North African mean (𝑥) was 14.83 compared to 13.93 in the Levant. Citizen’s based
their perceptions about their stability on country’s economic stability and their personal
safety. For example, in North Africa 59.3% believed that their household economic
situation was “good” in comparison to only 48.9% of citizens in the Levant. Additionally,
52.4% of citizens in North Africa reported that the future of their own personal as well as
their family’s safety was ensured; only 35.3% of citizens in the Levant felt the same.
Additionally, citizens in the Levant were more concerned with a terrorist attack (13.3%)
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or of being harassed in the street (25.9%) than North African citizens (4.3% and 7.3%
respectively). In short, even in relatively unstable circumstances, North Africans felt that
there was more (than the Levantines) economic stability in their country and
experienced a higher degree of personal safety.
Table 1.C. Stability
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016
Concept
Dimensions Indicators
Responses
Statistics
North Africa Levant
(n=4586)
(n=3536)
Stability
Economic
How would you
1. Very Bad
29.7%
31.7%***
38.1
Stability
evaluate:
35.0
2. Bad
Q101. The current
32.3
27.6
3. Good
2.6
economic situation
3.1
4. Very Good
in your country?
Q101a. The
1. Much worse
8.5%
8.6%***
11.1
economic situation
2. Somewhat Worse 11.9
in your country five
3. Almost the same
18.5
years ago (before
26.8
as the current
the Arab uprisings)
situation
39.3
compared to the
30.4
4.
Somewhat better
current situation?
22.4
22.5
5. Much better
Q102b. Your current 5. Very Bad
10.3%
15.8%***
30.2
household
26.4
6. Bad
economic situation? 7. Good
59.3
48.9
5.1
4.1
8. Very Good
Personal
Q105. Do you
1. Absolutely not
7.6%
10.6%***
Safety
currently feel that
ensured
your own personal
14.9
24.9
2. Not ensured
as well as your
52.4
35.3
3. Ensured
29.3
family's safety and
25.1
security are ensured 4. Fully ensured
or not?
To what degree are
you worried about:
Q1072. A terrorist
attack in your
country.
Q1074. Being
harassed or
threatened on the
street.
Index of Stability1

1.
2.
3.
4.

Very much
Much
Not much
Not at all

79.6%
11.7
4.3
4.3

58.0%***
22.4
6.7
13.0

1.
2.
3.
4.

Very much
Much
Not much
Not at all

69.3%
16.7
6.6
7.3

38.6%***
13.3
22.2
25.9

13.93
(2.78)
6-25

14.83***
(3.49)
6-25

Mean
(sd)
Min-Max

1

Index of Stability: ReversedQ101 + ReversedQ101A + ReversedQ102B + ReversedQ105 + Q1072 + Q1074;
correlations among the indicators for North Africa ranged from -0.02*** to 0.60***; Levant -0.01*** to 0.55***
***
p<=.001.

While stability is crucial to citizens of the Middle East, democracy is not necessarily
perceived to be the solution (Interviewee #2). According to the Professor, in a state of
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instability and lack of personal safety, democracy and civil rights are considered a
luxury. As a result, citizens are willing to settle for an ineffective government if its leader
is able to guarantee, verbally at least, safety and economic security. In the Middle East,
history has shown that citizens have a preference for tough leaders over democratic
states and are willing to compromise on accountability and democracy in return of
survival.
Government Corruption as Dysfunction
In addition to assess the functionality of governments, citizens were asked to evaluate
the extent of corruption in their countries. Specifically, their perception of corruption
within state agencies, cronyism in employment, and the extent to which corruption was
being remedied was addressed. As shown in Table 1.D, both regions were marked by
high levels of corruption, but corruption was more rampant in the Levant; the mean (𝑥)
corruption index score was 10.09 (range of 4-12) in the Levant and 9.61 in North Africa.
Two examples to illustrate regional differences in corruption levels. One, there was a
notable difference in the level of cronyism; while 75.3% citizens in the Levant believed
that obtaining employment through connections is “extremely widespread,” only 61.5%
of citizens in North Africa thought so. Second, more than half (57.2%) of Levant citizens
believed that there was corruption in their state agencies to a “large extent” in
comparison to the 55.2% of North Africans. But, Levantine governments (35%) were
more likely to be seen as cracking down on corruption than the 25.2% of North Africans.
That is, even though corruption was more rampant in the Levant than in North Africa,
the former governments were doing more to combat corruption.
Once again, according to the Professor (Interviewee #2), high levels of corruption stem
from the ability of politicians, with the use of the country’s resources and the
international support, to push certain agendas and create divisions within the country.
Many citizens see governmental institutions as compromised or corrupted, and too tied
up in politics. For example, the people that are chosen to take high positions within
governmental institutions are based on political ties, as opposed to merit (Interviewee
#1). Adeel Malik, a professor at Oxford University, mentioned in Kassab’s article “The
cost of cronyism under Mubarak,” found significant cronyism between the late 1990’s
and 2001 in 385 companies in Egypt that had been associated the former president,
Hosni Mubarak. Similarly, 497 companies in Lebanon and 662 in Tunisia had strong ties
to the political regimes in place, while 370 in Morocco were owned by holding
companies indirectly controlled by the King (Kassab 2019). Besides, Kassab noted that
companies in Egypt that were politically associated with the regime received more
benefits. For example, they received 92% of the total loans granted to the private
sector, despite not having higher profitability compared to non-politically connected
firms.
Corruption, as shown in Table 1.D., had a more corrosive effect on citizen trust, creating
more trust deficit, in Levant than in North Africa. The empirical data from The Global
Corruption Barometer are illustrative. According to the Barometer 92% of citizens in
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Lebanon, 75% of Jordanian citizens and 70% of Palestinian citizens believe corruption
had increased. On the other hand, citizens in North Africa did not believe corruption had
increased as drastically as in the Levant. While 64% of citizens in Tunisia and 51% of
Algerians thought that corruption had increased, this was a stark contrast to the 28% of
Egyptians and 26%of Moroccans who held the similar belief.
Table 1.D. Corruption
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016
Concept
Dimensions Indicators
Responses
Statistics

Corruption

Perceptions

To what extent do
you think that:
Q210. There is
corruption within
the state agencies
and institutions in
your country?
Q211.The
governments
working to
crackdown on
corruption and root
out brides?
Q213. How to get
a job1.

Index of
Corruption2

North Africa
(n=4360)
2.7%
10.0
32.1
55.2

Levant
(n=3334)
3.7%***
8.4
30.6
57.2

1. Not at all
2. To a small extent
3. To a medium
extent
4. To a large extent

12.9%
34.1
27.8
25.2

10.2%***
28.9
25.9
35.0

1. I do not know of
any relevant
experiences
2. Employment is
mostly obtained
without
connections
3. Employment is
sometimes
obtained through
connections
4. Obtaining
employment
through
connections is
extremely
widespread

7.5%

2.0%***

3.5

2.6

27.5

20.0

61.5

75.3

Mean
(sd)
Min-Max

9.61
(1.80)
4-12

10.09***
(1.65)
4-12

1. Not at all
2. To a small extent
3. To a medium
extent
4. To a large extent

1

Some people say that nowadays it is impossible to get a job without connections (wasta) while others say that
jobs are only available to qualified candidates. Based on a recent experience (or experiences) you are
personally aware of, do you think that…?
2
Index of Corruption: ReversedQ210 + ReversedQ211 + ReversedQ213; correlations among the indicators for
North Africa ranged from 0.36*** to- 0.20***; Levant 0.40*** to 0.20***
***
p<=.001
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Bivariate analysis
A preliminary exploration of the connections of citizen trust with government efficacy,
stability, and corruption were conducted using bivariate correlations (Table 2 in
Appendix A). In North Africa, the more efficacious the government was perceived to be,
and the more stable their personal life was, the more likely they were to trust
governmental institutions (Efficacy r=0.47***, Stability r=0.31***). On the other hand,
perceived corruption reduced trust in North African societies (r= -0.47***). Similar
patterns were evident in the Levant region. For example, the more efficacious (r=0.59***)
and the more stable their lives were (r=0.36***), the more trusting they were of their
governments, but corruption led to less trust (r= -0.48***). As illustrated in Table 2, the
level of trust in institutions was more reflective of government efficacy, stability and
corruption in the Levant than in North Africa. Also, in both regions, the more educated
citizens were, the less trust they had, particularly in North Africa (North Africa r= -0.15***,
Levant r= -0.08**). Some gender differences were also evident, with men being more
trusting than women (North Africa r= -0.06***, Levant r= -0.05**).
Linear Regression Analysis
In order to test the robustness of the hypothesized regionalized connections of citizen
trust with functional-dysfunctional assessments of their governments and consequent
trust deficits, two linear regressions were run, one each for the two regions. The
functionality of governments was indicated by perceptions of government efficacy and
stability, while corruption levels represented dysfunctionality in governmental institutions
(Table 3).
In North Africa, on balance, perceptions of government efficacy were the main reason
for increased levels of trust (β= 0.25***). While citizen trust in their governments was
reduced by the corrosive negative effects of corruption (β=-0.29***), governments were
able to combat the negative consequences of corruption, with functional services and
stability. There was a parallel functionality-corruption-trust dynamic in the Levant. That
is, functional Levantine governments engendered much more citizen trust (β=0.41***)
than the negative trust consequences of governmental corruption (β=-0.23***).
Two additional trust connections, even if not as prominent as that of efficacy and
corruption, were noted. Economic and personal stability contributed some to cultivating
more trust in governments in both regions, even if more so in Northern Africa; Stability β
in North Africa = 0.10***and 0.07*** the Levant. And educated North African citizens were
less trusting of their governments (β = -0.12**than their Levantine counterparts (β = 0.04**).
Another look at the regional differences in the functionality-corruption balance in
engendering citizen trust revealed interesting lessons in trust surplus and deficits. In the
Levant, governments were able to cultivate a trust surplus; that is, the trust deficit
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caused by corruption (β=-0.23***) was more than compensated for by functional
governments (Efficacy β=0.41***and stability β=0.07**combined). While in North Africa,
citizen trust that efficacious governments and stability were able to garner (Efficacy
β=0.25***and stability β=0.10) were just about sufficient to make up for the corrosive
effects of corruption (β=-0.29***). In other words, the trust surplus created in the North
African region was significantly smaller than the trust surplus in the Levantine region.
Table 3. Regression Analysis of Trust in Government
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016; Beta (β) Coefficients1
Regression Coefficients (β)
North Africa

Levant

0.25***
0.10***

0.41**
0.07***

-0.29***

-0.23***

Education and Gender:
1. Level of education
2. Gender

-0.11***
-0.02

-0.04**
0.03

Model Statistics:
Constant
Adjusted R2
DF 1 & 2

11.19***
0.24****
5 & 3410

8.79***
0.38***
5 & 2955

Functional Governments:
1. Perceptions of Government Efficacy
2. Stability
Dysfunctional Governments:
1. Corruption

1

Index of Trust in Government: ReversedQ2011 + RevesexQ2012 + ReversedQ2013 + ReversedQ2016;
range 4-16;
Index of Perceptions of Government Efficacy: ReversedQ2041 + ReversedQ2042 + ReversedQ20421 +
ReversedQ2043 + ReversedQ2043; range 5-20;
Index of Stability: ReversedQ101 + ReversedQ101A + ReversedQ102B +Reversed Q105 + Q1072 + Q1074;
range 6-25;
Index of Corruption: ReversedQ210 + ReversedQ211 + ReversedQ213; range 4-12;
Level of Education: (1) Illiterate/No formal education - (7) MA and above;
Gender: (0) Male - (1) Female.
***
p<=.001.

CONCLUSIONS
In this concluding section, the theoretical and political implications of the empirical
findings were reviewed. Some suggestions for future research to advance scholarly
understanding of the contested relationships between Middle Eastern citizens and their
governments were outlined.
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Empirical and Theoretical Implications
The quantitative findings indicated that a trust surplus in governmental institutions in the
Middle East was a result of positive perceptions of government efficacy, and stability. On
the other hand, corruption eroded citizen trust. However, while both the North African
and Levantine regions were able to garner an overall trust surplus, said surplus was
significantly smaller in North Africa than in the Levantine region. Educated Middle East
citizens were less trusting of their governments in both regions.
Some specifics of the trust dynamics between citizens and their leaders were found in
the narrative commentaries of professionals and journalistic accounts. For example, The
Professor (Interviewee #2) offered this scenario. Sectarian leaders are supported by
foreign leaders and are historically from wealthy families. Therefore, in return for loyalty
from their voters, they are able to provide tangible services, such as government jobs,
education to voter’s children in specific prestigious schools. The strong influence of
leaders on the citizens make it difficult to mobilize against leaders, because voters are
very dependent on these leaders. According to the Executive Director (Interviewee #1),
the dependent voter-politician relationship is harmful. Citizens prefer working in the
government public sector than in the private sector, because staying within the system
grantees them benefits they would not achieve otherwise. The reinter system, coupled
with corruption, allows for the elite class in the Middle East to continue controlling
resources and solidify their power. According to the Executive Director, the economic
differential between ordinary citizens and elites is vast; the government officials and
leaders are always of the upper class while citizens are of the lower or middle class, with
fewer material possessions and wealth.
In the Professor’s experience, there is no motivation for governmental institutions to help
and support citizens who do not have the ability to change the level of power of leaders,
because of both the lack of accountability and dependency of Middle Eastern citizens on
their leaders. Neither are the government agents motivated to facilitate economic
growth. Lack of accountability also contributes to the little confidence in leaders and
government agents, and ultimately leads to government inefficacy. Additionally,
widespread corruption, that goes hand in hand with lack of accountability, is quite
evident in the Middle East.
Citizens feel that the government is inefficient because they are corrupt. Yet, many do
not feel they can make a difference, although this sense of powerlessness is not
widespread throughout the region. As per the Global Corruption Barometer 2016 (Pring
2016) citizens in Tunisia felt empowered to help fight corruption, and believed ordinary
people are able to incite change (71%). Citizens in Jordan and Palestine, also had
positive outlooks on the ability for citizens to make a difference (66%). On the other
hand, half of the citizens in Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon and Egypt felt disempowered to
fight corruption. If left unaddressed, as the empirical findings presented in this paper has
shown, corruption in both regions will erode the trust surplus in government institutions.
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Theoretical Implications
From a theoretical standpoint, there was support in the linear regression findings (Figure
1) for predictions that were grounded in Max Weber and Gaetano Mosca’s Elite and
Legitimacy theories. As expected in first hypothesis, functional governments garnered
more citizen’s trust in the Levant than in North Africa, net of level of education and
gender. The economic equalities combined with the political turmoil that has roiled the
North African region, and the unmet expectations of economic and social change offer
an explanation. The legitimacy of governments (measured by trust surplus garnered by
government efficacy and stability versus trust deficits derived from corruption was also
higher in the Levant (Hypothesis #2) as a result of Levantine elites maintaining political
stability, even if not economic progress.
Figure 1: Empirical (Beta (β) Coefficients1) and Theoretical Models of the Impacts of Perceptions
of Government Efficacy, Stability and corruption on Trust in Government Institutions in North
Africa and the Levant2

2

Data source: Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,
Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016; *** p <=.001.
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Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
Despite the valuable insights presented in this research there is much left to be
uncovered about citizen trust in government institutions in the Middle East. The fact that
the adjusted R2 in North Africa was only 0.24*** and the Levantine R2 was 0.38***
indicated that there is more to the citizen-government dynamics than citizen perceptions
of government efficacy, stability, and corruption.
Further research on civil participation in politics of the region will be valuable. In the
Executive Director’s (Interviewee #2) perspective, citizens expect solutions to social
problems to come from the government, as opposed to a collaboration between citizens,
NGO’s and the government. The prevailing ethos in the Middle East is that because the
leader or government agency was elected, the responsibility lies completely with them,
without acknowledging the citizens’ role in the challenges they face. For example,
150,000 children of Syrian refugees have entered Lebanon in the recent years, exerting
extra pressure on the public schools. A proactive citizenry and support for these schools
could enhance the efficiency of existing governmental institutions. A bottom up
approach, through civil empowerment to participate and change the politics in favor of
citizens, will create a ripple effect, said the Professor (Interview #1).
The ethnocentric and secretariat conflicts that persist in the Middle East is another issue
that deserves more scholarly attention. According to the Professor, religion is
manipulated and used by government officials to maintain their position of power.
Besides, specific ethnic and religious minorities are discriminated against and are kept
out of political power or autonomy. Ethno-sectarian conflicts are more visible in the
Levantine region, especially in Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Lebanon. Based on the turmoil of
the last decade, and the growing insurgency and terrorist groups, such as ISIS, their
effects on corroding trust in governments in the Levant and North Africa need scholarly
attention.
APPENDICES
Appendix A. Demographic Controls: Gender and Level Of Education
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
Palestine, and Tunisia, 20161
Concepts
Indicators
Responses
Statistics
Gender

Male or Female

Education

Level of
Education1

1

(0) Male
(1) Female
Mean (sd)
Min-Max
(n)

North Africa
50.1%
49.9
3.42 (1.67)
1-7
(4787)

Levant
49.7%
50.3
3.70
(1.31)***
1-7
(4200)

Level of Education: (1) Illiterate/No formal education - (7) MA and above.
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Appendix B: Table 2. Correlation (r)
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016 1,2
Trust In
Perceptions Stability
Corruptio
Level of
Gender
Governm
of
n
Education
ent
Government
Efficacy
Trust In
1
0.589***
0.358***
-0.479***
-0.075***
0.049**
(n=3201)
(n=3405)
Government
(n=3350)
(n=3187)
(n=3405)
Perceptions
of
Government
Efficacy
Stability
Corruption
Level of
Education
Gender

0.471**
(n=3741)

1

0.495***
(n=3293)

-0.545***
(n=3117)

-0.060***
(n=3350)

0.050**
(n=3350)

0.305***
(n=4127)
-0.473***
(n=3959)
-0.152***
(n=4266)
0.063***
(n=4277)

0.413***
(n=3944)
-0.535**
(n=3802)
-0.052**
(n=4065)
0.067***
(n=4076)

1

-0.319***
(n=3284)
1

-0.019
(n=3536)
0.004
(n=3334)
1

-0.063***
(n=3536)
-0.060**
(n=3334)
-0.012**
(n=4200)
1

-0.310 ***
(n=4191)
0.052***
(n=4573)
-0.024
(n=4586)

0.113***
(n=4360)
-0.099***
(n=4586)

-0.164***
(n=4586)

1

Correlation below the diagonal of 1 is North Africa, while the correlation above is the Levant
Index of Trust in Government: ReversedQ2011 + RevesexQ2012 + ReversedQ2013 + ReversedQ2016; range
4-16;
Index of Perceptions of Government Efficacy: ReversedQ2041 + ReversedQ2042 + ReversedQ20421 +
ReversedQ2043 + ReversedQ2043; range 5-20;
Index of Stability: ReversedQ101 + ReversedQ101A + ReversedQ102B +Reversed Q105 + Q1072 + Q1074;
range 6-25;
Index of Corruption: ReversedQ210 + ReversedQ211 + ReversedQ213; range 4-12
Level of Education: (1) Illiterate/No formal education - (7) MA and above
Gender: (0) Male - (1) Female.
***
p<=.001.
2
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Racial Boundaries of Success in the U.S
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Racialized Resource Models of Socioeconomic Success:
A Mixed Methods Analysis of White and African American High School Students
By
Anna Heider1

ABSTRACT. Racial differences in the types of social resources that White and African
American students need to complete high school and be successful in young adulthood
were assessed using the 10-year longitudinal data on 10th graders from the 2002-2012
NELS survey. Racial limits of home and school resources for socioeconomic success
were theorized using Bourdieu, Coleman, and Lareau’s social capital theories in the
context of Massey and Denton’s residential segregation. Qualitative interviews and
content analyses of journalistic and of select documentary evidence were used to
illustrate the statistical analysis. Not only was completing high school essential, for both
groups, to succeed socioeconomically as adults, access to resources in their homes was
a critical element of early success in high school. But only Whites were able to activate
academic and home resources to their benefit in their later success. African Americans
continued to rely only on their home resources in their adulthood. These racialized
resource models added to the social capital literature on the racialized pathways to
economic success, but more research attention is warranted on the future success
pathways of African Americans.

INTRODUCTION
That a critical tool for economic success in modern America, high school completion
and even a college degree, is not equally available to all youth has been well
documented. It is also well established in the field of education that supportive
resources in the home and at school can help students on their way to finishing high
school and becoming economically successful in their adulthood. Educated parents
often expect their children to follow them in their educational trajectories, guide them in
high school and even in their later lives. Schools, their resources, teachers, and school
peers, are additional important assets to children in their high school and later careers.
Unfortunately, the contours of educational opportunities and success in the U.S. are
racially defined.
Part of the racialized success is due to differences in access to resources in the home and
in schools. But, even when resources are available to both African American and White
students, how useful or accessible are they at different points in their socioeconomic
1
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careers? What are the racial differences in the career supportive resources? Pinpointing
the types of supportive resources and the career points at which they are most useful
could highlight inequalities in the education system as well in later economic success,
and offer evidence for identifying ways of bridging the gaps in options available to
African American and White students.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Scholars have explored racial/ethnic differences in the roles that families, teachers,
schools, and communities play in the academic aspirations and achievements of youth.
The plethora of resources hypothetically available to young students can be categorized
into those in the home and in the school. On the home front, parents’ educational and
economic backgrounds are two well established assets that guide their children for
success in high school and later in their lives. Once children enroll and attend schools,
race/ethnic variations in perceptions of school climate and of teacher-student
relationships, as well as school resources, have found to shape their academic
achievements.
Support for Education in the Home
Parents and other family members are key to the educational trajectories of their
children. More often than not, parents model the value of education for their children,
are involved in shaping their aspirations, goals and school activities, and continue to
support them as they pursue their careers.
Parents: Academic Expectations and Involvement
Scholars have recognized numerous ways families influence and support their
children’s academic achievements. For example, students whose parents were very
involved with the school, did better academically, in a sample of 15,240 from NELS of
surveys (Benner, Boyle, and Sadler 2016). Gordon and Cui (2012) also drew a similar
conclusion, from two waves of the Add Health longitudinal study (Wave I sample: 20,745
and wave IV: 15,701). In the Gordon and Cui analyses, parents’ high educational
expectations for their children and general support were what led to their children’s
academic achievement.
Structural Class Resources in the Home
In addition to parent activities and motivations for their children’s future, social class can
affect how parents support their children. Socioeconomic structural assets available to
parents and children in the home have been documented to be salient for their children’s
academic success. For example, Lareau (2014) noted differences between how middle
class and lower class/poor parents approached educational support, expectations, and
general support for their children. Lareau, who observed a sample of 88 families (White
and African American), found that middle class parents were involved in the school and
were also more willing to challenge the teachers. In contrast, lower class/poor parents
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were less involved with the school, listened to everything the teachers said about their
child’s education, and did not try to change what goes on at the school (even if they
disagreed). In fact, in a survey study done by Dixson, Roberson, and Worrell (2017),
with a sample of 105 high achieving (GPA > 3.0) African American students, family
socioeconomic background was a stronger predictor (accounted 17% of academic
variance) of academic achievement than student psychosocial status.
Race, a moderator. The connections between the resources at home and school
success are mediated by the racial background of children and their families. For
example, in a study of parenting behavior and financial stress by Dotterer, Iruka and
Pungello (2012) with 164 mother-child dyads of African American and White ethnicity,
the effectiveness of parenting behaviors was found to be different according to racial
group. Maternal sensitivity did play a role in the link between SES and school readiness
only for White families. But, the maternal negative/intrusive behaviors link operated
similarly for both African Americans and whites; for example, lower SES was associated
with negative/intrusive maternal behaviors, and in turn, the children had lower preacademic knowledge than their counterparts.
Academic Resources: Structural, Engagement, and Race
Schools and teachers, with race/ethnicity and gender as central organizing principles,
are additional areas around which the complex interplay of academic expectations and
outcomes of high school students are played out. Race/ethnic variations in perceptions
of school climate, of teacher-student relationships, and school resources, as they
affected academic achievements, has been another central theme in the extant
research.
School Climate
Much research has been done on racial variations in how school climate is perceived by
students and the connections to student academic success. In one study, teachers in
schools with positive climate and strong discipline had positive relationships with their
students and high expectations for their students (Konold, Cornell, Shukla and Huang
2016). In turn, these students, who participated in an anonymous survey of 48,027
students in 323 schools, were highly engaged in their academics. Yet, African American
students in the survey (in contrast with White students) perceived the teachers to be
less supportive, but more demanding academically. African American students also
perceived the discipline at the school to be less structured and less fair. In yet another
longitudinal study (from the 7th grade in 1991 all the way through 11th in1996), Diemer,
Marchand, Mckellar, and Malanchuk (2016) looked more specifically at relationships
between teachers and African American students and the effects on students’
achievement in math. Not only did teacher’s differential treatment negatively predict
relevant math instruction during 8th grade, it also acted to “corrode the salutary benefits
of relevant instruction on students’ self-concept of math ability and task value” (p.1221).
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Similar racialized findings were available in a study done by Voight, Hanson, O’Malley,
and Adekanye (2015), using multilevel regression analyses of “school climate.” In a
middle school, the African American and Hispanic students, in contrast to their White
classmates, had less favorable experiences of connectedness, safety, opportunities for
participation, and relationships with adults. Besides, when the racial climate gaps were
wider, the racial achievement gap was also larger and vice versa. An example of this
racial divide in the Denver public school system was highlighted by an online journalist,
Asmar (2019), in “Black student excellence: Denver school board directs district to
better serve black students.” Illustrating the disproportionate treatment of African
American students in public schools, Asmar quoted one student: “Teachers, specifically
white teachers, don’t know how to act around me…do not know how to have respectful
conversations because they’re afraid of being offensive or because they’re not educated
in the right terminology” (https://chalkbeat.org/posts/co/2019/02/22/black-studentexcellence-denver-school-board-directs-district-to-better-serve-black-students/).
Another aspect of school climate is teacher support as perceived by the students,
particularly students of color. Mary, Calhoun, Tejada, and Jenson (2018), in their
phenomenological study of 25 African American students, found that despite negative
messages and stereotypes, African American students living in low-income
communities, had high academic expectations when they were surrounded by
supportive teachers, parents, and community programs/afterschool programs. At the
other end of the spectrum was academic dis-identification or a disconnect between
academic self-concept and achievement. African American youth, particularly males, in
Cokley, Mcclain, Jones, and Johnson’s (2012) research with 96 African American
students, had better academic performance when they had strong academic selfconcept. These authors found that African American males, more than female youth,
were likely to perceive school as a hostile environment associated with discipline and
corporeal punishment.
SES and Minority Composition of Schools
In addition to school climate, in its many dimensions, the class and race contexts of
schools is another important element in student success. In a meta-analysis of research
on the socioeconomic status-academic achievement connection published over a tenyear span (1990-2000), Sirin (2005) found that school SES, defined by parent’s
education, parental income, and parental occupation, was positively connected to
student achievement, but primarily for white, and less so for minority, students; their
sample included 101, 157 students at 6,871 schools from 128 different school districts.
On balance, Sarin concluded that SES of neighborhoods and schools exerted more of a
powerful negative effect on minority students than on white students.
Student Responsibility: Free Time Use
When all is said and done, students also have responsibility for their success. Wolf,
Aber, and Morris (2015) focused on how 504 African American and Latino students
used their discretionary time and its connections to their academic achievement.
Students grouped in the academic cluster (in discretionary time use) had higher levels
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of academic achievement compared to those in the social cluster; that is, students who
focused less on academics in their outside time were more likely to do worse
academically.
Success in Later Life
Unlike the plethora of research on student success in high school, there is not much
attention that has been paid to the connection between high school education and
success in later life. Most scholars have focused on adult socioeconomic attainment
as it has been shaped by life-time educational achievements, occupational status, and
family/community backgrounds. For example, Wilson (2017) looked at birth cohorts, of
Whites versus African Americans and men versus women, from the successive
decades from 1910 to 1979. The scholar defined occupational attainment as
“occupational returns to education and “earnings returns to occupation” (p. 387).
African American and Whites, both men and women, did improve their occupational
attainment over those of previous birth cohorts. However, African American men, of
both the baby-boom and generation X, were not as successful in moving forward in
their occupational trajectories as White men of the same age. Yet, African American
women did seem to have made occupational gains relative to White women, even if the
gains fluctuated over decades.
Another stream of research on the economic success trajectories has addressed the
socioeconomic and privilege contexts in which student grew up. For example, the
connections between family/community background, race/ethnicity and young adult
socioeconomic attainment was explored by Wickrama, Simons, and Baltimore (2012)
using the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health. African American youth
that came from a low SE (socioeconomic) background and lived in disadvantaged
communities were more likely to have significantly lower levels of earnings, assets, and
job quality as young adults. However, educational attainment of young adults helped to
buffer the limiting influences of family SE background on later achievements and
helped accentuate the positive influences of family resources. There is also a “success
sequence” with nuanced racial differences in the outcomes. In their reexamination of
Isabel Sawhill and Ron Haskins’ data, Reeves, Rodrigue, and Gold (2015) used a
similar definition of the “success sequence”, namely graduating high school,
maintaining a full-time job or having a partner who does and having children while
married and after age 21, should they choose to become parents. While Sawhill and
Haskins’ found the African Americans who followed these three “norms” to the middle
class were still worse off than their white counterparts, the reanalysis went even more
in-depth: “…blacks and white who follow the three norms have about the same
likelihood of ending up near the middle, with incomes three to five times the federal
poverty line…But white norm-followers have better odds than their black equivalents of
ending up in a more affluent household” (https://www.brookings.edu/research/followingthe-success-sequence-success-is-more-likely-if-youre-white/).
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Summary and Suggestions for Future Research
Numerous valuable lessons were identified in the scholarly research reviewed above on
the racial dimensions of high school academic success as it was impacted by support,
or lack thereof, in the home and school. It was clear that a high school diploma is critical
for later success. However, there was little longitudinal assessment found of how
resources that were effective in students’ success in high school completion continued
to be available to youth to be tapped into later in life and whether there are racial
dimensions to the resources accessible and activated by youth. The researchers
reviewed above also expressed the need for larger sample sizes, especially ones that
include more African American students.

RESEARCH QUESTION
To address some these gaps in the extant research, a mixed method approach was
used to outline, first, the potentially racialized social capital resource (academic and
home) models of high school completion of White and African American youth. Second,
if high school completion is a key to future socioeconomic success, which of these early
resources continued to help White and African American youth in their adult
socioeconomic success? The formal research question posed was, “How were
academic and home resources differently activated by White and African American youth
in their progress toward high school completion and, in turn, their future socioeconomic
achievement in young adulthood?” These findings will contribute to an ongoing
conversation about mechanisms to reduce racial inequalities in early life chances and
later success.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
An understanding of racialized resource models for high school completion and later
success explored in this study were framed within Bronfenbrenner’s (1974) ecological
approach and social capital theoretical frameworks (Bourdieu 1977, Bourdieu and
Passeron 1990, Coleman 1987, and Lareau 2014). Of the many ecologies that affect
youth as they grow and develop their academic and economic self- concepts, the home
(micro system) and school (meso system) are the most relevant. It is the economic and
socio-cultural capital that these two systems offer and are potentially activated by youth
that could theoretically demonstrate how these ecologies shaped youth as they worked
toward their early academic later socioeconomic (flexible self) success, Mead 1934).
However, because of racial inequalities in access to critical resources (Bourdieu and
Lareau), racialized resource success models were anticipated for whites and African
Americans.
Ecological Systems and Social Capital
Two important ecologies in which a person grows, develops, and succeeds are the
home micro-system and the school meso-system (Bronfenbrenner 1974). It is in these
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two ecologies that children first develop their core self-concept (Kuhn and Mcpartland
1954) and it is through these two ecologies that children learn how to access the
economic, social and cultural capital resources that will have to be activated for later life
success. It is well known that family economic resources are a major determinant of the
quality of schools in which American children are educated (Smelser, Wilson, and
Mitchell 2001). In addition, the home and schools are critical sources of sociocultural
capital resources. Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) outlined the cultural beliefs, traditions,
and the norms that one learns at home and in environments outside the home, such as
at school, that play an important role during youth development. These resources were
linked by Coleman (1987) to successful outcomes for children. To Coleman, parent’s
value, expectations, beliefs, and their own behavior play a role in a child’s life outcomes;
that is, the ways they parent their children shape children’s academic and later
socioeconomic achievement.
Race and Socio-Cultural Capital
However, Bourdieu (1977, 1990) and later Lareau (2014) also theorized access to
resources to be unequal by race and by other inequality markers. White Americans hold
a clear advantage over African Americans in terms of income, wealth, health, education,
and many other important resources. A compelling social capital explanation for this
white advantage is how social and cultural resources are used or activated by a
dominant white group in order to exclude others from jobs, social resources, and other
life chances (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990). Whiteness itself is a form of cultural
capital; that is, as the dominant racial group in American society, whites are able to set
the normative standards for appropriate values, beliefs, and behaviors necessary for
success. Besides, cultural capital often leads to valuable additional social capital, as in
the resources and knowledge, gained through one’s social networks. It is these forms of
knowledge, behaviors, and preferences that help individuals, Whites in this case, gain
an advantage in the specific social contexts of education, employment, and wealth. For
example, Massey and Denton (2003) demonstrated how residential segregation in the
US has become one of the main perpetuators of urban poverty among African
Americans. They spoke about how segregation has created the “black ghetto”.
There is much scholarly writing on the origins of racial segregation in the US and how
the social isolation of African Americans was intensified by social policies that supported
red-lining in the real estate markets and associated home financing industries. Massey
(2003; Chapter 2) located the beginnings of racial segregation, and the formation of the
“black ghetto” in the early 20th century, when African Americans left the south and
moved to northern cities. However, partly because of the racial violence that erupted,
neighborhood organizations and other institutions instituted policies that had the de
facto effect of confining African Americans to ghettos and socially insolating them from
the white communities. For example, neighborhood improvement organizations got
white landowners to sign convenants that specifically prohibited African Americans from
owning, or occupying, or leasing properties. Also, an earlier code of ethics of the
National Association of Real Estate Brokers stipulated that “ ‘…a Realtor should never
be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood….members of any race or
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nationality…whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values in that
neighborhood…’” (p. 37). Confined to such institutionalized segregated contexts, African
Americans were limited in, and unable to accumulate for future generations, the types of
transferrable social, cultural, and economic capital that need to be accessed to enter
and succeed in the broader dominant (White) educational system and workplace.
Lareau (2014) specifically connected the racial inequalities in social and cultural capital
faced by black families to educational inequalities. She found that social capital, derived
from class status of middle class and working/poor class parents, mediated the
connection between parenting style and school performance. Concerted Cultivation was
the parenting style used by most in middle-class families; in the concerted cultivation
style, parents teach their children to question authority, develop a large vocabulary, and
make them comfortable enough to have discussions with authority figures. In contrast,
children in lower or working-class families were exposed to a more natural growth
parenting. In this type of parenting, parents tell their children what to do rather than
negotiate with them; they also encourage putting trust into authority figures and
encouraged children to play on their own. While such natural parenting practices
encouraged children to be independent at a younger age they also set them up for jobs,
mainly working-class jobs, where those in authority were to be followed and respected.
These two differing approaches to parenting shaped the types of socio-cultural capital
that children could or could not access, depending on their class and/or racial origins.
As youth grow intro young adulthood, these racial differences, and even inequalities, in
socio-cultural capital continue to play key roles in the types of social networks that they
can activate in the requisite social interactions and connections for finding and
succeeding in the workplace. Such racialized social connections more often than not
tend to segregate African Americans into certain jobs. Even when they find jobs, Bell,
Nkomo, and Hammond (1994) documented the stereotypes that African American
workers encounter in workplace settings, leading to feelings of isolation and alienation.
In fact, much of the social divide in the workplace has been attributed to differences in
the social and cultural capital between African Americans and their coworkers. Such
unequal evaluations of racialized capital, that initiated the divide, also continued into the
workplace and shaped the types of jobs African Americans were assigned.
Given the racially segregated living, learning, and working environments in the U.S., it is
logical to expect that race does shape the kinds of, and access to, resources -economic, social, and cultural capital – that would be helpful for success in schools and
later in in the workplace. If societal evaluation of the value of home and school
resources are racialized in favor of white students, it can be predicted that home
(economic and sociocultural) and academic resources would be more useful, on
balance, to White students in their chances of high school completion than of African
American students (Hypothesis #1). Under this white privilege scenario, home and
academic resources will continue to be net beneficial to Whites (more than African
American youth) in their later SE success (Hypothesis #2). Besides, faced with a
racialized landscape that has disadvantaged African Americans outside their homes,
home resources were predicted to help African American students complete high school,
but not succeed necessarily socioeconomically in their adulthood (Hypothesis #3).
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METHODOLOGY
In order to capture a more holistic picture of the racialized resource models, a
sequential mixed methods design was employed. First, quantitative secondary survey
data was utilized to test the hypotheses. In the second step, narrative insights from
experts in education inequality as well documentary evidence about racial inequalities were
used to illustrate and to explain the statistical results.
Secondary Survey Data Analysis
The survey data set used in this paper were drawn from the NCES (National Center for
Education Statistics), collected from 2002 until 2012. At the beginning of the study
(Base Year) in 2002, the youth (n=16,197) were in the 10th grade. The first follow up in
2004 was done when the youth were in 12th grade. And two additional follow ups were
conducted, one in 2006 and six years later in 2011-12. The NELS data included
interviews and surveys with the school administrators, parents and students; test scores
and transcripts were also documented. The NELS sample in the base year was made
up of 50.5% men and 49.5% women; and 81.1 % were White and 18.9 % African
American. In keeping with the research design of racialized resources models, the
analyses were disaggregated by White and African American youth; sex of the
respondent was controlled.
Qualitative Methodology
In order to gain first-hand insights on how home and academic resources influenced
socioeconomic achievement, qualitative interviews were conducted with two education
professionals. The first interviewee is an Associate Provost for Research (Interviewee
#1) and the second a Senior Associate and Head of Faith Formation Interviewee #2);
both have worked in and on education issues for their whole careers. These educators
were selected for their well-recorded views of education and home resources that
contribute to academic success and socioeconomic success. The Interview Protocol
and Consent Forms are available in Appendix A. To set an additional context for the
quantitative analyses and expand on the interview comments, content analysis of select
journalistic and documentary evidence were also conducted. Some examples were:
“Following the success sequence? Success is more likely if you’re white”2;“Black
student excellence: Denver school board directs district to better serve black students”
by Asmar 20193; “Columbus State wins award for boosting student success, reducing
gaps”4; and the HBO documentary, “Class Divide” by Levin (2015)5
2

https://www.brookings.edu/research/following-the-success-sequence-success-is-more-likely-if-yourewhite/
3

https://chalkbeat.org/posts/co/2019/02/22/black-student-excellence-denver-school-board-directs-district-to-betterserve-black-students/
4
https://www.dispatch.com/news/20190220/columbus-state-wins-award-for-boosting-student-success-reducing-gaps.
5
https://play.hbogo.com/feature/urn:hbo:feature:GV7xUvQFq08JfPwEAAAFa?reentered=true&userProfileType=liteUs
erProfile&autoplay=true.
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DATA ANALYSES
Three different levels of analyses, disaggregated by White and African American
backgrounds, were conducted for this research. First, univariate analyses were
used to build a profile of the students sampled at the time they were in 10th grade and
again 10 years later when they were young adults. Bivariate analyses were then used to
search for the preliminary differential (by race) associations of socioeconomic
achievement and high school completion with home resources and academic
resources. These relationships were then tested once again by using a two-step
multiple regression analyses, to assess the net effects of resources (home and
academic) first on high school completion and then on SE achievement. In keeping with
the research design, the regression analyses were disaggregated by White and African
American students. Finally, comments from the qualitative interviews and content
analyses were used to illustrate the multivariate analysis findings.
Descriptive Analysis
White young adults were more economically successful and were more likely to have
completed high school than African Americans, despite having approximately similar
access to academic resources. As for home resources, African American youth had
fewer (than whites) economic resources, but were advantaged in some types of
sociocultural resources vis-á-vis their White counterparts.
Socioeconomic (SE) Achievement
Socioeconomic achievement, the first success indicator used in this research, was
measured using a scale that included educational achievement and employment
income 10 years after completing high school. As seen in Table 1.A, on balance, White
students (Mean SES = 0.16 on a range of -1.41 – 9.17) had overall higher
socioeconomic achievement than African American students (Mean SES = -0.17 on a
range of -1.41 – 5.99).

Concept

SE
Achievement

Table 1.A Socio-Economic Achievement as of 3rd Follow-up (2012)
Educational Longitudinal Study, NELS, 2002-2012
Dimensions
Variables
Values
Statistics

SES

F3SES Sample
member’s
socioeconomic
status as of F31

Mean
(Sd)
Min-Max

White
0.16

African
American
-0.17***

0.74

0.68

-1.41 – 9.17

-1.41 – 5.99

1

F3SES is the average of 3 standardized components, namely 2011 earnings from employment, the
prestige score associated with the respondent's current/most recent job, and educational
attainment. For more details, please refer to: hhtps://nces.ed.gov/OnlineCodebook/Session/Codebook/d61960c5287f-4edc-812a-3d5326a325d4.
***
p<= .001.
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High School Completion
High school completion, the second indicator of success, presented in Table 1.B indicated
the following: A vast majority, over 75% of both groups had completed high school on
time. However, slightly more White students (89%) were likely than African Americans
(78.7%) to have completed High school on time. And, although in small proportions,
African Americans (9.4%) were more likely to have had no GED or equivalency than
Whites (5%). In short, there was a difference between African American and Whites in
their achievement; African American students were less likely to achieve high school
education at the same level as White students.

Concept

High
School
Completion

Table 1.B High School Completion as of 2nd Follow-up (2006)
Educational Longitudinal Study, NELS, 2002-2012
Dimension
Variable
Responses
Statistics
White African
American
Completion F2HSSTAT
1. No GED or equivalency, no
5.0%
9.4%***
High School plans to pursue
Completion
2. Working towards GED or
1.5
5.5
status in
equivalency
2006
3. received GED or equivalency
2.9
3.5
4. completed HS summer post
1.3
2.9
2004
5. completed HS on time, 2004
89.3
78.7
(n)
(8682) (2020)

Academic Resources
Two types of academic resources, school resources and peer academic culture, were
considered as potential explanations for success in high school completion. As seen in
Table 1.C, both African American (AA) and White (WA) students felt supported in their
schools and had resources available to them; the index of school resources was high at
about 28 (on a range of 17 – 34) for both African Americans and Whites. For example, a
majority of schools did have libraries for both African American and White students (at
about 95%) and both groups of students rated the libraries as mostly useful (AA:52.8%;
WA:58.7%). But both sets of students were split between disagree (AA:25.8%;
WA:34.1%) and agree (AA: 44.2%; W:46.4%) on whether their teachers expected
success of kids in school.
Interestingly, the racial differences in school resources, when noted, were in favor of
African American students. For example, more White students (56.9%) were likely to
feel put down by professors in the classroom than African Americans (50.6%). And,
school counselor’s expectations for students to go to college were slightly higher for
African American students (88.3%) than for White students (84.9%); with less than 20%
saying their students would do anything but go to college (AA: 11.7%; WA: 15.1%). On
balance though, both groups were fairly equal in the available academic resources and
support felt in their schools, even if African American students registered more support.
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Concept

Academic
Resources

Table 1.C School Resources of Base Year (2002)
Educational Longitudinal Study, NELS, 2002-2012
Dimensions
Variables
Responses

Expectations

Resources

BYS66E
School Counselor’s
desire for 10th grader
after high school
BY27H
Teachers expect
success in school
BYS50
School has library
media/resource
center
BYS52
How useful are
school library
reference materials
BYS20F
Teachers are
interested in students
BYS20H
In class often feels
put down by teachers
BYS27A
Classes are
interesting and
challenging
Index of School1
Resources

1

0. anything but college
1. go to college
(n)

Statistics
White African
American
15.1% 11.7%
84.9
88.3
(5757) (9677)

1.strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. agree
4. strongly agree
(n)
0. no
1. yes
(n)

7.6%
34.1
46.4
11.8
(8258)
4.2%
95.8
(8192)

6.7%
25.8
44.2
23.3
(1890)
5.0%
95.0
(14238)

1. don’t use the school
library
2. not useful
3. useful
4. very useful
(n)
1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. agree
4. strongly agree
(n)
1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. agree
4. strongly agree
(n)
1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. agree
4. strongly agree
(n)
Mean
(sd)
min-max

11.4%

14.5%

8.3
58.7
21.7
(7687)
3.0%
18.5
59.4
15.2
(8682)
27.4%
56.9
9.4
2.2
(8621)
7.7%
37.2
44.7
6.5
(8631)
28.17
2.45
16-34

6.2
52.8
26.5
(1656)
5.6%
23.4
52.7
13.5
(1966)
31.8%
50.6
9.9
2.9
(1994)
5.6%
29.4
46.5
13.9
(1995)
28.60
2.48
17-34

Index of School Resources=Teacher Expectations Recoded + Library Usefulness Recoded + School Counselor
Recoded + BYS50 + BYS20H + Teachers are Interested in Students Recoded + Classes are Interesting and
Challenging Recoded; Range: 16-34; Correlations among these indicators ranged from 0.033**- 0.456**(p<0.01**) for
Whites and from 0.008*-0.385**(p<0.01**) for African Americans

As for the peer academic culture that students were immersed in, the following
similarities and racial differences were noted. African American students’ friends were
more academically influential than friends of their White counterparts. For example,
when asked if it was very important to their friends to get good grades, 60.8% of African
American students said so compared to only 48% of White students. Even though it was
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equally very important to friends of both groups (76.1% WA and 77.1% AF) to finish
high school, more African American youth (62.7%) compared to Whites (57.8%) had
friends who wanted to continue their education past high school.

Concepts

Academic
Resources

Table 1.D Peer Academic Influence of Base Year (2002)
Educational Longitudinal Study, NELS, 2002-2012
Dimensions
Variables
Responses

Peer
Academic
Influence

BYS90A
Important to friends
to attend classes
regularly
BYS90B
Important to friends
to study
BYS90D
Important to friends
to get good grades
BYS90F
Important to friends
to finish high school
BYS90H
Important to friends
to continue
education past high
school
Index of Peer1
Academic
Influence

1

1. not important
2. somewhat important
3. very important
(n)
1. not important
2. somewhat important
3. very important
(n)
1. not important
2. somewhat important
3. very important
(n)
1. not important
2. somewhat important
3. very important
(n)
1. not important
2. somewhat important
3. very important
(n)

Statistics
White African
American
3.5%
2.5%
31.1
22.0
40.2
30.7
(6489) (1116)
11.2% 9.1%
55.8
49.6
33.0
41.3
(6519) (10713)
5.8%
6.1%
46.2
33.1
48.0
60.8
(2223) (1117)
3.4%
5.6%
20.5
17.3
76.1
77.1
(6454) (1114)
6.2% 6.1%
36.0
31.1
57.8
62.7
(1917) (1108)

Mean
(sd)
min-max

12.38
2.35
5-15

12.61**
2.47
5-15

Index of Peer Academic Influence=BYS90A+BYS90B+BYS90D+BYS90F+BYS90H; Range: 5-15; Correlations
among these indicators ranged from 0.335**- 00.596** (p<0.01**) for Whites and from 0.297** - 0.693** (p<0.01**) for
African Americans.

Home Resources
Home resources, the second type of social capital considered in this analysis, were
measured by two sets of indicators: socioeconomic and socio-cultural resources. Based
on families’ total income (in 2001), White families had more economic resources than
African American families (Table 1.E). The majority in both groups made between
$25,001 and $200,000, both African American (63%) and White families (87.7%); but
there was a 24.7% difference in favor of White families. White parents were also more
educated than their African American counterparts. For example, 46% of white parents
had completed college and even go beyond. The comparable proportion of college
educated African American parents was 32.8%. On the other hand, more African
American parents had either graduated high school or had earned a GED than White
parents (AA: 23.3%; WA:19.4%). On balance, white youth had access to more
economic resources in their homes than African American youth.
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Concepts

Home
Resources

Table 1.E Home Resources of Base Year (2002)
Educational Longitudinal Study, NELS 2002- 2012
Dimensions
Variables
Responses

SE
Resources
(SER)

BYINCOME
Total Family
Income from
all sources
2001composite

BYPARED
Parents’
highest level
of education

Index of SE1
Resources
Sociocultural
Resources

BYHOMLIT
Home
literacy
resources
BYP81
How far in
school
parent
expects 10thgrader’s will
go

Index of
Sociocultural2
Resources

1. None
2. $1,000 or less
3. $1,001 - $5,000
4. $5,001-$10,000
5. $10,001-$15,00
6. $15,001-$20,000
7. $20,001-$25,000
8. $25,001-$35,000
9. $35,001-$50,000
10. $50,001-$75,000
11. $75,001-$100,000
12. $100,001-$200,000
13. 200,001 or more
1.Did not finish high school
2. Graduated from high school/GED
3. Attended 2-year school, no degree
4. Graduated from 2-year school
5. Attended college, no 4-year deg.
6. Graduated from college
7. Completed Master’s degree or eq.
8. Completed PhD, MD, other
advanced degree
Mean
(sd)
min-max
(n)
1.Family has none of the resources
2. Family has one of these resources
3. Family has two of these resources
4. 50+ book/daily paper/regular mag
(n)
1. Less than high school graduation
2. High school graduation/GED only
3. Attend or complete 2-year
college/school
4. Attend 4-year degree incomplete
5. Graduate from college
6. Obtain Master’s degree or equi.
7. Obtain PhD, MD, other advanced
degree
(n)
Mean
(sd)
min-max
(n)

Statistics
African
White
American
0.2%
0.8%
0.3
3.1
0.7
4.3
1.1
4.4
2.5
7.3
3.2
8.6
4.3
8.5
9.6
15.3
18.8
19.0
24.0
14.0
16.3
8.4
14.1
5.4
4.9
0.9
2.0%
4.5%
19.4
23.3
10.8
13.3
11.0
12.0
11.0
14.2
24.6
19.8
13.8
7.7
7.4
5.3
14.43
3.46
3-21
(8682)
2.8%
11.8
28.6
56.9
(7905)
0.3%
6.7
13.6

12.12
3.80
3-21
(2020)
7.6%
18.8
32.8
40.9
(1562)
0.5%
7.7
11.3

3.9
47.2
17.2
11.2

3.9
36.2
18.6
21.7

(7370)
5.05
1.32
1-8
(6738)

(1421)
5.43
1.53
1-8
(1128)

1

Index of SER= BYINCOME*BYPARED*BYP84; Range: 3-21; Correlations between the two indicators were 0.300**0.450** (p<0,01**) for whites, and from 0.242** - 0.431** (p<0.01**) for African Americans.
2
Index of Socio-Cultural Resources= By Home Lit Recoded*BYP81; Correlations between the two indicators were
0.184** (p<0.01**), and 0.075* (p<0.05*) for African Americans.
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The class resource divide among neighborhoods and homes that are accentuated by
gentrification are illustrated in the documentary, “Class Divide” in the Chelsea
neighborhood of New York (Levin 2015). On one side of the street are the expensive
schools, buildings, restaurants, while just across the street are housing projects. They
are only separated by one street, but coexist in the same area. One woman interviewed
in the film noted, “I feel like they’re trying to push everybody out of New York City. I
don’t care what color you are, if you don’t have the big dollars they want you out.”
Gentrification is a part of residential segregation, just because you have been living in
one place for a long time, does not mean you will always be able to afford to live there.
As for socio-cultural resources in the home, the second dimension of home resources,
the following similarities and differences were evident in Table 1. E. Parents of both
groups of students had very high expectations for their educational future. More than
three quarters of (WA= 75.6% and AA = 76.5%) parents expected their children to
complete college and even go beyond. Similarly, both sets of parents offered their
children rich literacy options in their homes; White homes were a bit more so than
African American homes. A majority (51.6%) of African American homes had 1-2
reading materials (versus 49.4% WA homes); a majority (56.9%) of White homes had
more than 50 resources for reading while the corresponding percentage in AA homes
was 40.9%.
Summary Profile
On balance, White youth grew up in families that had more socioeconomic resources
than African American youth; the mean (𝑥) index of socioeconomic resources was 14.3
for White families and 12.1 (𝑥) for AA (on a range of 3 – 21). Their socio-cultural home
background was similar, in their richness, and yet different. Both groups of families had
high expectations for their children’s education. But White youth had a more in their
exposure to literacy in the homes.
Bivariate Analyses
In the second analytical step, bivariate correlation analyses were run between the
socioeconomic achievement and high school completion with both home and academic
resources (Appendix B: Table 2). As seen in Table 2, several preliminary differences
were noted in the experiences of White and African American youth. For one, both both
White and African American students with good home resources did moderately better
when it came to completing high school. Specifically, socioeconomic resources were
equally helpful to both groups (SE resources: White r=0.18*** & African American r =
0.17***). But, sociocultural capital played a moderately bigger role in high school
completion for African American students than it did for White youth (Sociocultural:
African American r=0.27*** versus White r=0.21***). Racialized resource differences were
also noted in the utility of academic resources (school resources and peer academic
influence), the second type of resource, in high school completion. Both types of school
120
https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/svn/vol17/iss1/1

120

et al.: Class, Race, and Political BoundaryLimits of Community andPolitic

resources were more salient for White students than they were for African American
students (School resources: White r=0.11*** vis-a-vis African American r= 0.05*; Peer
Academic resources: White r=0.15*** contrast with African American r=0.07**). In
addition, more White male (r=-0.09***) and African American male youth (r=-0.06***)
were likely to have completed high school than their female counterparts.
Once they graduated high school, the high school completion certificate was very
helpful to both African American and White student’s future socioeconomic success.
But, the benefits of high school completion were more striking for African American
youth (African American r=0.32***) than for Whites (r=0.27***). And just as with high
school completion, home and academic resources continued to be assets to both
groups of youth in their future socioeconomic achievement. However, there were the
expected racial undertones in the extent of resource usefulness. Even though both
White and African American students were able to continue to activate their home
resources for later socioeconomic success, White students (SE resources r=0.34***
and Sociocultural r= 0.35***) were able to do so much more than African Americans
(r=0.24*** & r=0.24***). Along similar racialized lines, high school academic resources
continue to be an asset for White students’ socioeconomic success (School
Resources r=0.13*** and Peer Academic Resources r=0.20***) but that was not the
case for African Americans (r not significant).
Overall, home and school resources played an important role, both in high school
completion and in the future socioeconomic success of White youth. But African
American students could activate their home and academic resources only for their
high school completion, but not in their pursuit of later socioeconomic success. The
robustness of these preliminary racialized associations between resources and
success in high school and later in life were evaluated using mutilate regression
analyses.
Multivariate Analysis
The racial differences in the associations of home and school resources with high
school completion and later socioeconomic success were reevaluated using a two-step
multiple regression analysis for White and African American students separately (Table
3). In the first step, high school completion was regressed on home and school
resources. In the second step, future socioeconomic was predicted using high school
completion as well as home and school resources. Gender was controlled for in all four
analyses models.
Several racialized and non-racialized patterns were evident in Table 3 in both high
school completion and later socioeconomic achievement (SEA). As might be expected,
both groups of youth needed similar types of resources for success at the high school
and adult phases of their lives. But the resources needed for socioeconomic success in
the later life stage were more racialized than for high school completion. Racial
differences were also evident within each trajectory.
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Table 3
Regression Analysis of School Resources and Academic Resources on
High School Completion & Socioeconomic Achievement1
(Sex as control): β Coefficients
Educational Longitudinal Study, NELS, 2002-2012
Model 1
Model 2
HS Completion
SES Achievement
African
American

White

African
American

White

Home Resources:
Index of Family SE Resources
Index of Socio-Cultural Resources

0.22***
0.23***

0.08***
0.15***

0.17***
0.01

0.13***
0.14***

Academic Resources:
Index of School Resources
Index of Peer Academic Influence

0.08**
0.04

0.05**
0.06**

-0.01
0.01

0.04*
0.03

0.13***

0.13***

-0.17***

-0.08***

High School Completion
Control:
Female (1) vs. Male (0)

-0.05

-0.02

Modal Statistics:
Constant
Adjusted R2

2.03***
0.13***

3.38***
0.05***

-2.55***
0.08**

-4.86***
0.09***

5 & 486

5 & 3658

6 & 486

6 & 3658

DF 1 and 2
***
1

p<=.001; **p<=.01; *p<=.05.
Socioeconomic achievement: F3SES is the average of standardized 3 inputs, namely 2011
earnings from employment, the prestige score associated with the respondent's current/most
recent job, and educational attainment.
High School Completion: Range: 1 (No GED) - 5 (completed HS on time, 2004);
Index of Family SES = BYINCOME*BYPARED*BYP84; Range: 3-21;
Index of Socio-Cultural Resources = BYHOMELIT*BYP81; Range: 1-8;
Index of School Resources = Teacher Expectations Recoded + Library2 Usefulness Recoded +
School Counselor Recoded + BYS50 + BYS20H +Teachers are interested in Students Recoded +
Classes are Interesting and Challenging Recoded; Range: 16-34;
Index of Peer Academic Influence =BYS90A + BYS90B+BYS90D+BYS90F+BYS90H; Range: 5-15;
Female (1) vs. Male (0).

First, for the racialized resource models needed for high school completion (Models 1.A
and 1B): both types of resources were more useful to African American students than to
Whites. For example, socioeconomic resources were of more assistance to African
American youth (β=0.15*** in Model 1.A) than white youth (β=0.08*** in Model 1.B).
Similarly, sociocultural resources also favored African American youth (β=0.23***) more
than Whites (β=0.15***) in completing high school. In addition, there were racial
differences in the effectiveness of academic resources, albeit less than home
resources. School resources were a bit more useful to African American (β=0.08**)
than White (β = 0.05**) high school students. And peer support assisted, even if weakly,
only White youth in their high school completion prospects (β=.06**).
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The second noteworthy sets of findings in Table 3 were the non-racialized resources.
For one, irrespective of whether the youth were African American or White, home
resources were more useful than academic resources to high school students in terms
of high school completion (Models 1 in Table 3). And, both types of home resources,
sociocultural and economic, were useful in the high school completion trajectories of
students (Models 1 in Table 3). For example, sociocultural resources were the most
critical (than socioeconomic resources) in the high school success of both sets of
students (Model 1A and 1B); sociocultural effects were β=0.23*** for African Americans
and β=0.15*** for Whites. In contrast, the effects of socioeconomic resources were only
β=0.08*** for White youth, even if β=0.22*** for African Americans.
In sum, youth, whether white or African American, needed sociocultural and
socioeconomic resources to complete high school. But both family and academic
resources gave more of a boost to African American students than to their white
counterparts. In other words, African American youth needed more sociocultural and
economic family support as well as school resources in their journey toward high school
completion than White youth.
Once, the youth completed high school, there continued to be even more pronounced
racial differences in the useful resources they could activate for their socioeconomic
success, the second question posed in this paper. No doubt, completing high school
was a necessary condition for later socioeconomic success, whether one is African
American (AA: β=0.13*** in Model 2A) or White (WA: β=0.13*** in Model 2B). But, after
African American youth completed high school, it was family socio-economics
(β=0.17***, Model 2.A) and not sociocultural or for that matter academic resources, that
helped them succeed as adults. On the other hand, both family SE resources (β=0.13***
Model 2.B) and socio-cultural resources (β=0.14***, Model 2B) continued to play a role
in the adult economic lives of White youth. School resources ceased to be relevant for
both groups in their later socioeconomic success.
A last note about of racialized gender differences. Males and female high school
students were equally likely to complete high school (Models 1A and 1B). However,
once they completed high school, not only did gender differences become apparent in
adult socioeconomic success but the gender differences were racialized (Models
2.A and 2B). For example, net of resources, African American and White women
achieved less than men. But the gender gap in achievement was much more
pronounced among African American young adults (β= -0.17***) than among White
youth (β=-0.08***). In other words, even with social capital, African American women
were doubly disadvantaged in their adult socioeconomic success.
At first glance, it seemed as if the first hypothesis (#1), which stated that home and
school resources would be more beneficial to White, than African American, students in
their high school completion prospects, was not supported. However, another angle on
these racialized high school completion findings could also be that African students
needed more support (than White students) in the home, both economically and
culturally, to achieve the same level of success in completing high school. White
privilege was more noticeable in the resource models for later socioeconomic
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achievement. As predicted in Hypotheses #2, home resources, economic and cultural,
continued to be useful to White adults. But, African American adults could translate only
their family’s socioeconomic, not cultural or school, resources, into later economic
success (Hypothesis #3).
Both education professionals (interviewed for this paper) emphasized the importance
of family socioeconomic background as important contributing factors to high school
completion and future socioeconomic achievement. However, it was also clear that the
value of school resources for African American students, unlike their White
counterparts, stopped at the high school gate and were not transferable to their later
achievements. That African American students could not rely on their high schools once
they left school might be products of the limits of the support high schools can offer to
their alum. If the schools from which African American students graduated were mostly
located in low income communities, there were also likely to have fewer resources (than
well-endowed schools) available to them (Interviewee #1). Interviewee #2 added,
there is a revolving door of teachers and staff that don’t stay longer than 5 years in lowincome schools. If experienced teachers are hard to find at low- income school, new
teachers, who are generally less prepared, have no role models from whom to learn and
they too end up leaving after a short amount of time. Under these scenarios of limited
school resources, it is not surprising that low-income high schools, which many African
American students attend, are not able to continue assisting their alum. It is also
possible that the limited school resources that African American students have access
to are not transferable to work and success in the wider society.
The White students’ experiences offered a stark contrast between well-resourced and
under-resourced schools. Not only were white students able to capitalize on their high
school resources as they graduated from school but they could continue to do so even
later in life. But, that these racial gaps in education are not insurmountable was
demonstrated by a community college in Ohio which took concerted action to assist
students who needed extra support. Smola (2019) in their “Columbus State wins
award for boosting student success, reducing gaps,” highlight a school that won an
award for their programs to reduce gaps not only between white and minority
students, but also students who needed financial aid. The school implemented
programs such as, “mandatory student orientation, a student success course, an earlyalert system to identify and communicate with students who might be falling behind, and
the development of a student resource hub and mentorship groups. Many of those
measures have had particularly positive effects on low-income and minority students…”
(https://www.dispatch.com/news/20190220/columbus-state-wins-award-for-boostingstudent-success-reducing-gaps).
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
In these concluding sections, the theoretical and policy implications of the empirical
findings were explored. In addition, a few suggestions for future research, derived from
the limitations of the study, were outlined.
Theoretical and Policy Implications
Overall, based on both the quantitative and qualitative empirical findings,
socioeconomic resources in the home were most effective in ensuring not only high
school completion but also future socioeconomic progress of youth; this resourcesuccess connection was true for both African American and White youth. However, only
White youth were able to continue accessing their high school resources once they
completed high school, endorsing the Bourdieu-Lareau-Massey/Denton theoretical
reasoning (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Empirical Model of the Impacts of Home and
Academic Resources on Socioeconomic Achievement of White (WA) and African American (AA)
Youth Beta (β) Coefficients1
Educational Longitudinal Study, NELS, 2002-2012
Home Resources:
SE Background
--------------------Socio-cultural
capital

WA:
-0.08***
AA:
-0.17***

Control:
Female
(1) vs
Male (0)

WA: 0.13***
AA: 0.17***
WA: 0.08***
AA: 0.22***

WA:
0.15***
AA:
0.23***

High School
Completion

WA:
0.05**
AA:
0.08**
Academic
Resources:
School
Resources
---------------Peer
Academic
Support
1

WA: 0.14***

WA:
0.13***
AA:
0.13***

Socioeconomic
Achievement

WA: ß= .04*

WA:
0.06**

Refer to Table 3 for index coding.
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Further, racial differences in the utility of family socio-cultural resources to young adults
as they pursue socioeconomic success as young adults were also theoretically relevant.
Family socio-cultural capital were no longer helpful for the future socioeconomic
success of African American young adults. The sociocultural differences between
Whites and African Americans are deeply rooted in our racial history and these
differences have shaped the social structures and institutions. Since Whites are the
majority and dominant group, they have been the ones to build and influence the many
structures and related cultural expectations, putting their offspring in advantageous
positions. For the rest of society, including African Americans, their institutional
disadvantages represent major systemic hurdles that lead to inequalities in life
outcomes, be they in education, wealth, health, income, or other life choices. A recent
news story about wealthy parents paying for spots at elite colleges for their
underqualified children is illustrative of systemic advantages for the dominant
communities. Inequality in college admissions is not a new notion; with “college test
prep companies, academic tutors, personal sports coaches and college admissions
consultants, the family with resources can often improve their child's odds of
acceptance” into an elite college reported Bahney in a recent story (2019). Donations to
the school and legacy admissions suffice even if a child does not have the academic
aptitude to pursue higher education. These advantages are not something that African
American students typically have access to because of the history of discrimination in
America and because they are disproportionately represented in lower class and poor
communities.
To the extent that the hurdles faced by African Americans and other minority groups are
systemic, major policy changes are needed to combat the pernicious inequalities that
have been present in America since its founding. No doubt, institutional changes are
difficult to achieve and will take a lot of time and effort, particularly because reform
policies will have to be broad based, covering not only educational reform, but also
financial (as banking reforms to curb lending biases and redlining practices) and
housing practices, among others.
Educational reform in poor schools will have to ensure enough resources and better
infrastructure, so that educators have the resources to help the children succeed.
Teachers will also have to be incentivized to stay longer and be role models for the
younger teachers. Residential reforms will also have to be an integral part of the
package to address inequalities. As was noted earlier, funding for the American school
system is heavily dependent on its community tax base. Desegregation of
neighborhoods might need to be achieved using a mixed income model of housing, with
high income homes interspersed with affordable housing. If gentrification needs to
become a part of the neighborhood solution, concerted efforts will have to be made not
to push low income families out of their homes and communities. These policies need to
be put in place in order to help not only African Americans, but those who are in the
lower/working class and in poverty (which is disproportionately African American).
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Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
As with any research, while new lessons were gleaned about the high school
completion and future socioeconomic achievement paths of White and African American
youth, there is much left unexplained. For example, while the home (and to a lesser
extent school) resource model worked much better for African American youth in their
high school completion success (adjusted R2 = 0.13***) than for White youth (adjusted
R2 was only 0.05***), there is still much to be known. Similar limitations were noted in the
Socioeconomic Achievement Models (adjusted R2 for whites was only 0.09*** and 0.08***
for African Americans), although the racial disparities in models were less muted.
A fuller understanding of both educational and later economic success of youth can be
achieved by examining the role that racial differences in community resources, or lack
thereof, play in supporting as well presenting challenges for their youth. According to
both interviewees, socioeconomic background of both home and communities play an
important role in academic and socioeconomic achievement of their youth. Given the
current community-based funding structures of schools in the U.S., students in wellresourced areas can be expected to do much better in high schools as well be able to
tap into those community resources as they move on in their lives. More research
attention is also needed on community challenges, such as neighborhood crime and
violence, and how they hinder the smoother socioeconomic progress of African
American and White youth. For example, a comparison of low-income, middle-income,
and upper-class income schools and communities on the socioeconomic achievement
of their students could shed light on the effect of structural forces that inhibit or facilitate
access to certain resources required for socioeconomic success. In the final analyses, a
clearer understanding is needed about of how institutional structures (communities,
schools, and workplaces) facilitate or inhibit youth access to different resources as they
chart their lives as adults.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Letter of Consent and Interview Schedule
Dear ____________
I am a Sociology Senior working on my Research Capstone Paper under the direction of Professor
Marilyn Fernandez in the Department of Sociology at Santa Clara University. I am conducting my
research on socioeconomic achievement.
You were selected for this interview, because of your knowledge of and experience working in the area of
research and education. I am requesting your participation, which will involve responding to questions
about education inequality and will last about 20 minutes. Your participation in this study is voluntary. You
have the right to choose to not participate or to withdraw from the interview at any time. The results of the
research study may be presented at SCU’s Annual Anthropology/Sociology Undergraduate Research
Conference and published (in a Sociology department publication). Pseudonyms will be used in lieu of
your name and the name of your organization in the written paper. You will also not be asked (nor
recorded) questions about your specific characteristics, such as age, race, sex, religion. If you have any
questions concerning the research study, please call/email me at ______ or Dr. Fernandez at
_______________
Sincerely, Anna Heider
By signing below you are giving consent to participate in the above study. (If the interviewee was
contacted by email or phone, request an electronic message denoting consent).
Signature

Printed Name

Date

If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have
been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Committee, through Office of
Research Compliance and Integrity at (408) 554-5591.
Interview Schedule for Supplemental Qualitative Interviews
Interview Date and Time: ___ Respondent ID#: ____
1. What is the TYPE Agency/Organization/Association/Institution (NO NAME, please) where you
learned about (and/or worked) with this issue:
2. What is your position in this organization?
3. How long have you been in this position and in this organization?
4. Based on what you know of education inequality, how common is this problem (issue or concern)?
5. In your opinion, what are some reasons that contribute to this problem (issue or concern)? (PROBE
with: Could you expand a bit more?).
6. [If the respondent does not bring up your independent concepts as potential causes), PROBE: a. How
about home resources, such as family’s socioeconomic status and parent’s education, and their
potential connection to academic achievement and socioeconomic achievement.
b. How about school resources, such as teacher’s expectations, if they have computers, a library, etc. or
not; and their potential connection to academic achievement and socioeconomic achievement.
7. Is there anything else about this issue/topic I should know more about?
Thank you very much for your time. If you wish to see a copy of my final paper, I would be glad to share it
with you at the end of the winter quarter. If you have any further questions or comments for me, I can be
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contacted at
. Or if you wish to speak to my faculty advisor, Dr. Marilyn Fernandez, she can be
reached at mfernandez@scu.edu

Appendix B
Table 2. Correlation Matrix of SES, High School Completion, Indices of Home (Socioeconomic and
Socio-Cultural), Academic (School and Peer) Resources, and Sex:
(White correlations above the diagonal of 1 and African American below the diagonal of 1)1
A

B

C

D

E

F

G

A. F3SES:
B. F2HSSTAT

1
0.32***

0.27***
1

0.34***
0.18***

0.34***
0.21***

0.20***
0.15***

0.13***
0.11***

-0.01
-0.06***

C. Index of
Family SES

0.24***

0.16***

1

0.32***

0.16***

0.06***

0.02

D. Index of
Sociocultural
Resources

0.24***

0.27***

0.198***

1

0.17***

0.18***

-0.10***

E. Index of
Peer
Academic
Influence
F. Index of
School
Resources

0.03*

0.07**

-0.001

0.12***

1.0

0.33***

-0.17***

0.04*

0.05*

-0.09***

0.04

0.24***

1.0

-0.08***

-0.02

-0.09***

0.02

-0.18***

-0.13***

0.001

G. Female

1.0

***p<=.001;**p<=.01;*p<=.05
1

A. F3SES: F3SES is the average of 3 standardized components, namely 2011 earnings from employment,
the prestige score associated with the respondent's current/most recent job, and educational attainment;
ranges: WA: -1.41 – 9.17; AA: -1.41 – 9.17
B. High School Completion: 1 (No GED) - 5 (completed HS on time, 2004);
C. Index of Family SES = BYINCOME*BYPARED*BYP84; Range: 3-21;
D. Index of Socio-Cultural Resources = BYHOMELIT*BYP81; Range: 1-8;
E. Index of School Resources = Teacher Expectations Recoded + Library2 Usefulness Recoded + School
Counselor Recoded + BYS50 + BYS20H +Teachers are interested in Students Recoded + Classes are
Interesting and Challenging Recoded; Range: 16-34;
F. Index of Peer Academic Influence = BYS90A + BYS90B+BYS90D+BYS90F+BYS90H; Range: 5-15;
G. Female (1) vs. Male (0).

129
Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

129

Silicon Valley Notebook, Vol. 17 [2019], Art. 1

REFERENCES
Asmar, Melanie. 2019. “Black Student Excellence: Denver School Board Directs District
to Better Serve Black Students.” Chalkbeat. Retrieved March 22, 2019
(https://chalkbeat.org/posts/co/2019/02/22/black-student-excellence-denverschool-board-directs-district-to-better-serve-black-students/).
Bahney, Anna. 2019. “What Wealthy Parents Do to Get Their Kids into Elite Colleges
(Legally).” CNN. Retrieved March 22, 2019.
(https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/13/success/college-admissions
parents/index.html).
Bell, Ella L. J. Edmonson, Stella M. Nkomo and John Hammond. 1994.
Barriers to Workplace Advancement Experienced by African-Americans.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Benner, Aprile D., Alaina E. Boyle, and Sydney Sadler. 2016. “Parental Involvement and
Adolescents’ Educational Success: The Roles of Prior Achievement and
Socioeconomic Status.” Journal of Youth and Adolescence 45(6):1053–64.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. “Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction.” In Halsey,
A.H. and Jerome Karabel, eds. Power and Ideology in Education. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Bourdieu, Pierre and Jean Claude Passeron. 1990. Reproduction in Education,
Society, and Culture. London; Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage. Pp.125-31.
Bronfenbrenner, Urie. 1974. “Developmental research, public policy, and the ecology of
childhood.” Child Dev. 45(1):1-5.
Cokley, Kevin, Shannon Mcclain, Martinique Jones, and Samoan Johnson. 2012. “A
Preliminary Investigation of Academic Disidentification, Racial Identity, and
Academic Achievement among African American Adolescents.” The High School
Journal 95(2):54–68.
Coleman, James S. 1987. “Families and Schools.” Educational Researcher 16(6):328. https://doi.org/10.3102/0013189X016006032.
Diemer, Matthew A., Aixa D. Marchand, Sarah E. Mckellar, and Oksana Malanchuk.
2016. “Promotive and Corrosive Factors in African American Students’ Math
Beliefs and Achievement.” Journal of Youth and Adolescence 45(6):1208–25.
Dixson, Dante D., Cyrell C. B. Roberson, and Frank C. Worrell. 2017. “Psychosocial
Keys to African American Achievement? Examining the Relationship Between
130
https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/svn/vol17/iss1/1

130

et al.: Class, Race, and Political BoundaryLimits of Community andPolitic

Achievement and Psychosocial Variables in High Achieving African Americans.”
Journal of Advanced Academics 28(2):120–40.
Dotterer, Aryn M., Iheoma U. Iruka, and Elizabeth Pungello. 2012. “Parenting, Race,
and Socioeconomic Status: Links to School Readiness.” Family Relations
61(4):657–70.
Form, William and Robert E. L. Faris. 2015. “Sociology.” Encyclopædia Britannica.
Retrieved October 25, 2018
https://www.britannica.com/topic/sociology#ref222977).
Gordon, Mellissa S. and Ming Cui. 2012. “The Effect of School-Specific Parenting
Processes on Academic Achievement in Adolescence and Young Adulthood.”
Family Relations 61(5):728–41.
Interviewee #1. November 2, 2018. Associate Provost for Research.
Interviewee #2. November 5, 2018. Senior Associate and Head of Faith Formation.
Konold, Timothy, Dewey Cornell, Kathan Shukla, and Francis Huang. 2016.
“Racial/Ethnic Differences in Perceptions of School Climate and Its Association
with Student Engagement and Peer Aggression.” Journal of Youth and
Adolescence 46(6):1289–1303.
Kuhn, Manford H. and Thomas S. Mcpartland. 1954. “An Empirical Investigation of Self
-Attitudes.” American Sociological Review 19:68-76.
Lareau, Annette. 2014. Unequal Childhoods: Class, Race, and Family Life. Berkeley,
Calif: University of California Press.
Levin, Marc. 2015. Class Divide. United States: HBO. https://play.hbogo.com/feature/
urn:hbo:feature:GV7xUvQFq08JfPwEAAAFa?reentered=true&userProfileType=
liteUserProfile&autoplay=true.
Mary, Jason St., Molly Calhoun, Jacqueline Tejada, and Jeffrey M. Jenson. 2018.
“Perceptions of Academic Achievement and Educational Opportunities Among
Black and African American Youth.” Child and Adolescent Social Work Journal
35(5):499–509.
Massey, Douglas S. and Nancy A. Denton. 2003. American Apartheid: Segregation and
the Making of the Underclass. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mead, George Herbert. 1934. Mind, Self, and Society. edited by C. W. Morris.
Reeves, Richard V., Edward Rodrigue, and Alex Gold. 2016. “Following the Success

131
Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

131

Silicon Valley Notebook, Vol. 17 [2019], Art. 1

Sequence? Success Is More Likely If You're White.” Brookings. Retrieved March
22, 2019 (https://www.brookings.edu/research/following-the-success-sequencesuccess-is-more-likely-if-youre-white/).
Sirin, Selcuk R. 2005. “Socioeconomic Status and Academic Achievement: A MetaAnalytic Review of Research.” Review of Educational Research75(3):417–53.
Smelser, Neil J., William J. Wilson, and Faith Mitchell (eds.). 2001. America becoming:
racial trends and their consequences. Vol 2. National Academy Press,
Washington, DC
Smola, Jennifer. 2019. “Columbus State Wins Award for Boosting
Student Success, Reducing Gaps.” The Columbus Dispatch. Retrieved March
22, 2019 (https://www.dispatch.com/news/20190220/columbus-state-wins-awardfor-boosting-student-success-reducing-gaps).
United States Department of Education. National Center for Education Statistics.
“National Education Longitudinal Study: Base Year through Third Follow-up,
1988-1994.” Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research [distributor], 2006-01-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR06961.v1
Voight, Adam, Thomas Hanson, Meagan O’Malley, and Latifah Adekanye. 2015. “The
Racial School Climate Gap: Within-School Disparities in Students’ Experiences
of Safety, Support, and Connectedness.” American Journal of Community
Psychology 56(3-4):252–67.
Wickrama, Kandauda A. S., Leslie Gordon Simons, and Diana Baltimore. 2012. “The
Influence of Ethnicity and Adverse Life Experiences During Adolescence on
Young Adult Socioeconomic Attainment: The Moderating Role of Education.”
Journal of Youth and Adolescence 41(11):1472–87.
Wilson, Franklin D. 2017. “Generational Changes In Racial Inequality In Occupational
Attainment, 1950–2010.” Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on
Race 14(02):387–425.
Wolf, Sharon, J. Lawrence Aber, and Pamela A. Morris. 2015. “Patterns of Time Use
Among Low-Income Urban Minority Adolescents and Associations with Academic
Outcomes and Problem Behaviors.” Journal of Youth and Adolescence
44(6):1208-25.

132
https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/svn/vol17/iss1/1

132

et al.: Class, Race, and Political BoundaryLimits of Community andPolitic

Author Biographies
Noor Darwish is a senior at Santa Clara University will graduate in June 2019 with a
double major in Sociology and Political Science and a minor in International Business.
She is passionate about social justice, and plans to use the knowledge and skills she
has learnt to help the Middle Eastern and Muslim communities. On a personal note, she
is Palestinian and is the Co-President of “Students for Justice in Palestine” and is a
member of “Advocacy for Workers on Campus” at Santa Clara University. She grew up
in Dubai and speaks English and Arabic fluently. A fun fact about her is that she is a
twin.
Anna Paris Heider is a senior Psychology and Sociology double major at Santa Clara
University. She will be graduating in the Spring of 2019 and hopes to continue working
with communities on social inequalities. In addition to her studies, she enjoys
photography, and hopes to incorporate it into her future work with social inequalities.
Elizabeth Namakula Kamya is a senior who will graduate in June 2019 with majors in
Sociology, psychology, and ethnic studies. She is half Ugandan and proud of her
multicultural background. While she was growing up, she was fortunate enough to travel
to Uganda every summer. Spending time with people who have different life
experiences than her own instilled her with values, of compassion, consciousness, and
cultural competence, which have guided her career choices and activities tremendously.
While studying at Santa Clara University, her mentors and peers have challenged her to
think creatively in response to problem-solving. Programs at SCU, with a singular focus
on social justice, have helped her discover a love of learning in new cultures and being
pushed to grow. Doing research on community attachment has inspired her to take what
she has learned and apply it to local and international communities in order to create
powerful transformations.
Erin Jessica Ronald is a fourth year Environmental Studies and Sociology double
major. She is passionate about helping communities reduce social inequalities
through sustainable development. After college, Erin aims to continue her vocational
discernment, pursuing research with a focus on urban climate change mitigation
before applying to graduate school. She is most interested in human ecology,
climate change management, and international development.

133
Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

133

